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Let your light shine before others, so that they may see your good works and give glory
to your Father who is in heaven.

Matthew 5:16 (ESV)

Preach the gospel at all times. Use words if necessary.

Attributed to St. Francis of Assisi

If I profess with the loudest voice and clearest exposition every portion of the Word of
God except precisely that little point which the world and the devil are at that moment
attacking, I am not confessing Christ, however boldly I may be professing him.

Attributed to Martin Luther
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ABSTRACT
Clayton, Kirk M. “Vocational Apologetics: An Argument for Using the Lutheran
Understanding of Vocation as a Form of Enfleshed Apologetics for the Church to Engage a
Cultural Setting Influenced by the Criticisms of the New Atheists.” Ph.D. diss., Concordia
Seminary, 2017. 252 pp.
This dissertation examines criticisms against Christianity from the New Atheists (Dawkins,
Dennett, Harris, Hitchens, and Stenger), considers problems with how the church has formulated
its apologetic response, and concludes that Martin Luther’s understanding of vocation applied to
the Christian life offers a significant contribution to shaping an apologetic response to the New
Atheism.
Apologetics is best understood as a defense, and must be a responsive discipline. For the
last several centuries apologetics has largely consisted of rational or evidential responses to
challenges arising from the Enlightenment. However, the strength of the New Atheists’
arguments lies not with their rational arguments, which are intellectually unserious, but with
their moral arguments that Christianity is evil. These moral accusations, made with strong ethical
and emotional appeals, have gained a hearing in a receptive culture. When the challenges
presented to the Christian faith are of a moral nature, as with the accusations of the New
Atheists, the apologetic response needs to demonstrate not only the truth of Christianity, but also
the goodness of Christianity. While the apologetic response to the New Atheists has been
prolific, it has been focused primarily on traditional apologetic methods such as Presuppositional
Apologetics or Evidential Apologetics, providing intellectually correct answers to what really are
moral challenges. Thus the apologetic response to the New Atheists so far has largely missed the
main force of the attacks.
This dissertation uses Aristotle’s rational, ethical, and emotional appeals to apply a
rhetorical analysis to the New Atheists’ writings in order to understand better the challenge they
pose to Christianity. The dissertation then explores the developing field of Enfleshed
Apologetics (also called Incarnational Apologetics and Lifestyle Apologetics) and argues that
this form of apologetics should be used to respond to the lifestyle-oriented challenges of the New
Atheists. Luther’s teaching on vocation provides the theological basis for developing an
enfleshed approach in which a morally exemplary Christian life becomes the apologetic answer
to the moral accusations of the New Atheists. This approach can be used alongside traditional
apologetic methods as part of an overall Cumulative Case apologetic response to the New
Atheists.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: APOLOGETICS IN THE MIDST OF CHANGING CONTEXTS
Throughout its history, the church has been the subject of attacks on its doctrine and
practice. The church has traditionally responded to attacks by the use of apologetics, and as the
attacks against the church have changed, so also the form of the church’s apologetic response has
changed. However, many in the church have demonstrated a general resistance to any apologetic
efforts and have not participated strongly in apologetics.1 Some have gone so far as to attempt to
put an end to apologetic efforts altogether and establish a “post-apologetic” outlook.2 Based on
some of the common understandings of the apologetic task, the hesitance to engage in
apologetics is completely understandable. However, the understanding of apologetic approaches
is changing. In particular, the field is broadening from primarily traditional apologetic methods
like Presuppositional Apologetics, Classical Apologetics, and Evidential Apologetics to include
an Enfleshed Apologetic methodology.3 In addition, the cultural context in which apologetics is
being practiced is changing, including the popularization of attacks against Christianity through
1

For an examination of the underlying causes of this phenomenon in the Lutheran Church, my own religious
affiliation, see Alvin Schmidt, “Christianity Needs More Lutheran Apologetes,” in Tough-Minded Christianity:
Honoring the Legacy of John Warwick Montgomery, ed. John Warwick Montgomery, William A. Dembski, Thomas
Schirrmacher, and James Innell Packer (Nashville: B&H Academic, 2008), 495–512.
2

See “Ambivalence about Apologetics,” in Avery Cardinal Dulles, A History of Apologetics (San Francisco:
Ignatius, 2005), 345–48.
3

The distinction between these categories will be spelled out in greater depth later, but as a brief overview,
traditional apologetic approaches are geared primarily toward the mind either through philosophy or evidences,
including both Presuppositional and Evidential Apologetic approaches, while an Enfleshed Apologetic approach
focuses on the defense of the Christian faith as embodied in the lives of Christian believers. This field focuses on
establishing the plausibility of the Christian message through a consistent lifestyle before demonstrating the
credibility of Christianity through truth claims. For further elaboration, see Timothy Phillips and Dennis Okholm,
Christian Apologetics in the Postmodern World (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995), 15–16. See also David
Wilkinson, “The Art of Apologetics in the Twenty-First Century,” ANVIL 19, no. 1 (2002): 5 and 11, and Alister
McGrath, Mere Apologetics: How to Help Seekers and Skeptics Find Faith (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012), 154,
where, as an extension of this thought, McGrath specifically comments that “Living out the truth can be thought of
as an ‘incarnational apologetic,’ itself a powerful witness to that truth.”
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the works of the New Atheists. In the midst of these changes, some fears can be allayed and new
apologetic insights can offer valuable contributions to the church at large. In particular, Martin
Luther’s teaching on vocation can shape the church’s Enfleshed Apologetics as it engages a
cultural setting influenced by the popular criticisms of the New Atheists.

The Thesis
This dissertation will examine the criticisms leveled against Christianity by the New
Atheism, explore how the church has formulated its apologetic response to these criticisms, and
propose that Luther’s understanding of vocation as practiced in the Christian life can be seen as a
significant component of the apologetic task. This dissertation will propose that an effective way
to respond to the popular cultural attacks of the New Atheism is for the church to utilize Luther’s
understanding of vocation as a way to guide Christians into tangible approaches to apologetic
witness toward their neighbors who may be influenced by the writings of the New Atheism. In
this way, I will contribute to the recent development of an Enfleshed Apologetics which engages
the charges of the New Atheists directly rather than secondarily.

Apologetic Challenges and their Causes
The hesitance to participate in apologetic endeavors has not been limited to any one
particular denomination or persuasion, and at times those who refrained from apologetics did so
with good reason. While apologetics is a helpful tool which the church has used since the first
centuries of its existence, it can certainly be abused. Peter Kreeft and Ronald Tacelli provide an
example of one common apologetic problem in their “Personal Preface” to their work, Handbook
of Christian Apologetics, where they write,
Our compelling reasons for writing this book are three:

2

1. We are certain that the Christian faith is true.
2. We are only a little less certain that the very best thing we can possibly do for
others is to persuade them of this truth, in which there is joy and peace and love
incomparable in this world, and infinite and incomprehensible in the next.
3. We are a little less certain, but still confident, that honest reasoning can lead any
open-minded person to this same conclusion.4
As Christians look at this three-part statement, they certainly find nothing wrong with the
first part. The second part, while perhaps objectionable to non-Christians who do not prefer the
active proselytization demonstrated frequently by Christians, when properly understood is also
acceptable. The problem comes in the third part of Kreeft and Tacelli’s statement as they claim
that honest reasoning can lead any open-minded person to the certainty that Christianity is true.
Such a view would indicate that any human being, given the correct facts, could reason himself
or herself to the Christian faith.
In approaches to apologetics that overemphasize reason, there is a parallel danger of overly
intellectualizing the Christian faith and transforming a relationship with a living God into a
mental exercise. There is nothing wrong (and much right!) with strongly intellectual defenses of
Christianity, but problems certainly arise when the Christian faith becomes nothing more than an
intellectual exercise. This can and has been a problem attributed to apologetics.5 The Christian
faith certainly can be defended with strong intellectual arguments, but the Christian faith can also
be presented in many other ways as well, and it should be, since “reason alone cannot give
answers to every question and reason alone does not represent Christian faith.”6 An exclusively

4

Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics: Hundreds of Answers to Critical
Questions (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 7.
5

David Wilkinson points out, “There is a classical view of apologetics as simply a dry, intellectual type
argument, the legal defense. Indeed this defensive role has been an important part of its role in Christian history. …
Such an approach is not just limited, it is dangerous. It can lead to intellectualism, exalting reason and intellect to the
centre of Christian faith and mission.” Wilkinson, “Art of Apologetics,” 7–8.
6

Wilkinson, “Art of Apologetics,” 7–8. As a humorous commentary highlighting some of the additional
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intellectual approach to the apologetic task, as has at times been practiced by some apologists,
misses the importance of the Christian life as questions of the mind and intellect become allconsuming.7 This exclusively intellectual trend in modern apologetics has led Craig Parton, a
strong Evidential Apologist, to note that “Apologetics, a branch of theology interested in the
defense of Christian truth claims, is an unwanted guest in many Christian churches. It is often
ignored, despised, or totally unknown.”8 Parton elaborates, “apologists are often viewed as
unspiritual ‘intellectual types’ who sacrifice a heart relationship with the Lord for the academic
pursuit of knowledge. It is often perceived that the apologist is either answering questions no one
is asking or is attempting to ‘prove’ that which must be accepted by faith.”9
Such views of apologetics that overemphasize the role of reason and intellectualize the
Christian faith call into question the work of the Holy Spirit in the conversion process, and
threatens to make the act of conversion a working of the human mind and will. At the very least,
such a view of apologetics places too much emphasis on the value of reason and runs the risk of
giving the impression that Christianity is an affair of the mind instead of a relationship of faith.
For Christian denominations that stress the inability of the fallen human being to move toward

problems of an exclusively intellectual approach to apologetics in particular and the Christian life in general, John
Stackhouse provides the following tongue-in-cheek definition of apologetics: “‘Apologetics’ is ‘telling someone
why you’re sorry you are a Christian.’” John Stackhouse, Humble Apologetics: Defending the Faith Today (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2002), 114. He follows that with an even more tongue-in-cheek definition of apologetics
from the opposing viewpoint as he writes, “There is more than a little irony in another whimsical definition:
‘Apologetics’ is ‘making someone sorry he asked why you are a Christian!’” Stackhouse, Humble Apologetics, 114;
emphasis original.
7

For an example of the recognition of such a problem see Robert Webber, who in his book The Younger
Evangelicals, points to his own experience with a cold, rationalistic approach to apologetics, and the lack of
connection the intellectual undertaking of apologetics had on his faith and life. He writes that the rational approach
to apologetics, “made faith an object to be proven. My head became filled with arguments, proof texts, distinctions,
and a kind of intellectual arrogance. … My commitment to faith as intellectually verifiable did not strengthen my
resolve to live in the pattern of Jesus’ death and resurrection.” Robert Webber, The Younger Evangelicals: Facing
the Challenges of the New World (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 95.
8

Craig Parton, The Defense Never Rests: A Lawyer's Quest for the Gospel (St. Louis: Concordia, 2003), 52.

9

Parton, Defense Never Rests, 52.
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God and participate in the conversion process,10 a view such as that proposed by Kreeft and
Tacelli is deeply problematic. Whatever the specific conversion process taught by a particular
branch of Christianity may be, often an understanding that conversion is primarily an act of
human will and reason runs counter to proper teaching of the conversion process. When
apologetics is seen as using reason and the will as the primary means of conversion rather than
relying more significantly on the guidance or work of the Holy Spirit, apologetics then runs afoul
of doctrine especially in the area of conversion.11 Views such as described above in Kreeft and
Tacelli have created a backlash against apologetics. This backlash and resulting negative view of
apologetics is noted by many, and can be seen across apologetic styles and categories.
Avery Cardinal Dulles in his widely read and respected work, A History of Apologetics,
points to this unease with traditional apologetic approaches as he writes,
In the minds of many Christians today the term ‘apologetics’ carries unpleasant
connotations. The apologist is regarded as an aggressive, opportunistic person who
tries, by fair means or foul, to argue people into joining the Church. Numerous
charges are laid at the door of apologetics: its neglect of the grace of prayer, and of
10

C. Stephen Evans offers a consideration of the possible conflict noted in Lutheran theology—my own
religious tradition—between the work of the Holy Spirit and the work of human reason as he notes, “it is not
uncommon to hear Christians claim that if they appeal to evidence they are somehow relying on ‘human reason’ and
not relying on God. Such a claim is sometimes found in Lutheran theology.” C. Stephen Evans, The Historical
Christ and the Jesus of Faith: The Incarnational Narrative as History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996),
285. Evans does admit that “Human reasoning to some looks dangerously like human ‘work,’ and thus something
that has no part in coming to know God by faith.” Evans, Historical Christ, 285. However, Evans defends the
rational approach to apologetics by using an analogy of healing through medicine versus healing by God, and “it is
surely possible for one to go to a human physician in faith that God will heal through the agency of the human
physician,” and thus, “In a similar manner, it seems to me to be a mistake to argue that the Holy Spirit could not
operate by means of evidence. The Holy Spirit could be active in calling an individual’s attention to evidence, and in
helping an individual properly to understand and interpret evidence, as well as in producing the conviction of sin
that motivates the individual to receive the forgiveness that God offers. … I therefore reject the assumption that one
must choose between the Holy Spirit and rational evidence.” Evans, Historical Christ, 285–86.
11

Similar to the explanation of a doctor and patient offered by C. Stephen Evans in the preceding footnote,
Kreeft and Tacelli also offer some corrective to their view in their Pocket Handbook of Christian Apologetics as
they write, “Arguments may not bring you to faith, but they can certainly keep you away from faith. Therefore we
must join the battle of arguments. Arguments can bring you closer to faith in the same sense that a car can bring you
to the sea. The car can’t swim; you have to jump in to do that. But you can’t jump in from a hundred miles inland.
You need a car first to bring you to the point where you can make a leap of faith into the sea. Faith is a leap, but a
leap in the light, not in the dark.” Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Pocket Handbook of Christian Apologetics
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 10.
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the life-giving power of the word of God; its tendency to oversimplify and syllogize
the approach to faith; its dilution of the scandal of the Christian message; and its
implied presupposition that God’s word should be judged by the norm of fallible, not
to say fallen, human reason.12
Dulles concludes his thoughts on this topic by acknowledging that “some Christian apologists
have no doubt been guilty on each of these counts.”13
Another objection to apologetics arises from a similar concern not to confuse the work of
God with the work of fallen human beings. The “Introduction” to Cornelius Van Til’s Christian
Apologetics notes: “Defending the faith. … The idea is repugnant to some. It smacks to them of
defensiveness, at best, or coercion, at worst. Should not God be left to defend himself with no
help from us? Is not the idea as absurd as defending a tiger in a cage? Why not just let him
out?”14 A further criticism arises as noted by John Stackhouse, “In societies that pride themselves
on being ‘multicultural’ nowadays, apologetics (in the traditional sense of religious argument) is
often seen to be in bad taste, and even as offensive.”15
Thus, apologetics comes in for criticism or recognition of criticism from many angles and
apologetic approaches. What led to this condition? What gave rise to the forms of apologetic
engagements that engender such challenges? Part of the problem is that the shape of apologetics
as we generally recognize it was largely formed in the Enlightenment and by the forces of
Rationalism. These movements brought about profound changes to the apologetic task, and the
resultant apologetic approach is largely what we still recognize today. Dulles notes this dramatic
change:

12

Dulles, History of Apologetics, xix; emphasis added.

13

Dulles, History of Apologetics, xix.

14

William Edgar, Introduction to Christian Apologetics by Cornelius Van Til (Phillipsburg, NJ: P&R, 2003),

15

Stackhouse, Humble Apologetics, 121.

1.

6

Apologetics in the early modern period takes on a very different shape than it had in
earlier centuries. For the Fathers it was a debate about the relative merits of
paganism, Judaism, and Christianity. For the medieval theologians, apologetics was a
contest among the three great monotheistic faiths—Judaism, Christianity, and
Islam—all of which appealed to historical revelation. But after the Renaissance,
apologetics had to address thinkers who rejected revelation entirely and who in some
cases denied the existence or knowability of God. For the first time in history,
orthodox Christians felt constrained to prove the existence of God and the possibility
and fact of revelation. In so doing they sometimes conceded too much to their deist
adversaries, making it appear that unaided reason could erect a satisfactory natural
religion that in many respects reduplicated Christianity itself.16
Dulles points out here that the early modern period, marked as it was with its emphasis on
reason and a concurrent questioning of divine revelation, brought about the need for a new and
different apologetic emphasis, with different goals and different methods. The resultant
apologetic format is largely still the apologetic outlook current today in both message and
methodology. This apologetic approach focuses largely on evidences, the scientific method, and
reason as key tools. Dulles notes:
In the eighteenth century the forces of the Enlightenment staged a more blatant attack
on the claims of Christianity, appealing to the positive sciences, especially history, to
prove their case. Christian apologetics, seeking to answer in kind, concentrated
increasingly on scientific historical evidences and relied rather less upon lofty
metaphysical considerations.17
Among the prominent apologists rising to the challenge of the Enlightenment were Joseph
Butler and William Paley. They can be seen as representative examples of the trend Dulles
describes. Butler worked to “discredit deistic liberalism”18 and his method was “empirically
based in factual evidences.”19 Butler was a practitioner of empiricism and held that evidence

16

Dulles, History of Apologetics, 205–6.

17

Dulles, History of Apologetics, 146.

18

L. Russ Bush, Classical Readings in Christian Apologetics A.D. 100–1800 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan,
1983), xvii.
19

Bush, Classical Readings, xvii.
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always leads to the probability, although not the certainty, of truth.20 In Butler, we can see the
effects of the Enlightenment and Rationalism as it shaped the apologetic approach. In addition, in
Butler, we can see how the forces of the Enlightenment and Rationalism in fact continue to lurk
behind much of the apologetic methodology used to this day, as L. Russ Bush suggests, “Butler’s
Analogy is perhaps the classic statement of the ‘evidential’ approach to apologetics.”21 The form
of apologetics shaped by Butler continues to serve as one of the prominent methodologies
practiced today.
The same case can be made for William Paley. “Following in the evidential tradition of the
Enlightenment, Paley argues for an evidential natural theology, the belief that God can be
understood by anyone who will properly reference the natural world.”22 As with Butler before
him, Paley thought and worked within “the general evidential milieu”23 of the era, which as noted
was shaped and driven by the Enlightenment. Paley’s most prominent argument was that of the
watch in need of a watchmaker, which is “perhaps the single most famous illustration of the
teleological argument for the existence of God. For many people it continues to be a persuasive
argument.”24 As with Butler, we see that through Paley the forces of the Enlightenment still
shape a large portion of what is considered to be the standard apologetic approach today. Thus,
the current shape of apologetics is largely still being drawn by the same forces of the
Enlightenment and the elevation of reason as ensconced there. Perhaps understandably, this
method of approaching apologetics was shaped by the Enlightenment and by Rationalism as

20

Bush, Classical Readings, 328–29.

21

Bush, Classical Readings, 329.

22

William Edgar and K. Scott Oliphint, eds., Christian Apologetics Past and Present: A Primary Source
Reader (Wheaton: Crossway, 2009), 2:240.
23

Edgar and Oliphint, Christian Apologetics, 2:241.

24

Bush, Classical Readings, 351.
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much as the message was.
For the last several centuries, then, apologetics has generally been understood as a rational
undertaking, by which I mean that apologetics is understood to use reason and logic to defend
tenets of Christianity. The message has been the rational explanation of Christian truth, and the
method has been to present the message in verbal or written form focusing on the logical
cohesion of rational arguments, proofs for God’s existence, and external evidence, among other
things. This rational approach to the apologetic task is observable even in the common
definitions given to apologetics. In Five Views on Apologetics, Steven B. Cowan describes the
apologetic undertaking thus: “As it concerns the Christian faith, then, apologetics has to do with
defending, or making a case for, the truth of the Christian faith. It is an intellectual discipline.”25
Robert Velarde, in A Visual Defense, defines apologetics as “The rational defense of Christianity
as ‘true and reasonable.’”26 William Lane Craig, in his Apologetics: An Introduction, writes that
“Apologetics is primarily a theoretical discipline, though it has practical application. That is to
say, apologetics is that branch of theology that seeks to provide a rational justification for the
truth claims of the Christian faith.”27 While this is obviously a brief overview of apologetic
definitions and far from comprehensive, many more could be added of a similar nature.
The unifying factor in these understandings of the apologetic task is a focus on using
reason to defend the objective truth claims of Christianity. One of the effects of this
understanding of apologetics is that the apologetic endeavor has usually been worked out using
textual approaches. Challenges to the Christian faith have arisen primarily in writing or in

25

Steven B. Cowan, William Lane Craig, John M. Frame, Kelly James Clark, and Paul D. Feinberg, Five
Views on Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 8.
26

Robert Velarde, A Visual Defense: The Case For and Against Christianity (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2013),

27

William Lane Craig, Apologetics: An Introduction (Chicago: Moody, 1984), xi.

195.
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debate, and the apologetic answers have been given in similar manner, in textual fashion.
Apologetics has primarily been a written or spoken discipline, drawing on logic and reason in
one shape or another in an appeal to the mind. However, this approach does not fit well with the
needs of the church today as culture continues to shift in several significant ways.28
As will be seen in the next chapter, attacks against Christianity are shifting in their
approach, moving from a reliance upon the use of reason to a reliance upon emotion and the
character of the speaker. Given that shift, I question whether understanding apologetics as a
primarily rational endeavor is adequate. In response to the changing challenges of contemporary
culture as exemplified by the New Atheists, the apologetic field needs to change in both message
and methodology. However, before we can see how the apologetic approach needs to adapt to
new challenges, we first need to see what the most common current apologetic approaches are,
specifically regarding their use of reason and provable evidences to support the case for
Christianity. Before focusing upon a new approach to apologetics, which I am suggesting, it is
good to see how this approach fits into the field of apologetic approaches already developed.

Overview of Apologetic Approaches and Uses
Classifying the many approaches in the field of apologetics is difficult because throughout
the various eras of the church, Christian apologists have used a variety of methods to
communicate its message of Christian truth. Adding to the challenge of describing apologetic
approaches is the fact that authors who undertake such a task rarely agree on how to describe or
divide the field. Cowan notes that apologists often differ in opinions about how best to go about
the apologetic task and what kinds of arguments can and should be used to engage an unbeliever
28

Robert Webber was one of the first to recognize the apologetic implications of the shifting ground around
Christianity, and I will seek to build on his call for a changing approach to the apologetic task. He notes, “There is a
general agreement among younger evangelicals that the emphasis in apologetics has shifted from reason to
embodiment.” Webber, Younger Evangelicals, 101.
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in apologetic discourse. This leads to a distinct challenge for any effort to label and characterize
apologetic approaches: “How do we delineate the different approaches to apologetics? Of all the
other books on apologetic methodology, no two classify the various methods in exactly the same
way.”29
I would note that in the current shape of apologetics as an outgrowth from the
Enlightenment and its questioning of revelatory authority, the basic challenge seems to be
defending the existence of God, and then clarifying who this God is. The central question
addressed by apologetics tends to be the same, no matter how one divides the schools of
apologetics. No matter the system, the existence of God features as a central question. Beyond
this similarity, one could also argue that the approach is similar among all these various methods.
All of the apologetic categories just mentioned are primarily intellectual in practice. By this I
mean that all of these approaches are geared toward the mind, rather than life. They are to be
researched and pondered, rather than lived out in practice. As such, all of these approaches are
traditionally strongly tied to the rational enterprise. However, these rationally-driven methods,
while needed and important, are insufficient in light of changes in the cultural landscape as
exemplified by the New Atheists.
While I will attempt to summarize various types of apologetic methodology below, my
descriptions will be brief. My purpose is not to give an in-depth presentation on the strengths and
weaknesses of Presuppositionalism, Evidentialism, and the other apologetic methods, as
information of this kind is readily available in several excellent sources.30 Rather, the goal is to
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For an excellent and in-depth examination of a range of apologetic approaches, using the writings and
thoughts of key apologists of varying classifications as the method of consideration, see Brian Morley, Mapping
Apologetics: Comparing Contemporary Approaches (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2015). Steven Cowan
serves as the editor of a very helpful work called Five Views on Apologetics, in which he presents an essay written
by a representative practitioner of each field of apologetics explored along with rebuttal essays from the other four

11

give only a cursory overview of various apologetic methods with special consideration given to
how these apologetic methodologies flow out of the use of reason as the near-exclusive form of
defense since the Enlightenment era. Instead of relying so extensively on rational argumentation,
instead current apologetic approaches need to be expanded to meet new challenges.
As an identifiable and accessible way of seeing what these new challenges are, we will be
using the writings of the New Atheists and their particular arguments against Christianity. The
New Atheists do not present their arguments against Christianity in primarily rational terms
using calm logic to argue that it is wrong, instead they attack Christianity on moral grounds
alleging that it is evil. The arguments of the New Atheists are representative and reflective of the
current cultural setting and call for a new and different apologetic method of response than has
been offered to date. The heavy reliance on reason and logic in current apologetic approaches is
ill-suited to meet the challenges of the New Atheists, so a new apologetic response is needed.
This new apologetic response will need to be tailor-made for the challenges presented by the
New Atheists, and it needs to be applicable to the cultural climate that they represent.
To see how a proposed new apologetic response relates with the current field of
apologetics, the brief summaries of various current apologetic methodologies offered below will
focus on issues related to reliance on reason and access to the use of outside evidence to support
the claims being defended. We will start by considering the parts of the spectrum of apologetics
that use the least evidence and rely almost exclusively on reason and special revelation. From
there we will proceed to other apologetic methodologies that make increasing use of evidence,31

contributors for each category. For a thumbnail sketch of each apologetic type, see Cowan, Craig, Frame, Clark, and
Feinberg, Five Views on Apologetics, 15–20. Dulles also gives helpful overviews of several apologetic approaches.
See Dulles, History of Apologetics, 353–65.
31

My use of the term “evidence” to a limited extent fits with the definition given in Five Views of
Apologetics, namely, “those objective facts in the world that warrant a conclusion.” Cowan, Craig, Frame, Clark,
and Feinberg, Five Views on Apologetics, 216n12. Of course, the degree to which any facts are truly “objective” is
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and then open to even other forms of experience such as can be presented in the life of a
Christian. The important consideration of the summaries offered here is less the actual school of
apologetics and more the system of classification showing a shift from a strictly rational
approach through approaches that allow for the use of tangible evidence to an approach that is
open to additional forms of support outside of reason and tangible evidence. This will then set up
the ability to evaluate how well-suited these apologetic approaches are to meet the needs of
responding to new and changing challenges to the Christian faith.
Presuppositional Apologetics
Presuppositional Apologetics represents the apologetic methodology with the least recourse
to evidence, and with the strongest reliance placed on establishing the internal logical coherence
or incoherence of a line of argument. In a specific sense, Presuppositionalism as it is currently
practiced traces its roots back to the thought of Cornelius Van Til in the mid-twentieth century.
William Edgar, writing the “Introduction” to a new edition of Van Til’s Christian Apologetics,
notes that Van Til did much to articulate “the approach to apologetics that has become known as
presuppositionalism. Though Presuppositionalism’s more distant roots are in the Anselmian
soubriquet, ‘faith seeking understanding,’ the more contemporary context is the Dutch and
Presbyterian theologies of his [Van Til’s] immediate horizon.”32
Presuppositional Apologetics is closely linked with a Calvinist/Reformed understanding of
up for debate in some quarters, but I use “evidence” to indicate some degree of externalism as opposed to internal
mental exercise or emotion. Velarde supplies what some of these external pointers may be: “Typical evidences
include arguments from the reliability of the New Testament, archaeological support for the Bible, and arguments in
support of the reality of the bodily resurrection of Christ.” Velarde, Visual Defense, 196. Each of these forms of
evidence has a link to an external, often tangible, fact or artifact. This definition is particularly tied to the practice of
Evidential Apologetics, and similar formats that rely to an extent on external verification. However, in a broader
sense “evidence,” while still corresponding to an external event, can also be less tangible. For example, as I discuss
the Christian life as a form of apologetics, the manner of life of a Christian can itself be a form of evidence. The
points of common ground, perhaps, are that the evidence is external to the person considering the evidence, and that
the external evidence corresponds favorably to a teaching of Christianity.
32

Edgar, “Introduction,” in Van Til, Christian Apologetics, 3; emphasis original.
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the nature of God and the total depravity of humanity.33 One of the foundational starting points of
this approach is the noetic effect of sin,34 specifically its effect on human reason. Due to the
overwhelming effect of sin on humanity, all knowledge is tainted and can only be ultimately
understood in light of God’s truth. All truth is God’s truth, and only God’s truth is truth in this
line of thought. Without the (even unacknowledged) presupposition of God’s existence, nothing
can be known since human reason is seen as fallen and totally depraved. Brian Morley, in
Mapping Apologetics, states that in a Presuppositional Apologetic approach, “unless we assume
the existence of the God of (Reformed) Christianity, there is no way to account for human
knowledge and experience.”35 Another implication of this view is that between the Christian and
the non-Christian, there is no “common ground,” no shared understanding or experience of the
world by which people could have any possibility of reasoning together.36 Morley also notes that
in this viewpoint, “Christianity is not merely the best explanation, as is held by many traditional
apologists. It is the only explanation that can possibly work.”37 As an extension of this thought,
not only is Christianity the only explanation that can possibly work, it works absolutely, leading
to complete 100 percent proof of Christianity, according to Presuppositionalism.38 Van Til opines
that anything less than 100 percent certainty is an affront to the sovereignty of God. “It is an
insult to the living God to say that his revelation of himself so lacks in clarity that man, himself
through and through revelational of God, does justice by it when he says that God probably

33

Morley, Mapping Apologetics, 64–65.
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faith itself requires 100-percent proof. Less than 100-percent proof could not justify 100-percent faith.” Morley,
Mapping Apologetics, 295. See also 186.
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exists.”39 Non-Christians, according to a strict Presuppositional view, can only understand the
world “because they covertly function on the assumption that the God of (Reformed) Christianity
exists. … They know things, but only because they do not actually live by the worldview they
profess. Instead they borrow from (Reformed) Christianity.”40
In a Presuppositional view, the basic role of apologetics is to show a non-Christian the
supposed inherent dissonance within his or her own belief system. The Presuppositional
apologist seeks to show:
that the non-Christian “makes nonsense” of his experience, and cannot even account
for knowledge of any kind. The Christian invites the non-Christian to examine the
Christian’s own view from within, viewing the world through Christian glasses, and
to discover how it can account for knowledge, make sense of experience and more.41
The Presuppositional Apologist “Sees his argument as a reductio ad absurdum, that is, an
argument that reduces the opposing argument to an absurdity.”42
In a strict interpretation, evidence supporting Christianity can play no role in discussion
with an unbeliever, since no common ground of understanding exists between the two. The only
valid use for reason is to confirm the faith that a believer already presupposes.43 Van Til argues
that when an apologist and a non-Christian use the same method of argument, namely facts
uninterpreted by Christian, Biblical presuppositions, there can be no conclusive resolution.44 The
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Van Til, A Christian Theory of Knowledge (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1977), 291; emphasis
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“All this is bound to lead to self-frustration on the part of the traditional apologist. Let us watch him for a
moment. Think of him first as an inductivist. As such he will engage in ‘historical apologetics’ and in the study of
archaeology. In general he will deal with the ‘facts’ of the universe in order to prove the existence of God. He
cannot on his position challenge the assumption of the man he is trying to win. That man is ready for him. Think of
the traditional apologist as throwing facts to his non-Christian friend as he might throw a ball. His friend receives
each fact as he might a ball and throws it behind him in a bottomless pit. The apologist is exceedingly industrious.
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resolution to the dilemma can only come through considerations of the coherence of an
argument, not the evidence used to support it.
Dulles gives a helpful and brief summary of Presuppositional Apologetics as follows:
This position normally rests on the premise that human reason has been so damaged
by sin that evidential apologetics is fruitless. Presuppositionalists therefore begin by
assuming that the teaching of the Bible is true. Setting out from this axiom, the
apologist argues that biblical revelation yields a coherent explanation of our
experience in the world, and that other worldview traditions are, in comparison,
incoherent. Some add that it is impossible to live or think without logically
presupposing the reality of God, the source and measure of all truth.45
From this summary we can see the near-exclusive emphasis placed on the role of reason within
Presuppositional Apologetics. This methodology starts with the premise that human reason is
fallen, and thus only divine revelation imparted externally can impart wisdom or truth. The
establishment of a coherent rational worldview based on God’s revealed truth is the goal of the
methodology. Evidence has little to no role in this apologetic approach, but likewise extrarational appeals have no place either. This apologetic methodology is strongly beholden to the
rationalistic Enlightenment outlook, and allows scant opportunity for the expression of human
emotion or for other means for evaluating the reliability of a message. Reason alone is viewed as
valid. Since current challenges to Christianity rely less on reason than has been the case in the

He shows the unbelieving friend all the evidence of theism. He shows all the evidence for Christianity, for instance,
for the virgin birth and the resurrection of Christ. Let us think of his friend as absolutely tireless and increasingly
polite. He will then receive all these facts and toss them behind him to the bottomless pit of pure possibility. ‘Is it
not wonderful,’ he will say to see ‘what strange things do happen in Reality. You seem to be a collector of oddities.
As for myself I am more interested I the things that happen regularly. But I shall certainly try hard to explain the
facts you mention in accord with the laws that I have found working so afar. Perhaps we should say that the laws are
merely statistical averages and that nothing can therefore be said about any particular event ahead of its appearance.
Perhaps there are very unusual things in reality. But what does this prove for the truth of your view?’” Van Til,
Christian Theory of Knowledge, 297–98.
45

Dulles, History of Apologetics, 357. Dulles also writes that Presuppositional Apologetics “maintains that
the issue between believers and nonbelievers in Christian theism cannot be settled except by reference to a
conceptual framework in terms of which facts and laws become intelligible. The Christian must begin by
presupposing that the revelation contained in Scripture is true and then find that reality and life make sense in terms
of this presupposition. Dulles, History of Apologetics, 322. For another helpful summary of Presuppositional
Apologetics, see Cowan, Craig, Frame, Clark, and Feinberg, Five Views on Apologetics, 18–19.
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past, this outlook is simply inadequate to meet the changing challenges posed to Christianity and
a broader understanding of apologetics is needed to meet current criticisms faced by the church.
Classical Apologetics
In contrast to the method of Presuppositionalism, which relies almost exclusively on reason
and allows virtually no recourse to evidence, Classical Apologetics allows evidence in support of
its positon, but only after the question of God’s existence has been addressed. Dulles states that
the Classical Apologetic method “became standard after the outbreak of deism in the seventeenth
century, proceeds by stages, first demonstrating the existence of God as an omniscient and
omnipotent Creator and then the validity of Christianity as the highest version of theism.”46
Classical Apologetics, utilizing reason and evidence as primary techniques, follows what can be
described as a “two-step method” of apologetics to demonstrate the existence and nature of God,
insisting that one must first demonstrate a theistic worldview before proceeding on to consider
the particular truth of the Christian faith. Demonstrating the existence of God is the first, and
necessarily prior, step in the apologetic program.47 For the second step, which is the
demonstration of the truth specifically of Christianity as opposed to other theistic systems, the
apologist has access to evidence and can use it profitably.
Norman Geisler gives a clear example of this approach in the Preface to his work,
Christian Apologetics. Geisler writes:
The heart of this apologetic approach is that the Christian is interested in defending
the truths that Christ is the Son of God and the Bible is the Word of God. However,
prior to establishing these two pillars on which the uniqueness of Christianity is built,
one must establish the existence of God. For it makes no sense to speak about an act
of God (i.e., a miracle) confirming that Christ is the Son of God and that the Bible is
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the Word of God unless of course there is a God who can have a Son and who can
speak a Word. Theism, then, is a logical prerequisite to Christianity.48
The “two-step” approach to apologetics can be clearly seen in Geisler’s description. He argues
that establishing the existence of God is a necessary prerequisite for examining the works of
God.
According to Classical Apologetics, any consideration of miracles is impossible or
senseless to examine outside a theistic view which already holds a God who could work such
miracles. Thus, it is vital to demonstrate theism before turning to any forms of evidence, which
trace and point back to an acting God. In a Classical Apologetic approach, however, contrary to
Presuppositionalism, after the existence of God is demonstrated, then evidences can certainly be
used to point to the accuracy of Christianity. This is the essence of the “two-step” apologetic
approach that marks Classical Apologetics.
Classical Apologetics is keen to answer the question of the existence of God, and does so
with reason without recourse to evidence. Once the question of God’s existence has been settled
by rational means, then a logical presentation of supporting evidence can follow. This
methodology is helpful when the basic question being addressed is that of the existence of God.
This is a recognition that needs to be considered when we explore what the questions being
raised by the current culture actually are. Upon this consideration will depend much of the
question as to how helpful of a methodology Classical Apologetics will be in responding to the
current challenges of our culture.
Evidential Apologetics
We now turn to a brief consideration of Evidential Apologetics, a method that, as its name
suggests, gives full value to evidence in all areas of apologetic consideration. In common with
48

Norman L. Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976), “Preface;” emphasis original.
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Classical Apologetics, Evidentialism as we know it today is largely the result of responses to the
Enlightenment and Rationalism, and as such relies heavily on reason and logic. In contrast to the
“two-step” approach that marks the Classical Apologetic approach which demands the
demonstration of a theistic worldview before evidence can be considered, the Evidential
Apologetic approach maintains that evidence can independently point back to the existence of
God and the truth of Christianity without any a priori assumptions or proofs.
In contrast to the “two-step method” of apologetics as seen above in Classical Apologetics,
a “one-step method” of apologetics as seen in Evidentialism claims that one can move directly to
the demonstration of the truth or probability of Christianity in particular on the basis of reports of
miracles, the historical record, evidentiary support, the accuracy and reliability of Scripture,
philosophical consistency, and other means. This can be a valid move even if a shared basis of
theism has not yet been established. However, one of the primary points to be demonstrated
often is the existence of God, established by the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus Christ
from the dead. The logic typically flows as follows. The evidence strongly points to Jesus’
resurrection from the dead. What do you call someone who has power over death? God. Jesus
rose, therefore Jesus is God. Thus, God exists.
John Warwick Montgomery, a prime practitioner of the Evidential Apologetic method, and
a legal scholar, practicing lawyer, and barrister, holds an apologetic approach that is compatible
with the legal system’s methods of using evidences to establish guilt or innocence beyond a
reasonable doubt. Such a view would hold that we can approach facts objectively, and to some
extent the facts will point us to the proper interpretation.49 Montgomery would argue that this
approach is not at all unique to Christianity or apologetics, and is in fact quite independent of
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theology. He writes:
Now if you are not inclined in the direction of Christianity—as I was not when I
entered university—the most irritating aspect of the line of argumentation that I have
taken is probably this: it depends in no sense on theology. It rests solely and squarely
upon historical method, the kind of method all of us, whether Christians, rationalists,
agnostics, or Tibetan monks have to use in analyzing historical data.50
The appeal directly to evidences such as those found in history, archeology, science,
reports of miracles, and the like without previously establishing a theistic framework marks the
“one-step” apologetic method of Evidentialism. Cowan writes that “Evidentialism as an
apologetic method may be characterized as the ‘one step’ approach. Miracles do not presuppose
God’s existence … but can serve as one sort of evidence for God.”51
Dulles describes Evidential Apologetics as an approach that:
most frequently places primary reliance on external evidences, especially the miracles
of Jesus and the Apostles as described in the New Testament. The Resurrection, taken
as the central miracle, occupies a dominant place in this form of apologetics. The
evidential method substantially coincides with the second phase of classical
apologetics, but the two schools disagree about the necessity of natural theology. The
classical method maintains that the existence of God and the possibility of miracles
must be established in advance in order for miracles to be understood as signs of
revelation. The evidential method holds on the contrary that the study of Christian
evidences does not presuppose natural theology. The remarkable miracles of Jesus,
including His Resurrection, are seen as proofs that the God He proclaimed is real.52
Despite the differences in starting points between “two-step method” apologists and “onestep method” apologists, these two seemingly disparate groups of apologetic thought still share
striking similarities. Both of these groups of apologists focus on the same central question,
namely the existence of God, and both of these groups of apologists approach the apologetic task
50
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through primarily intellectual means as they formulate their positions largely in response to the
intellectual challenges of the Enlightenment. For this reason, the same question asked of
Classical Apologetics regarding its applicability in responding to the changing challenges to
Christianity is also valid to ask regarding Evidential Apologetics. It may be a somewhat helpful
methodology when the challenges to Christianity are of a factual or historical nature or if
questions regarding the existence of God are predominant. However, such an approach certainly
has its limits and is not as helpful when the question changes.
Historical Goodness Apologetics
A newer development within Evidential Apologetics is a method of apologetics I am
calling Historical Goodness Apologetics.53 This approach is significant because it highlights a
change in the primary message of the apologetic task. Rather than examining questions about the
existence of God, this approach addresses questions and challenges posed to Christianity about
the goodness of God and the goodness of His followers. It does so by looking into history to
show that the church has been a force for good within society in the past.
While this approach features a different message, it still uses the same methodology of
Evidential Apologetics. While the common message of Evidential Apologetics revolves around
pointing to proofs for the accuracy of the Christian accounts of the resurrection of Christ and by
extension, the existence of God and the accuracy of the Scriptural record, Historical Goodness
Apologetics does not actually look at the text of Scripture and defend its accuracy or
interpretation. Rather, its message is to look at the implementation of Scriptural teaching in the
lives of Christians and the actions of the church throughout history in order to begin to offer a
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response to criticism that Christian calls to virtue and service go unheeded in the lives of those
who would claim the Bible to be their spiritual guiding force.
One of the earliest works in this method of apologetics is the superbly documented book by
Alvin Schmidt entitled How Christianity Changed the World.54 Schmidt relates that as he began
thinking about this book, he found that,
there was a pronounced paucity of information extant and available regarding the
influence and impact that Jesus Christ has had on the world for two thousand years.
Yet, in a rather nebulous manner many of us “know” that much of our culture,
especially in the Western world, bears prominent imprints of Christ’s influence.
Much of that influence is still with us even in the ever-growing secular and
religiously pluralistic milieu of today. But when one looks for particular examples in
books and articles regarding the influence that Christ exerted through his followers,
there is very little that has been specifically delineated.55
Schmidt, throughout his book, then traces the positive influence of Christianity in almost all
areas of life, including education, economics, science, politics, slavery, and the arts.
When considered by methodology, Historical Goodness Apologetics is identical with
Evidential Apologetics. The method considers and evaluates facts of history open to all, without
requiring Christian presuppositions. It does not require a two-step approach to consider the
goodness demonstrated in the history of the church; it allows direct access to the topic in a single
evidential step. It uses the same methodological procedures as would be practiced by an
Evidential Apologist studying more traditional apologetic topics. However, the message of this
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method has changed, in accord with changing cultural challenges. Thus this approach merits its
own brief mention here in the overview of apologetic methods currently in practice. This
approach is helpful in the way it demonstrates how apologetics can shift in its message when
faced with new opponents of the faith.
The expanded message of Historical Goodness Apologetics can provide a needed
flexibility when the scope of challenges to Christianity moves beyond the existence of God and
the factual and historical nature of his word. This is a good step for the corresponding apologetic
message. As the church faces new opposition, however, the message of apologetics is not the
only thing that changes. Sometimes the very method of apologetics can change as well.
Enfleshed Apologetics
Consider a very different method of apologetics, which departs significantly from the
approaches considered above. Previous categories of apologetics have developed largely in
reaction to the Enlightenment and Rationalism and use the approaches of philosophy, evidence,
or historical examination. It is also important to consider a rather different approach to the
apologetic method, one that is less beholden to the influences of the Enlightenment. This form of
apologetics has been developing in reaction to postmodernism, and its attendant diminution of
reason. This approach has variously been called Incarnational Apologetics, Embodied
Apologetics, or Relational-Incarnational Apologetics, as no standardization has yet occurred in
the terminology, but I will use the term Enfleshed Apologetics for this style of apologetic
response. The applications for this form of apologetics are broader, but I will apply it more
closely to the charges of the New Atheists.56 Enfleshed Apologetics points to a significant shift in
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the apologetic field away from intellectual argument and toward embodied practice. The
category of Enfleshed Apologetics moves from thinking or talking about apologetic topics to
embodying a living apologetic of love toward others. The emphasis is not on what the apologist
thinks or says, but on what the apologist does and how the apologist lives. Practitioners of this
category of apologetics are responding to the common cliché, “I don’t care how much you know
until I know how much you care.”57 The apologist thus seeks to show how much he or she cares
through a life of Christ-like love and service. I will refer to this style of apologetics as Enfleshed
Apologetics.58 As we consider various apologetic methodologies, all the previous approaches

of varied usages follows: the term Incarnational Apologetics has been used in Webber, Younger Evangelicals; in
Irving Hexham, Stephen Rost, and John Morehead, Encountering New Religious Movements: A Holistic Evangelical
Approach (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004); in David Wheeler, “Apologetics, Incarnational,” in Edward E. Hindson
and Ergun Caner, The Popular Encyclopedia of Apologetics (Eugene, OR: Harvest, 2008); in McGrath, Mere
Apologetics; and in James K. A. Smith, Speech and Theology: Language and Logic of Incarnation (London:
Routledge, 2002); although he is criticized as being vague and using the term in too many different ways in Neal
DeRoo and Brian Lightbody, eds., The Logic of Incarnation: James K. A. Smith’s Critique of Postmodern Religion
(Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2009). In my writing, however, I will try to use the term Enfleshed Apologetics and leave
the term Incarnation to Jesus alone, as is done by Norman L. Geisler and Patrick Zukeran. The Apologetics of Jesus:
A Caring Approach to Dealing with Doubters (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), as they consider Incarnational
Apologetics as the method of apologetics that Jesus himself put into practice in his earthly ministry. The term
Embodied Apologetics is employed in Kevin Graham Ford and Jim Denney, Jesus for a New Generation: Putting
the Gospel in the Language of Xers (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1995); in Ross Clifford and Philip Johnson,
The Cross Is Not Enough: Living as Witnesses to the Resurrection (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2012); and in Phillips and
Okholm, Christian Apologetics. The term preferred by Paul Louis Metzger is Relational-Incarnational Apologetics,
see Paul Louis Metzger, Connecting Christ: How to Discuss Jesus in a World of Diverse Paths (Nashville: Nelson,
2012). More often, writers describe an approach to apologetics that is lived rather than thought or argued, but do not
name it at all. Such approaches tend to focus on relationships or general lifestyle. All of these various titles and
approaches I am grouping together in the category of Enfleshed Apologetics.
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have been considered based on a greater or lesser use of evidence, or on an effort to find
coherence or incoherence in argumentation. This new approach, Enfleshed Apologetics, does not
seek to present more or less evidence. Instead, the evidence given is the life of the Christian
itself. Likewise, Enfleshed Apologetics does not focus primarily on the internal coherence of the
argument for Christianity. Instead, it focuses on the coherence of a Christian’s life with
Christianity’s professed teachings.
As I just noted, early developments in the shift from more traditional, rationally-oriented
apologetic methods towards Enfleshed Apologetics began in the mid-1990s in response to
postmodernism.59 After an incubation period of about five to ten years, other authors began to
pick up the idea, also largely in response to postmodernism. In the development of this approach,
advocates have stressed that Enfleshed Apologetics must be seen as an ecclesial practice, it must
be praxis-oriented, and it can’t neglect the sociological realities that face the postmodern
church.60 In their view, apologetics should involve life experience and moral behavior.61
Some of the earlier examples of Enfleshed Apologetics come from Robert Webber in his
2002 work, The Younger Evangelicals, and his subsequent book, Ancient Future Evangelism, of
2003. He writes, “I have already commented on how the church is the new apologetic in the
post-Christian era,”62 and he argues that, in our postmodern world, “people are not nearly as
interested in rational arguments. They want to see truth embodied and made real.”63 While this
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may seem like a new and different approach, it is actually a return to a very ancient approach to
apologetics. Webber traces the outlines of this form of apologetics, using the term Incarnational
Apologetics. Webber begins his consideration of this apologetic method by looking back to the
early church. He writes that the:
early church apologetic may be rightly called an “incarnational apology.” The church
is the continuation of the incarnation. It is the earthed reality of the presence of Jesus
in and to the world. Herein lies the ancient apologetic. The church by its very
existence is a witness to the presence of God in history (Eph. 3:10). There is only one
actual incarnation of God and that is in Jesus Christ, but the church, being his body,
sustains an incarnational dimension. The church is a witness to the presence of Jesus
in the world as it embodies and lives out the faith.64
Webber encourages a return to this earlier, incarnational outlook for apologetics in which
the church embodies God’s presence in the world. He describes the implications for a current
apologetic approach, rooted in the approach of the early church, this way: “truth is not proven, it
is embodied by individuals and by the community known as church. There is a general
agreement among younger evangelicals that the emphasis in apologetics has shifted from reason
to embodiment.”65 Webber further writes, “I have heard from numerous young people; they are
moved more by an authentic lived-out faith than they are by internally flawless, logically
coherent, and evidently consistent argument.”66
In looking briefly at Presuppositional Apologetics, Classical Apologetics, Evidential
Apologetics, Historical Goodness Apologetics, and now Enfleshed Apologetics, we have seen a
broad scope of apologetic methodologies in continuum from using a nearly exclusive reliance on
special revelation interpreted by reason without recourse to external evidence, to methodologies
that admit various forms of external, tangible evidence, to a new apologetic methodology that is
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able to consider the life of a Christian as a lived form of evidence for Christianity. This last
approach, Enfleshed Apologetics, gives great flexibility to respond to the changing challenges
faced by the church.
Cumulative Case Apologetics
In addition to the previously described categories of Classical Apologetics, Evidential
Apologetics, Presuppositional Apologetics, and Enfleshed Apologetics, another category called
Cumulative Case Apologetics has been recognized in the last several decades. This category
allows one to recognize that the previous methods of apologetics discussed can all be
individually helpful at times, but each one individually may not be completely sufficient to every
apologetic need. Cumulative Case Apologetics allows for the mixing and matching of other
approaches to best meet the needs of a given challenge. Since Cumulative Case Apologetics may
not be as widely understood as perhaps Evidential Apologetics or Presuppositional Apologetics
might be, a definition and longer consideration is in order. Cowan describes Cumulative Case
Apologetics this way:
According to advocates of cumulative case apologetics, the nature of the case for
Christianity is not in any strict sense a formal argument like a proof or an argument
from probability … it is an informal argument that pieces together several lines or
types of data into a sort of hypothesis or theory that comprehensively explains that
data and does so better than any alternative hypothesis. … Christian theists are urging
that [Christianity] makes better sense of all the evidence available than does any other
alternative worldview on offer, whether that alternative is some other theistic view or
atheism.67
In some ways, the name “Cumulative Case Apologetics” does a fairly good job of
explaining itself. Such an approach recognizes that the objections to Christianity are many68 and
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thus one size of response cannot fit all objections. No one single argument can refute all of the
varied charges leveled against the Christian faith. Instead, many approaches and many different
methods and modes of argumentation must be marshalled to meet the attacks against
Christianity. Each of these Christian arguments has a significant contribution to make to the
overall Christian response.69
While some Cumulative Case Apologetic arguments deal with the issue of the existence of
God, as is the primary thrust of Presuppositional, Classical, and Evidential Apologetics as noted
above, the category is in fact far broader than that one issue. Cowan notes, “The data that the
cumulative case seeks to explain include the existence and nature of the cosmos, the reality of
religious experience, the objectivity of morality, and certain other historical facts, such as the
resurrection of Jesus.”70 Cumulative Case Apologetics is not limited to one particular line of
inquiry, or any one form of attack, or any single style of argumentation, so it can encompass any
of the widely varied questions that may be of issue challenging Christianity.71 In this way,
Cumulative Case Apologetics is uniquely responsive to the questioner. Paul Feinberg notes that
this methodology would see various elements in human experience that need explanation, and
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that a Cumulative Case Apologetics “gives apologists a variety of places where they can start in
defending the faith, depending on what arguments would be accepted by the one seeking
confirmation.”72 Note how receiver-sensitive this description from Feinberg is. The apologetic
response offered is shaped and guided by the type of argument that would be accepted by the
challenger, not determined by the one offering the response.
One key strength of Cumulative Case Apologetics is the flexibility this approach offers to
recognize the strengths of various apologetic methods and use them as needed and appropriate.
In a book with the interestingly transposed title of The Historical Christ and the Jesus of Faith:
The Incarnational Narrative as History, author C. Stephen Evans lays out two streams of
apologetic thought which he classifies as Evidential Apologetics and Reformed Apologetics
(with this latter category basically being a synonym for Presuppositional Apologetics). In one of
Evans’ latter chapters, entitled “Putting the Two Stories Together,” he demonstrates the
combined usage of Evidential Apologetics and Presuppositional Apologetics, which he calls the
Reformed story. He writes:
I propose understanding the two accounts as related in the following way: the
Reformed story is the story that the Church tells when it is attempting to understand
how Christians in fact gain the knowledge they claim to have. The evidentialist story
is the story the Church tells when it is attempting to convince or persuade someone of
what it takes to be the truth.73
Evans notes that the Reformed story at times is not actually apologetics at all but rather is a
theological explanation “to make clear that this knowledge is primarily due to the work of God
rather than being something people achieve for themselves,”74 while the Evidentialist approach is
a truer form of actual apologetics.
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The purpose of the Evidentialist story is primarily apologetic, though the doubters to be
convinced may be within as well as outside the church. This task must not be understood as the
task of providing a once-and-for-all justification of faith, one that would be convincing to any
rational person in any time or place, but as the task of persuading or convincing particular groups
of people by responding to particular objections and appealing to particular beliefs already held.75
The consideration of recognizing the strengths of various apologetic approaches, and using
varying methods as appropriate, is a helpful contribution of the Cumulative Case methodology of
apologetics. In this particularly responsive approach, the apologist has the freedom to recognize
the particular forms and nature of the challenges presented against Christianity and tailor the
apologetic response to the type of attack, rather than starting with a ready-made, seemingly onesize-fits-all theory of apologetics and attempting to use that one form for all challenges
presented. The opportunity to combine even diametrically opposed approaches such as
Presuppositionalism and Evidentialism give the strengths and advantages of flexibility and
variety to the overall apologetic task.
Those who practice Cumulative Case Apologetics also contribute another understanding
that is vitally needed in the field. Apologetics cannot absolutely prove the truth of any position.
The level of certainty never rises to 100 percent.76 Apologetics can point to the strong likelihood
of a position or argument, but it cannot claim to give an absolute proof. Instead of attempting to
make an iron-clad and irrefutable argument, Cumulative Case Apologetics seeks to establish the
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probability of a claim, not the proof of a claim. Charges against Christianity are answered in
order to support the Christian position, but not to prove it.77 The arguments assembled by
Cumulative Case Apologetics seek to show their position to be probable—not proven, but
probable.78
Paul Feinberg points out that some forms of apologetics seek proof. He writes:
Some have argued that we can prove the truth of Christianity or at least theism by
offering demonstrably sound arguments. Such arguments are logically valid and have
premises that can be shown to be true. A demonstrably sound argument is coercive in
the sense that anyone who wants to retain rationality must accept the argument.79
However, Feinberg points out, there is another option.
A second way to understand the case for theism and Christianity is to argue that we
can make a probable case. We will relax the standard and give up the search for
absolute certainty. While we cannot prove that God exists and that Christianity is
true, we can at least show that it is probable, maybe even very probable.80
Feinberg holds that the second option has more promise, and that the option seeking probability
rather than proof is Cumulative Case Apologetics.81

Apologetics as a Responsive Discipline
As has been seen in this brief overview of apologetics, apologetics is a responsive
discipline. It changes in method and in message depending upon the context in which it is
practiced and the controversies it is addressing. Because each time period presents its own
challenges to the church, the Christian apologist needs to be aware of the past approaches in
77
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apologetics and yet also open to new developments.
In being aware of past approaches, one can note a dependence on logic and reason in
apologetic approaches growing out of an Enlightenment mindset. Logic and fact-based
arguments predominated in these methodologies of apologetics. This was appropriate to respond
to the challenges which grew out of the enlightenment and were predominantly rooted in reason.
The question of the existence of God was a critical question in the challenges faced by
Christianity coming out of the Enlightenment, and traditional forms of apologetics addressed this
question through straight reason, through straight evidence, or some combination thereof.
In looking at new developments in apologetic methodologies, we saw in Enfleshed
Apologetics an increased flexibility to meet changing challenges to Christianity. Enfleshed
Apologetics was marked with a less exclusive reliance on reason and a much greater openness to
other forms of support in defense of Christianity. Evidences for Christianity no longer needed to
be exclusively rational or evidential, but could include support such as the nature and experience
of the Christian life. Enfleshed Apologetics did not develop in reaction to Enlightenment
challenges, so its development was unencumbered by a near-exclusive reliance upon reason.
Other avenues of persuasion were welcomed, and in fact given prominence. A Christian life of
love, matching Christ’s teaching of love, was in itself seen as an apologetic support for
Christianity.
Various times and people pose a wide variety of questions or challenges to Christianity, so
apologetics needs to offer a wide variety and style of responses. An approach to apologetics
needs to be flexible because the changing challenges posed to Christianity need to be evaluated
and each given its most favorable and probable response. In the past several centuries, the attacks
against Christianity have been primarily intellectual, driven by the challenges of the
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Enlightenment and Rationalism, so intellectual methods of response have been appropriate to a
degree. However, in recent years the attacks on Christianity have broadened in our current
cultural situation from intellectual challenges into the area of a Christian’s life, so also the
apologetic method of response needs to broaden accordingly.
At times, an apologetic approach can be broadened by looking to past methods of
apologetics used in eras where similar challenges to those currently being faced were also
addressed. However, a note of caution is in order. To use the same modes and methods of
apologetics used in previous eras just because they were effective at that time does not mean the
same previously successful approaches will be relevant today. Dulles notes, “Not surprisingly,
therefore, no apologist from previous centuries or generations precisely fills the prescription that
might be written for a present-day apologetic.”82 Alister McGrath further explains the problem by
saying, “Each age generates its own specific concerns and critiques of the Christian faith. ...
Indeed, reading older apologetics often seems like a journey down memory lane, marked by the
names of writers and controversies that no longer seem relevant.”83 In some cases utilizing
apologetic modes and methods of the past might be helpful, to a greater or lesser degree, but
rarely can they simply be applied entirely without update. Giving correct answers, no matter how
true they may be, to different questions runs the risk of speaking without being heard. New
questions and new challenges also require new thoughts and new responses.84 The apologist’s job
is to keep an attentive finger on the pulse of culture and sense any changes in the heartbeat of
society so that a properly tailored apologetic response can be given in a timely fashion.
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Otherwise, if an apologetic technique or approach that was developed in response to a challenge
from a previous era is used simply because it is common or because it worked previously, one is
left with the problem of trying to use a square peg to plug a round hole.
Perhaps the simplest way to navigate the challenge of broadening apologetic approaches
while avoiding the problem of applying either contemporary or ancient views inappropriately is
to remember that apologetics is, in its root and most basic definition, a defense. Gene Edward
Veith, makes this point:
The word apologetics comes from the Greek word for “defense.” Christian
apologetics is not necessarily about trying to argue someone into the faith, if that
were possible. At its heart, apologetics is about defending Christianity from those
who attack it.85
A defense specifically is given in the area of attack. When the attacks against Christianity
change, the defense against those attacks also needs to change.86 When the focus of apologetics
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remains on defending the faith against attacks, then apologetics should be understood as a
responsive discipline. Stated another way, the role of apologetics is to respond to the attacks
leveled against Christianity. Apologetics is not and indeed cannot be done in a vacuum. The
apologist’s role is to respond to the charges made. This is why I call apologetics a responsive
discipline.
Since apologetics must be contextual in its approach, apologetics must be taking note
specifically of what attacks are being launched against Christianity, and adjust accordingly.
David Wilkinson comes to the same point in his article, “The Art of Apologetics in the TwentyFirst Century.” He writes:
If the apologetic task in the twenty-first century involves the question of relevance,
then part of its practice is identifying what are the apologetic obstacles and
opportunities of today, and indeed the future. What are the issues that are going to
become important in the years to come? The task of the apologist is to learn to listen,
hearing what people are asking, and anticipating the things that will influence
people.87
The first job of an apologist is not to analyze or argue, but to listen. Only in carefully discerning
the nature of the attacks against Christianity can a truly appropriate answer be given. In our
current context, an apologist needs to be attuned to the culture and its appraisal of Christianity.
In the understanding of apologetics as a responsive discipline, the apologist is always
starting on “enemy turf.” The apologist properly understood can never claim “home-field
advantage.” Apologetics does not start from a safe or even neutral starting point, it always starts
under attack. Apologetics is, by its very definition, defensive. It does not choose the time or the
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place or the means of the engagement. In fact, the method of defense is in large part dictated by
the method of the attack. An apologetic approach thus needs to respond in a manner carefully
crafted to the precise attacks presented.

Introduction to the Changing Cultural Setting
Since apologetics needs to be highly attentive to the challenges faced by Christianity, it is
vital to consider the condition of the culture into which an apologetic response is to be given.
Thus, we now turn to a consideration of the rise of unbelief taking place in America as a basis for
determining what apologetic response can be offered in light of the current cultural situation.
While the specific focus is the challenge of New Atheism, it is also important to see an overview
of the context in which New Atheism arose.
James Emery White, in his book, The Rise of the Nones, shows that the number of people
claiming no religious affiliation has accelerated rapidly over the course of the last two decades.
He writes:
To put this in perspective, consider that the number of nones in the 1930s and ‘40s
hovered around 5 percent. By 1990 that number had only risen to 8 percent, a mere 3
percent rise in over half a century. Between 1990 and 2008—just eighteen years—the
number of nones leaped from 8.1 percent to 15 percent. Then, in just four short years,
it climbed to 20 percent, representing one of every five Americans. Even more telling
was the discovery in the National Study of Youth and Religion that a third of U.S.
adults under the age of thirty don’t identify with a religion.88
The rise of the nones means that people will not be affiliated with a particular form of
religious belief, and this lack of conscious affiliation may mean more openness toward critical
examination of the role of religious belief in the public sphere. This is particularly the case
regarding a critique of those who, unlike the nones, do have a religious affiliation and attempt to
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bring that religious affiliation into the public discourse and practices of the country. As perhaps
one marker of this changed environment regarding the role of religion in the public square,
George Yancey and David Williamson, in their book entitled So Many Christians, So Few Lions,
point out that the public voice of the Moral Majority has subsided in recent years, but an opposite
counterpart, the Freedom From Religion Foundation (FFRF) has grown 235 percent since 2005.89
The criticism of the role of religion in the public square is reflective of a somewhat
different approach than has been the case in recent centuries. The attacks on Christianity have
not been coming as forcefully or as frequently in the area of doctrine, but instead the attacks have
been coming in the area of practice. The challenges to Christianity have not been intellectual in
nature, but instead have been focused on the morality of Christianity. Instead of attempting to
challenge Christianity on intellectual grounds, the more recent methodology has been merely to
dismiss religious beliefs, simply because they are religious, and thus are deemed not worthy of
consideration due to perceived moral failings of Christianity.90
However, rather than trying to restate the views of non-Christians, here are some nonChristians’ thoughts in their own words regarding Christians: “I am only too well aware of their
horrific attitudes and beliefs—and those are enough to make me see them as subhuman. (Female,
aged 66–75 with some graduate school.)”91 Another: “I would not live in a neighborhood that
was almost all Christian Right. I would probably kill some of them. (Male, aged 66–75 with
some graduate school.)”92 And yet another: “They should be eradicated without hesitation or
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remorse. Their only purpose is to damage and inflict their fundamentalist virus onto everyone
they come into contact with. (Female, aged 66–75 with master’s degree.)”93 These citations show
the severity of the hostility held against Christianity in the current cultural situation. NonChristians fear that Christians are trying to force their Christian views upon everyone around
them. Non-Christians also seem to dehumanize Christians, in order better to rail against them.
The non-Christians interviewed would deny people of faith a voice in dealing with society’s
problems, and in fact blame Christianity for society’s problems.
The question of morality regarding Christianity is approached largely through the issue of
tolerance and intolerance. Tolerance is elevated to the level of the highest societal virtue, and
Christianity is then shown to be a seedbed of intolerance. One non-Christian who was
interviewed about the possibility of whether the United States should have explicit laws
punishing Christians responded, “[I] don’t believe in targeting a group of people with a law
designated to control behavior. As long as they leave me alone and stay out of influencing
government and political activities, let them wallow in their stupidity. (Male, aged 56–65 with
some college.)”94 The respondent himself demonstrates a high priority on tolerance, saying that
he would not favor outright intolerance against Christians. However, he hints that Christianity
itself is intolerant as he qualifies his statement by adding, “as long as they leave me alone and
stay out of influencing government,” thus implying that Christians trying to force their views on
others is a common problem.
When Christianity is viewed as intolerant, then it is not only not seen as the height of
virtue, but in fact as its opposite. Intolerance is seen as being immoral.95 If Christianity is
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perceived as being intolerant, which is how Christianity is perceived,96 then Christianity itself is
immoral. Current culture goes a step further yet from seeing Christianity as being immoral, it
even makes the claim that Christianity is evil. Christians can “be seen as hateful, especially if
they are tied to a tendency to perceive conservative Christians as evil and without any redeeming
value. Indeed, many with anti-Christian animosity did have a propensity to perceive conservative
Christians as evil.”97 If Christianity is viewed as evil it is also viewed, of course, as a detriment to
society. In light of this style of animosity toward Christianity, Yancey and Williamson introduce
the concept of “Christianophobia” as the best way to describe the current cultural view of
Christianity.98
David Kinnaman and the Barna Group also offer insights into the thoughts of the culture
that currently surrounds us and its views on religion, they published four books of particular
interest to our topic.99 Based on this elaborate and extensive survey research, these books analyze
the culture that gave rise to the New Atheists and shaped many of the challenges currently faced
by Christianity. In Kinnaman’s first book, UnChristian, he deals directly with the perceptions
their surveys find the perceived attempted imposition of Christian moral ideas (seen as intolerance) to be immoral.
See also Yancey and Williamson, So Many Christians, 55.
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“In chapter 7 we argue that the term “Christianophobia” best illustrates the characteristics exhibited by the
respondents. This term refers to an unreasonable hatred toward and fear of conservative Christians.” Yancey and
Williamson, So Many Christians, 12.
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These four books consist of David Kinnaman and Gabe Lyons, UnChristian: What A New Generation
Really Thinks About Christianity … And Why It Matters (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007); David Kinnaman and Aly
Hawkins, You Lost Me: Why Young Christians Are Leaving Church—and Rethinking Faith (Grand Rapids: Baker,
2011); George Barna and David Kinnaman, Churchless: Understanding Today’s Unchurched and How to Connect
with Them (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale, 2014) and David Kinnaman and Gabe Lyons, Good Faith: Being a Christian
When Society Thinks You're Irrelevant and Extreme (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2016). These three books are based on
extensive research done over a period of 20 years stretching from1995 to 2014, constructing surveys with various
demographic groups including self-identified Christians who are churched, others adults who are unchurched, and in
some cases focusing on the 18–29 year old age category, probing their reaction to faith-based questions. Together
the three books reflect the research of approximately 50 surveys, representing both qualitative and quantitative
polling. Most surveys had a sample size of either approximately 600 or approximately 1000 with overall numbers
totaling tens of thousands of respondents.
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that “outsiders” such as atheists have of Christianity which reflect the themes of the New
Atheists and help depict the broader cultural milieu.100
Kinnaman proposes six broad themes at the center of UnChristian, namely that Christians
are seen as 1) hypocritical, 2) too focused on getting converts, 3) antihomosexual, 4) sheltered,
5) too political, and 6) judgmental.101 One could note that none of these challenges is particularly
oriented toward the truth claims of Christianity or the accuracy of beliefs held by Christians.
Instead, they mirror in many ways the issue of intolerance within Christianity. Christians are
seen as being “unChristian,” meaning immoral, because they are intolerant. Several of
Kinnaman’s points lean in the direction of perceived intolerance. A focus on converts means that
whatever beliefs a potential convert holds are inferior and intolerable. Obviously, an
antihomosexual stance is intolerant towards homosexuals. The political activities of Christians
foster the perception that Christians are politically active in order to impose their intolerant view
of morality upon an unwilling culture. Finally, the view that Christians are judgmental is another
obvious connection to perceived intolerance among Christians. Thus, in light of Kinnaman’s
research, we could summarize that our current culture does not concern itself as much with
alleged doctrinal errors in Christianity as it is concerned that Christianity is a moral evil due to
pervasive intolerance.
Kinnaman and Lyons stress that the ideas expressed by outsiders that shaped the book were
100

Kinnaman and co-author, Gabe Lyons note, “The main group we studied is ‘outsiders,’ those looking at
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focus of the book later as well. See Kinnaman and Lyons, UnChristian, 249. The views reflected by Kinnaman and
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Yancey and Williamson, So Many Christians, 45, 50, 52–54, and 81. They note that progressives worry about the
Christian Right and politics, and suspect an attempted Christian takeover leading to theocracy.
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not formed in a vacuum or without good reason. To the contrary, those interviewed were quite
familiar with Christianity, and with Christians personally. They note, “Most Mosaics and Busters
in America have an enormous amount of firsthand experience with Christians and the Christian
faith.”102 Most have attended a church for a significant amount of time, at least a matter of
months, and nine in ten say they know Christians personally.103 Kinnaman and Lyons point out
the importance of a careful consideration of lifestyle in light of this research. They write:
Young people said they formed their views of Christians based on conversations with
others, often with Christians. This is significant because not only does it mean we
have a great deal of responsibility in developing many of the perceptions that people
hold, but it also suggests the possibility that our words and our lives can change these
negative images.104
Kinnaman and Lyons reinforce that the primary current objections to Christianity are not based
on intellectual objections to doctrine but on emotional responses to the perceived “UnChristian”
manner of many Christians’ lives.
Kinnaman’s next book, You Lost Me, was published in 2011. Kinnaman notes in this work
that one of the disconnects between culture and Christianity is that Christianity is seen as
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Kinnaman and Lyons, UnChristian, 31. This statistic stands in stark contrast, however, with research by
Yancey and Williamson in So Many Christians. Yancey and Williamson note that anti-Christian sentiment, or
Christianophobia, is highest among those who have the least contact with Christians. Yancey and Williamson, So
Many Christians, 48, 50, 86–87. In fact, they note that those with anti-Christian sentiment attempt to avoid contact
with Christians. Yancey and Williamson, So Many Christians, 66. They also find that many with Christianophobia
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antiscience.105 Of particular interest to my project regarding this topic, however, is that by the
time You Lost Me was written, Kinnaman begins to note several of the New Atheists by name.
Kinnaman notes:
Another dimension of our scientific culture is the many scientists today who enjoy
rock star status. Well-known scientists who promote atheism, such as Sam Harris,
Richard Dawkins, and Stephen Hawking, are front and center in our culture today.
They have gained popular attention not only because of the post-Christian Zeitgeist,
but also because the Internet amplifies provocative voices, enabling them to reach
niche audiences and leverage their powers of persuasion to generate mainstream
attention.106
Kinnaman brings two thoughts to the discussion of the interplay between the New Atheists
and the shape of conversations about religion in popular culture. First, by recognizing that much
of the perception of religion held by “outsiders” already in 2007 matches strongly with themes
seen in New Atheist writings, we see that the New Atheists were already poised to have a
significant cultural impact even before their writings had the time to permeate culture as they
have today. Second, as Kinnaman does not even mention any of the New Atheists in his earlier
work from 2007, but lists two by name in the 2011 book, we see that Kinnaman begins to hint at
a degree of cultural influence exerted by the New Atheists, which could be suspected but not
clearly seen in UnChristian from 2007. I am not arguing that the New Atheists have caused the
changing attitudes toward Christianity that are becoming recognizable in culture but rather
arguing that the New Atheists are accurate and applicable representations of the challenges from
culture. However, Kinnaman seems to hint that his theory is that the New Atheist critiques are
indeed working their way into the general cultural consciousness.
A subsequent book produced by the Barna Group, co-authored by George Barna and David
Kinnaman, entitled Churchless, published in 2014, shows the further progression of New Atheist
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ideas into the culture. In this work, Barna and Kinnaman use the term “Atheist Renaissance” to
describe what has taken place in the early years of the twenty-first century.107 They point to the
work of the “energetic anti-God evangelism of Sam Harris, Richard Dawkins, Christopher
Hitchens, and others”108 as being a factor in a dramatic increase in the unchurched population of
the United States in the current decade.109 According to Barna and Kinnaman, due in large part to
the work of the New Atheists, atheism has been transformed from “cultural anathema to what all
the cool kids are doing.”110 In this more recent book, we can trace the further inroads New
Atheist thought has made into current culture, as now Barna and Kinnaman name three of the
five New Atheists by name, whereas seven years earlier Kinnaman had vaguely described some
themes of the New Atheism being reflected in culture, but had not named any of the authors in
particular. Thus, while the New Atheists have not caused the cultural shift we see occurring, they
are representative of it in a significant, concrete, and documented manner.

Conclusion
The culture in which the church finds itself has become increasingly hostile towards
Christianity in recent years. The growing challenges toward the church have not by and large
been presented on intellectual grounds, challenging the factuality of Christianity, but instead
have grown from an understanding that Christianity is seen as a moral evil, in part due to its
perceived intolerance of other views. As these styles of challenges have become more vocal in
culture, the New Atheists have been recognized more commonly as representative voices of this
107
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shift.111 This indicates that it is important to consider carefully the writings of the New Atheists
for two reasons. First, the arguments made by the New Atheists are representative of current
culture, where such ideas continue to spread and gain in influence. Second, the New Atheists ask
helpful questions for Christianity to ponder, even though as representatives of a coarsening
culture their questions and critiques are significantly harsher than what has been heard for
centuries. However coarse the critiques of the New Atheists, the way these challenges are framed
can lead the church to consider an apologetic response that does not rely upon reason alone for
defense. Instead, the challenges of the New Atheists should push apologetics to formulate a
method of defense that is applied directly to a Christian’s life, which is where the challenges of
the New Atheists and the current culture find fault. The basic New Atheist charge, reflecting the
view of current culture, is that Christianity is evil and a detriment to society. This challenge has
raised a good and needed question: How can the church demonstrate that it is not a force for evil
in society, but that in fact Christianity has a positive contribution to make for the benefit of
society? But first, we need to look at the way the New Atheists have framed their attacks on the
church.
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CHAPTER TWO
NEW ATHEISM AS A POPULAR CULTURAL CHALLENGE TO CHRISTIANITY
We now turn more specifically to the actual writings of the group of authors known as the
New Atheists, noting how they embody the current culture’s critique of Christianity. The New
Atheists make no secret of their desire for religion to be given far less respect and deference in
society than it has been accorded for centuries, and for atheism to be accorded a proportionally
greater degree of moral respect. This is a surprising and relatively recent reversal of the status of
atheist voices in contemporary American culture. For centuries, the ethos of Western culture saw
atheists as immoral and untrustworthy, while religious leaders were held in esteem as being
moral leaders and trustworthy authority figures. David Williamson and George Yancey, in their
book, There Is No God: Atheists in America, note that “A generation ago, most [atheists] were
tight lipped about their atheism because they knew the judgment that likely awaited them. That
reticence is understandable and not without foundation.”1 Williamson and Yancey point out that,
as late as the 1990s, most Americans would prefer to vote for someone who identified as gay or
for a Muslim for President of the United States over voting for an atheist.2 In fact, based on a
2006 study published just as the books of the New Atheists were beginning to gain popularity,
atheists were considered to be among the least trustworthy recognizable groups in the United
States, when compared to “Catholics, Christian fundamentalists, Mormons, even Muslims and

1

David Williamson and George Yancey, There Is No God: Atheists in America (Lanham, MD: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2013), 6.
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gays.”3 While today names like Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens are fairly commonly
known, and known specifically for being atheists, that was not necessarily the case before the
publication of the New Atheist books starting in 2004. Richard Dawkins and Christopher
Hitchens, if they were recognized by name, would have been known instead as an evolutionary
biologist and a journalist and literary critic, respectively. Their atheism would have been far less
prominently known or proclaimed due to the stigma held against atheism in society.
In summary, in the closing days of the twentieth century, Christianity was generally viewed
with at least some degree of trust among many members of the general public as reflected in the
surveys cited by Williamson and Yancey. Atheists, on the other hand, were distrusted and
disdained. Then came September 11, 2001 and the New Atheists.

A Brief History of the New Atheist Writings
On September 11, 2001, the landscape changed. Certainly, the landscape of Manhattan
changed as the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center were reduced to rubble by passenger
planes used as guided missiles. But more than the landscape of Manhattan changed. The
landscape of culture changed, and specifically the landscape of popular religious culture in
America. The attacks of September 11, 2001, planned and carried out by Islamic terrorists, cast a
new light on how people viewed religion and religious fervor.4
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Williamson and Yancey, There Is No God, 6, citing Penny Edgell, Joseph Gerteis, and Douglas Hartmann,
“Atheists as ‘Other’: Moral Boundaries and Cultural Membership in American Society,” American Sociological
Review 71, no. 2 (2006).
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Sam Harris himself claims the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 were the motivating factor for his
writing. In the “Acknowledgements” section of The End of Faith, Harris points clearly to the link between his
thoughts on religion and the terrorist attacks. He writes, “I began writing this book on September 12, 2001. Many
friends read and commented on a long essay that I produced in those first weeks of collective grief and stupefaction,
and that text became the basis for this book.” Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of
Reason (New York: Norton, 2004), 323. This connection has been noted elsewhere. Massimo Pigliucci, for example,
notes that the burst of New Atheist writings “was triggered (according to Harris himself) by the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001.” Massimo Pigliucci, “New Atheism and Scientism,” in Peter French and Howard Wettstein,
The New Atheism and Its Critics (Boston: Wiley Periodicals, 2013), 142. Robert Stewart notes in his introduction to
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While discontent with organized religion is not a new phenomenon or a phenomenon
isolated to a handful of recent writers by any means, and thus the New Atheists can be seen as
representative of broader cultural trends, the September 11 terrorist attacks served as the impetus
for a small handful of persuasive atheists—the New Atheists—to publish books that gained
international attention.
Who are the New Atheists and what books constitute their publishing moment? Victor
Stenger, in his survey of the New Atheism, argues that the following authors and books
established a new genre of atheist literature:5 Sam Harris’ The End of Faith;6 Sam Harris’ Letter
to a Christian Nation;7 Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion;8 Daniel C. Dennett’s Breaking the
Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon;9 Stenger’s own book, God: The Failed Hypothesis;10
and finally Christopher Hitchens’ god is not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything;11 all of

the book, The Future of Atheism: Alister McGrath & Daniel Dennett in Dialogue, that “Our world was changed
forever by the events of September 11, 2001. On at least a surface level Al Qaeda is a religiously motivated
organization. The New Atheists typically insist that contemporary religious terrorism is no mere historical accident.”
Alister E. McGrath, Daniel Clement Dennett, and Robert B. Stewart, The Future of Atheism: Alister McGrath &
Daniel Dennett in Dialogue (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), 6. Alister McGrath also notes in his book, Why God
Won’t Go Away: Is the New Atheism Running on Empty? that “[t]he 9/11 attack turned out to be the intellectual and
moral launchpad for the New Atheism.” Alister McGrath, Why God Won’t Go Away: Is the New Atheism Running
on Empty (Nashville: Nelson, 2010), xii. Perhaps the most memorable link between 9–11 and the New Atheism
comes from the pen of New Atheist Victor Stenger himself. He writes, “Science flies us to the moon. Religion flies
us into buildings.” Victor Stenger, The New Atheism (Amherst: Prometheus, 2009), 59.
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which were published from 2004–2007.
This listing of authors and books comprising the New Atheist movement is somewhat
standard, but not universal. Of these authors, four figure prominently in summaries of New
Atheism. Some have called them “The Four Horsemen” of the New Atheist movement, and this
group includes Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, and Christopher Hitchens.12
Hitchens also picks up on this term, “The Four Horsemen,” and uses it to describe that same
group of writers.13 While these four men are always included in lists of the New Atheists, other
names are added descriptions as well. The most common additional name is that of Victor
Stenger.14 Stenger is a self-proclaimed member of the New Atheists.15 Various authors include
other writers in the list of New Atheists,16 but for the purposes of this dissertation I will include
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McGrath, Why God, 3–4.
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Christopher Hitchens, Hitch-22 (New York: Twelve, 2010), unnumbered photo interleaf page. This
association comes as the caption to a photo in Hitchens’ memoir, which is not numbered. The photo, showing
Dawkins, Dennett, Hitchens, and Harris gathered together for a conversation in Hitchens’s Washington, D.C.
apartment, and including the pertinent description referenced above, is immediately prior to page 309.
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For example, Louis Markos adds Victor Stenger in addition to Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, Sam
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the Twenty-First Century (Wheaton: Crossway, 2010), 216.
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Meister and James K. Dew, God and Evil: The Case for God in a World Filled with Pain (Downers Grove:
InterVarsity Press, 2013), 198. Jonathan Kvanvig develops a category he calls “The belittlers,” including the New
Atheists whom he lists in as being Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and Daniel Dennett in
French and Wettstein, New Atheism, 109n1. John Haught provides an exception to the standard listing of the New
Atheists as he excludes Daniel Dennett from the group, saying “I was initially tempted to include Daniel Dennett’s
Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon more focally in my survey of the new atheism, but Dennett’s
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book adds nothing new to the conversation and in my judgment does not represent a significant development in the
thoughts of the New Atheists.

48

“The Four Horsemen” of Dawkins, Dennett, Harris, and Hitchens and add in Stenger as the
group that most clearly constitutes the New Atheists.17
In addition to establishing a list of New Atheist authors and books, Stenger provides some
of the major themes of the New Atheists. Stenger writes:
In 2004 Sam Harris published The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of
Reason. This marked the first of a series of six best-selling books that took a harder
line against religion than had been the custom among secularists. This movement has
been termed New Atheism.
Motivated primarily by the events of September 11, 2001, which he laid directly at
the feet of the religion of Islam, Harris did not leave Christianity or Judaism off the
hook. Nor did he pardon religious moderates.18
Here, Stenger sets forth several characteristics of the New Atheist movement that are
worthy of note. While positioning the New Atheists within the broader secularist movement, he
points out that the New Atheists take a harder line against faith than had previously been done.
With arguments that are more harsh and aggressive than other atheists, they lay the blame for
much of the world’s violence (exemplified by the September 11, 2001 attacks) at the feet of
religion. Here, it is important to note that Harris does not focus his attention only upon a
17
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Horseman: The Insights of Victor Stenger (1935–2014),” Skeptic.com, September 20, 2014, accessed May 17, 2015,
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radically violent interpretation of certain Islamic religious texts by certain religious zealots in a
particular act of terror. Instead, he broadens his argument both to include the Abrahamic faith
traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam and to extend to the larger public realm. Such a
broader argument is common in the literature of New Atheism.19 By linking religions and
violence, Sam Harris led into his larger argument that religions should not be tolerated for the
greater good of society. This argument runs throughout the corpus of New Atheists texts.
Not only is the argument harsher in content, it is also harsher in tone. In the writings of
these early works, the New Atheists function more with shock value than scholarship.20 They do
not present original or profound ideas stated as rational appeals as much as they catch the
attention of the media and the popular imagination through visceral emotional appeals to a
secular audience.21 Such positions play well in the media, which thrives on extremes and
shocking statements that sell much better than carefully crafted academic considerations. It also
led to the flourishing of the New Atheists in popular culture. This connection between the New
Atheists and the media is not surprising since Christianophobia is common among media
personalities,22 journalists, and in the entertainment industry.23 New Atheism, thus, can be
considered a popular cultural movement, occasioned by an increase in religious tension and
violence and both welcomed and exploited by the mass media.
19
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As a publishing venture, however, New Atheism is waning. Following the New Atheist
publishing outburst which lasted from 2004 to 2007, all of the New Atheists have published
additional works, but the content of these later works by the New Atheist authors are less
uniform in their message than the initial round of publications.24 Of the five New Atheists, three
have moved on in their writings away from strident denunciations of faith to other topics,25 and
two have died.26 In showing that the authors have moved on, Dawkins writes regarding a
subsequent work, “It is not intended as an anti-religious book. I’ve done that, it’s another T-shirt,
this is not the place to wear it again.”27 Harris similarly notes in one of his more recent books,
“For many years, I have been a vocal critic of religions, and I won’t ride the same hobbyhorse
here.”28
24
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and co-authored a book with Linda LaScola based largely on interviews with pastors who have lost their faith in
God and wrestle with decisions about abandoning their careers, Caught in the Pulpit: Leaving Belief Behind
(Durham, NC: Pitchstone, 2015). After god is not Great, Hitchens has published Hitch-22, in 2010; and his final
book, entitled Mortality (New York: Twelve, 2012), is a compilation of essays he wrote while battling cancer,
complied by his wife after his death and published posthumously. After God: The Failed Hypothesis, Stener has
published The New Atheism: Taking a Stand for Science and Reason (Amherst: Prometheus, 2009) and God and the
Folly of Faith: The Incompatibility of Science and Religion (Amherst: Prometheus, 2012).
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The three who have moved to other topics are Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Sam Harris. This
does not indicate their own positions and thoughts about religion have changed, but their professional writing focus
has changed.
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The two who have died are Christopher Hitchens and Victor Stenger. Perhaps ironically, the three New
Atheists still living have softened their approach toward religion somewhat in subsequent writings, while the two
who have died are the ones who maintained their harder, more abrasive stance toward religion in their subsequent
writings.
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Why Continue to Focus on the New Atheists?
A valid question might be asked: if three of the five New Atheists have changed course in
their writings, and have toned down their harsh pronouncements about religions so that the
publication of New Atheist works has died down, and the other two New Atheists have died,
why respond to a publishing movement that seems to have enjoyed its moment and moved on?
To answer that question, it is important to remember that the New Atheist movement was
never an academic exercise. It was and is a movement within popular culture. The New Atheists
should be seen not as careful scholars who bring about profound changes in culture through their
original thought, but as representations of popular culture. The New Atheists serve as examples
of the objections that society itself is increasingly posing to Christianity. The popular and nonacademic nature of New Atheism has been readily recognized. As Amarnath Amarasingam
notes, the academic community “has largely dismissed their writings as unsophisticated, crude,
and lacking nuance.”29 He characterizes the New Atheists as “characteristically petulant and
provocative, challenging yet cranky, urgent but uninformed,”30 but “their respective books have
been selling extremely well.”31 One of the characteristics Victor Stenger consistently noted in his
works was the bestselling status of New Atheist books, that for example, the The God Delusion,
spent 51 weeks on the New York Times Best Seller List, or that Hitchens’ god is not Great: How
Religion Poisons Everything debuted in first place on the New York Times Best Seller List.32
This points to the ongoing need for responses to the New Atheists for two reasons: 1) the
arguments made by the New Atheists, while not being profound and original in themselves, are
representative of current culture, where such ideas continue to spread, and 2) the New Atheists
29
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actually ask good questions of Christianity that can lead the church to formulate a cultural
response that goes beyond a strictly rational defense of the faith. The New Atheists pose
challenges that Christians would ignore only to their own detriment.
The first reason that an ongoing response to the New Atheists is needed is that their
arguments can serve as representations of popular culture. While it is difficult to discern how
deeply a movement is accurately reflective of popular culture, it is perhaps an indication of the
nature of New Atheism as a symbol of a larger cultural movement that Richard Dawkins
headlined a “Reason Rally” which drew an estimated 20,000 participants to the National Mall in
Washington DC on March 24, 2012, and another “Reason Rally” was held in June of 2016.33 Or
perhaps the ongoing cultural connection to the New Atheists and their thoughts can be gauged by
the following they have generated online. A recent check of the web site for the Richard
Dawkins Foundation showed that the site had 1,275,890 Facebook fans, 173,046 Google+
Subscribers, 7,405 Instagram Followers, 57,666 Twitter Followers, and 209,335 Youtube
Subscribers.34 Thus, while the publication of recognized New Atheist books seems to have
ended, New Atheist thought continues on as a movement reflective of popular culture35 and so
the thoughts of the New Atheists continue to call for Christian apologetic responses.
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Hemant Mehta, “Where Was the Crowd for the Reason Rally?” June 5, 2016, accessed June 7, 2016,
http://www.patheos.com/blogs/friendlyatheist/2016/06/05/where-was-the-crowd-for-the-reason-rally/. The second
Reason Rally had significantly lower attendance than the first one. Whereas the first rally drew and estimated 20,000
people, the second one seemed to be under 10,000. Hemant Mehta, in the blog cited here, speculated that one reason
for the lower attendance was that planners moved away from speakers that were strident atheists to try to attract a
broader base of seekers, which may have backfired. Mehta speculates that if prominent, vociferous atheists (along
the line of the New Atheists) had headlined the event, attendance may well have been higher.
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Perhaps another way to gauge the extent to which the New Atheists have penetrated culture is to note
that—although the New Atheists’ writings themselves are not scholarly in execution—the influence of the New
Atheists is now being examined in a summer course at Harvard based on the cultural impact the New Atheists have
made. Harvard University, accessed July 8, 2015, http://www.summer.harvard.edu/courses/summer-seminarengaging-new-atheism%E2%80%94why-religion-remains. It is interesting that, regarding the New Atheists, the
course examines both “religious belief and its relation to rationality” as well as “how it [religion] functions in human
life.”
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Richard Dawkins, in his memoir, Brief Candle in the Dark, recognizes both that the New
Atheists happened to catch a cultural movement of which they became vocal representatives, and
also that they in turn had some effect on shaping the direction of the cultural argument as well.
He writes:
[S]omething exceptional was taking place. It wasn’t just the sales that were
exceptional, it was the fact that the book had struck a vital chord with the public. I
think it is no exaggeration to say that it started a whole new debate, certainly for this
generation, about religion and its place in society and became a game-changer.36
Dawkins goes on to write:
I think it’s true that something really did happen in our culture between The End of
Faith in 2004 and God is not Great in 2007. … Our books do seem to have hit the
proverbial nerve, in a way that many excellent books that preceded them did not. …
Was it that our books were especially outspoken and uninhibited? Maybe that had
something to do with it. Was it something in the atmosphere of the first decade of this
century: wings of a Zeitgeist hovering in the air waiting for an updraft from the next
four books that came along? Possibly.37
Because of this, the New Atheists can serve as a vehicle by which to begin to consider the
current status of culture. Cultural trends now facing the church are prefigured by, and
encapsulated in, the writings of the New Atheists. Thus a response to the New Atheists’ writings
from a decade ago comes very close to being a response to cultural challenges against
Christianity as they are being expressed at the current time.
The second, and perhaps more pertinent reason to respond to the New Atheists is a
recognition that the questions the New Atheists ask lead the church at large and not just
intellectuals to formulate more than a rational response, but instead push the church in the
direction of a response applied in life.38 The New Atheist charge that Christianity is evil and a
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While phrased somewhat differently, this is similar to the case that Phillip Johnson and John Mark
Reynolds make, writing “What I like about atheists is that although they tend to give the wrong answers, they also
tend to raise the right questions.” Phillip Johnson and John Mark Reynolds, Against All Gods: What’s Right and
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detriment to society has raised a good and needed question: How can the church demonstrate
that it is not a force for evil or a curse upon society, but in fact is a help and a great blessing to
society?
For these reasons, it is a needed and helpful project to consider and respond to the
challenges of the New Atheists carefully. The response, however, must go beyond academic or
intellectually oriented responses rooted in primarily rational appeals and address as well the
popular and emotional and ethical appeals formulated by the New Atheists with such force.

Analysis of the Rhetorical Appeals and Arguments Made by the New Atheists
For centuries, most of the debate between Christians and atheists consisted of
rational/logical appeals about the existence of God. However, the New Atheists are less
interested in the question of the existence of God than they are in the question of the goodness of
God and by extension of his followers. The prominent New Atheist, Daniel Dennett, writes, “I
decided some time ago that diminishing returns had set in on the arguments about God’s

Wrong about the New Atheism (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2010), 8. They explain that the challenging
questions of the New Atheists force Christians to clarify their thinking, which is a good and needed project. Stephen
Bullivant makes a related argument in his essay in Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal, edited by
Amarnath Amarasingam. Rather than say that the pointed criticisms of New Atheism force Christians to think with
clarity, instead Bullivant makes the argument that the challenges of the New Atheists could stir new life into a
religious culture overwhelmed by indifference. He expects that the New Atheist writings will cause an increase in
professed atheists, but will also cause some complacent Christians to become more engaged in their faith. Stephen
Bullivant, “The New Atheism and Sociology,” in Amarasingam, Religion, 123. Bullivant also asks who is buying all
the copies of the bestselling New Atheist works. He notes that, “Aside from a few sold to curious atheists, the vast
majority are presumably bought by religious believers who, although they may feel challenged by the new atheists,
believe (or hope) that their arguments are not insuperable. For a significant number of these believers, then, The God
Delusion (or whichever book) may eventually lead to the strengthening, rather than the abandoning, of religious
faith and practice.” Bullivant, “The New Atheism,” 123. In the same work, Jeffrey W. Robbins and Christopher D.
Rodkey note that the New Atheism might allow a freer conception of God to be reborn, although their conception of
God is one that they hope would be “stripped free of the straightjacket of theological theism.” Jeffrey W. Robbins
and Christopher D. Rodkey, “Beating ‘God’ to Death: Radical Theology and the New Atheism,” in Amarasingam,
Religion, 26–27. Their hope is that the New Atheist criticism will dampen fundamentalist, or literalist interpretations
of who God is. While this is not what many Christians would consider to be a healthy form of “rebirth,” it is a
related argument to the one noted above that the New Atheists could bring improvement to Christian thought
through their criticisms—it just depends on what one considers to be an “improvement.”
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existence, and I doubt that any breakthroughs are in the offing, from either side.”39 Instead of
questioning the existence of God, the New Atheists attack the goodness of God, and the
goodness of Christians as God’s followers.
As we see here from Dennett, the question about the existence of God is not the foremost
question addressed by the New Atheists. This is not to say that they do not make any arguments
against the potential existence of God. They do.40 Instead, the claim that I am making is that
while the New Atheists do at some points venture into the arguments regarding the existence of
God, their main focus and strongest arguments lie elsewhere. The argument has shifted from the
existence of God to the goodness of God and his faithful followers. They work with the
overarching thesis that atheism should have a stronger voice in society than religion, since
religion's many moral failings show that religions are evil and a detriment to society rather than a
force for good.
The Message of the New Atheists
What is the primary message of the New Atheists if truth claims such as the existence of
God are not central? Victor Stenger speaks well for his own genre of New Atheism as he writes
in his book, The New Atheism: Taking a Stand for Science and Reason, that faith should not be
given respect or deference in society because “it is always foolish and leads to many of the evils
of society.”41 The main point of Stenger’s argument is not against the rationality of Christianity
but against the moral standing of the faith. Later in this work he elaborates, “The new atheists
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Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 27. Alister McGrath points out that the belief that there is not a God is just as
much a matter of faith as the belief that there is a God, and that the belief in atheism is ultimately a circular
argument. Alister McGrath, The Twilight of Atheism: The Rise and Fall of Disbelief in the Modern World (New
York: Doubleday, 2004), 180.
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argue that faith is far from a benign force that can simply be tolerated by those who know better.
Rather, it plays a significant role in much of the violent conflict in the world.”42
In fact, it might be better to think of the New Atheists as strongly anti-theistic agnostics
rather than true atheists.43 Christopher Hitchens makes this claim in his earlier book Letters to a
Young Contrarian, “I'm not even an atheist so much as I am an antitheist; I not only maintain
that all religions are versions of the same untruth, but I hold that the influence of churches, and
the effect of religious belief, is positively harmful.”44 However, this group has been labeled as the
“New Atheists” by the popular culture they exemplify. It is unlikely that the title will change, no
matter how technically inaccurate it may be.45 For this reason I will continue to use the term
“New Atheist,” but with the understanding that the movement, like the label, is more popular
than academic. The New Atheists are arguing more against the presence of a Western JudeoChristian religious tradition in the public realm due to their claim of a link between religion and
violence than they are arguing about the existence or non-existence of God.
As noted by Stenger, the most basic message communicated by the New Atheists is that
religion is evil. It is not an incorrect but benign superstition to ignore, but an evil to eradicate.
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The difficulty in classifying the New Atheists as strict atheists can be seen, for example, in Richard
Dawkins himself as he develops a seven-point scale to describe the range of faith from “1”—someone who is certain
about the existence of God to “7”—someone who is equally certain about the non-existence of God. Dawkins labels
himself as a six out of seven. Dawkins describes the seventh positions as a “Strong atheist. ‘I know there is no
God’”, but he labels his own positon as a 6, which he calls a “De facto atheist.” In this categorization, while
Dawkins calls himself a “De facto atheist”, he is in fact describing in the strictest sense of the term an agnostic
position. Dawkins himself says that he would be surprised to find very many people in his seventh category at all,
and he does not see the strong atheistic position as a likely possibility. Dawkins, God Delusion, 50–51; emphasis
original.
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Richard Dawkins provides a first-hand take on the name “New Atheist” in his memoir, Brief Candle in the
Dark, and he comes to a fairly similar point. “Wherever the phrase came from, ‘New Atheists’ seems to have stuck.
… I don’t object to any of these phrases. It is, however, necessary to disclaim any suggestion that ‘new’ atheism is
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Stenger is quite bald-faced in his claim that religion is evil, as he writes, “Faith in God is the
cause of innumerable evils and should be rejected on moral grounds. Morality does not require
belief in God, and people behave better without faith than with it.”46 At the conclusion of his
book, Stenger summarizes the position of the New Atheists as arguing that faith is worthless and
dangerous, and religion is a moral sickness.47 Or, as Richard Dawkins says in The God Delusion,
quoting Nobel Prize-winning American physicist Steven Weinberg, “Religion is an insult to
human dignity. With or without it, you’d have good people doing good things and evil people
doing evil things. But for good people to do evil things, it takes religion.”48 Other similar
arguments on the part of the New Atheists could be added as well.49
The basis of the New Atheists claim that religion is evil is that in their view, religion is a
common cause of violence. Sam Harris writes in the first of the New Atheist books, The End of
Faith, “We can see at a glance that aspiring martyrs will not make good neighbors in the future.
We have simply lost the right to our myths and to our mythic identities.”50 In his next book,
Letter to a Christian Nation, Harris writes:
Faith inspires violence in at least two ways. First, people often kill other human
beings because they believe the creator of the universe wants them to do it. …
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This argument is also well-noted, although not well-refuted, in secondary sources about the New Atheists.
Ted Peters states that the New Atheists condemn not just belief in God but respect for belief in God since religion is
not only wrong but evil. Ted Peters, “The God Hypothesis and the Future of Atheism,” in McGrath, Dennett, and
Stewart, Future of Atheism, 168. Richard Harries argues that the New Atheists, whom he calls attack dogs, believe
that religion is not only wrong but “pernicious, an evil or poison that needs to be eliminated from the bloodstream of
society.” Richard Harries, “Foreword,” in Amarasingam, Religion, xi. Phillip Johnson and John Mark Reynolds
argue that the New Atheists see religion as evil and claim that it should no longer be tolerated. Johnson and
Reynolds, Against All Gods, 17. Dinesh D’Souza writes that the New Atheists make the charge “that Christianity is
worse than irrational—it is evil.” Dinesh D’Souza, What’s So Great about Christianity (Washington, DC: Regnery,
2007), 203.
50

Harris, End of Faith, 48.

58

Second, far greater numbers of people fall into conflict with one another because they
define their moral community on the basis of their religious affiliation.51
Daniel Dennett, in Breaking the Spell, argues that violence can be fueled by religion, as
“religions are certainly the most prolific source of the ‘moral certainties’ and ‘absolutes’ that
such zealotry depends on.”52 Richard Dawkins wittily links religions and violence in The God
Delusion as he writes, “Immunized against fear by the promise of a martyr’s paradise, the
authentic faith-head deserves a high place in the history of armaments, alongside the longbow,
the warhorse, the tank, and the cluster bomb.”53 The connection between violence and religions
motivation is common throughout the pages of the New Atheist books.54
The New Atheists tend to make the argument that religions are violent because the holy
books upon which they are based are violent either by example or by admonition. Victor Stenger,
in his book, God: The Failed Hypothesis, notes that “The Old Testament is filled with atrocities
committed in the name of God. These are rarely mentioned in Sunday School, but anyone can
pick up a Bible and read them for herself.”55 In his later book, The New Atheism, Stenger devotes
several pages to listing violent passages in the Bible and supposedly morally questionable
teachings ascribed to Jesus.56 Richard Dawkins demonstrates both avenues of Scriptural
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Again, this connection can be seen readily in the secondary literature. John Haught notes that the New
Atheists place the blame for killing and maiming on religions, and to free the world of such violence a radical
solution is needed—no more faith. Haught, God, 7. Jeffrey Robbins and Christopher Rodkey note, “Taken together
in sum, the new atheists tell us religion has been one of the principal causes of human suffering, that it has led to
violence, and that it promotes extremism.” Robbins and Rodkey, “Beating ‘God’ to Death,” 25. Alister McGrath
claims that the New Atheists make the allegation that Christianity causes violence. McGrath, “Challenges from
Atheism,” 26. From the same compilation, we find Sam Soloman arguing that there is the widely held and
unquestioned belief that religion is the main cause of violence and oppression in the world. Sam Soloman,
“Challenges from Islam,” in Zacharias, Beyond Opinion, 52.
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guidance, example and admonition, in The God Delusion. He writes:
There are two ways in which scripture might be a source of morals or rules for living.
One is by direct instruction, for example through the Ten Commandments, which are
the subject of such bitter contention in the culture wars of America’s boondocks. The
other is by example: God, or some other biblical character, might serve as—to use the
contemporary jargon—a role model. Both scriptural routes, if followed through
religiously (the adverb is used in its metaphoric sense but with an eye to its origin),
encourage a system of morals which any civilized modern person, whether religious
or not, would find—I cannot put it more gently—obnoxious.57
As with the previous lines of New Atheist argumentation, other examples linking Scripture with
motivation for violence and mischief could be given as well.58
In conjunction with these linked lines of argumentation that religion is evil, the New
Atheists also make the argument that the God worshiped by Christianity is himself evil. This
argument can also be extended out to his followers. If God is evil and his followers seek to
imitate him in nature and in actions, then the followers are evil also. Stenger makes the argument
that a God who is described as being willing to damn people to hell might be a possible God, but
such a God would not be a moral God. However, Stenger shrewdly argues, an evil God would be
perfectly compatible with evidence we see of evil in the world.59
The New Atheists hold that religion is evil and a detriment to society for five reasons, some
of which have received significant apologetic responses, and some of which have not been
adequately addressed. While I will list all five reasons the New Atheists claim religion to be evil,
I will devote significant time to an exploration of those topics which have not been adequately
57
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New Atheist claim is that religion poisons everything, and that the Bible leads people to violence. McGrath, Why
God, 62.
59
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answered by apologetic responses. The five reasons the New Atheists hold that religion is not a
neutral topic but a negative topic, a root of evil, are: 1) religions, in the accusations of the New
Atheists, are the most prominent sponsor of worldwide violence,60 2) religions are inherently
intolerant, and thus unworthy of toleration themselves,61 3) religious moderates, in the view of
the New Atheists, provide cover for extremist religious views and thus are equally responsible
for violence,62 4) religions, according to the New Atheists, define faith almost exclusively as
blind faith,63 and 5) religions, in the view of the New Atheists, hinder or try to circumvent
scientific exploration, and science should be held as the primary or nearly exclusive source of
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See, among many other places, the claim that faith is not benign but leads to violence in Stenger, New
Atheism, 46. Several additional references are provided above, and I will continue to document and support this
theme in the coming pages as well.
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We have already seen signs of intolerance toward religions in the New Atheists as for example in Sam
Harris’ quote that “aspiring martyrs will not make good neighbors in the future. We have simply lost the right to our
myths and to our mythic identities.” Harris, End of Faith, 48. While the New Atheists will occasionally make an
outright call for an active intolerance of faith, often their intolerance is more circumspect, as in the example just
noted. However, whether by active means or passive, the New Atheists’ intolerance toward religion is quite
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encounter such a sweeping intolerance of tolerance. Intolerance of tolerance seems to be a truly novel feather of the
new atheists’ solution to the problem of human misery.” Haught, God, 10. See also Johnson and Reynolds, Against
All Gods, 17.
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Sam Harris makes the claim that religious moderates are as guilty as extremists in the opening pages of the
very first New Atheist book, The End of Faith. He writes, “Of course, people of faith fall on a continuum: some
draw solace and inspiration from a specific spiritual tradition, and yet remain fully committed to tolerance and
diversity, while others would burn the earth to cinders if it would put an end to heresy. There are, in other words,
religious moderates and religious extremists, and their various passions and projects should not be confused. One of
the central themes of this book, however, is that religious moderates are themselves the bearers of a terrible dogma:
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Delusion, 306.
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knowledge.64 As a result of these five reasons the New Atheists see religions as a source of evil.
Thus, they demonstrate an openly evangelistic zeal to de-convert readers of their works from any
and all religious faith traditions and convert people to an atheist view. In addition, they seek to
limit toleration of religious views.65 In general, the New Atheists argue that atheism should have
a stronger voice in society than religion, since religion’s many moral failings show that religions
are evil and a detriment to society rather than a force for common good. The first three summary
statements are rooted in the New Atheists’ approach utilizing emotional and ethical rhetorical
appeals, while the last two summary statements present a rational rhetorical argument regarding
the nature of faith as the word is variously defined and the facts of scientific inquiry.
The Methods of the New Atheists
As the New Atheists constitute a shift away from traditional atheistic arguments, they also
64

See Victor Stenger’s The New Atheism where he notes that his main themes are regarding science and
regarding violence in religion. Stenger, New Atheism, 14–15. The thoughts on violence have already been noted,
here the significance of the reference is to note the importance placed on science. See also Haught, God, xiii–xiv.
Stanley Hauerwas finds it somewhat of a curiosity that the New Atheists assume “that the most decisive challenges
to the truthfulness of Christian convictions come from developments in the sciences or, perhaps, more accurately
put, the ‘method’ of science.” Stanley Hauerwas, Approaching the End: Eschatological Reflections on Church,
Politics, and Life (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 74. Hauerwas thus finds that the New Atheists’ emphasis on the
methodology of science is misplaced, and I would agree that this is not their strongest critique of Christianity.
However, Hauerwas goes on to imply that the New Atheists “think it important to show what Christians believe to
be false.” Hauerwas, Approaching the End, 74. Hauerwas finds it strange that the New Atheists would attempt to
show the falsehood of Christianity because the Christian life has become so watered down as to be virtually
indistinguishable from other lifestyles. While I would tend to agree with Hauerwas that the Christian lifestyle has
become unremarkable and my project is to show positive opportunities for Christians to demonstrate their Christian
faith through applied service in vocation, I think the New Atheists view the Christian life (or any life rooted in faith)
to be dangerous, rather than culturally accommodated and benign. However, despite this perceived threat, I would
also assert that the New Atheists do not so much try to prove what Christians believe to be false as they launch a
broadside attack against implementing faith in life at all, whether it is true or not.
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While these five summary statements are, to the best of my knowledge, original to me, others have come to
quite similar conclusions. For example, Alister McGrath states that in his view, there are four main challenges from
the New Atheists. 1) Christianity, like all religions, leads to violence. 2) God is just an invention designed to console
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62

demonstrate a shift toward harsher tones of attack. The change in the message of the New
Atheists, attacking the goodness of religion rather than the truth of religion, also brings about a
change in the method of their argumentation. While arguments about the factual nature of
religion are most naturally conducted using logic and reason, arguments about the goodness of
Christianity are less naturally suited to logical discussion and debate. Thus the New Atheists
shift their method of presentation accordingly. The New Atheists do not so much argue that
Christianity is factually wrong as they argue that Christianity is morally wrong. To do so, they
present their case on the ground most favorable to their proposition, and rightly so. The most
favorable ground, however, is not logical argument, but the provision of examples of religion as
a moral evil presented with emotional power and coupled with claims to the moral superiority of
atheism. For this reason, the New Atheists have subtly changed their method of argumentation.
Rather than relying exclusively on rational/logical appeals in their rhetorical approach, the New
Atheists broaden the attack to include emotional and ethical appeals in their rhetorical arsenal. In
fact, the New Atheists are less effective in their writing when they use rational appeals, and their
strongest points are made using emotional and ethical appeals.
The tendency of the New Atheists to rely more on emotionally charged, passionate
arguments than on dispassionate reason has been noted even by other atheists. This is reflected in
the way that Victor Stenger presents a discussion among various atheists at a meeting called
Beyond Belief held at the Salk Institute in San Diego in November of 2006. Stenger reports that
Sam Harris and Richard Dawkins were a part of the meeting, and “Top scholars in science also
attended and most of those who spoke were atheists.”66 Stenger writes, “I was somewhat taken
aback by the benign view of religion presented by the atheistic scientists other than Harris and
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Dawkins.”67 He also laments that “Other atheist speakers came down hard on Harris and
Dawkins, arguing that their approach will not earn any converts to atheism and asking what right
do atheists have to deny believers the comforts of faith.”68 Stenger bemoans that, while Harris
and Dawkins tried valiantly to make their case, the other atheists at the conference were not
swayed.69
It is interesting to note that, while Stenger calls attention to the fact that most attendees at
the conference were scientists and atheists, what interests Stenger in his description of the
conversation is not the scientific material presented in defense of atheism, but instead the
approach to rhetoric preferred by most atheists as opposed to the harsh tenor of the New
Atheists. The pushback from the scientifically atheistic representatives at the conference, and the
point of resentment with Stenger, comes in regards to the question of what approach to
communicating atheism will be most helpful or least detrimental. The majority of attendees at
the conference apparently noted the tendency of the New Atheists to use harsh, violence-driven,
fear-laden emotional appeals against religions, and feared that such a tactic would offend and
drive people away from atheism rather than attract them. The disagreement had nothing to do
with the rational content of atheism in general or various scientific approaches suggested to
support the claims of atheism, rather the disagreement at the conference revolved around what
type of rhetorical attack is best used to appeal to people who may be leaning toward atheism.
The New Atheists recognize that their approach bears rhetorical differences from the
standard approach other atheists have taken over the years, and as Stenger identified, the
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rhetorical presentation of their arguments is of great interest to their overall project. For this
reason, I will approach the New Atheist writings by using a limited form of rhetorical analysis
focusing on their use of the three methods of appeal: rational appeal, emotional appeal, and
ethical appeal. These three methods of appeal are, of course, only a small component within the
overall field of rhetoric, and I do not plan to engage here in a full rhetorical analysis of the New
Atheist writings. However limited, I believe even a focus on just the three rhetorical appeals as
used by the New Atheists can bring a new and helpful understanding of how it is that the New
Atheists seek to advance their argument that religion is evil, and this focus on the rhetorical
appeals can hopefully also point to ways that the New Atheist message can then be countered in
Christian message and methodology.
In recent years, consideration of rhetoric has been resurgent in Christian scholarship, and
with a much broader approach than what I will be implementing. As but one example of this
trend, one could consider the “Socio-Rhetorical Commentary Series” undertaken by Ben
Witherintgon III.70 A fuller treatment of rhetoric within the Christian tradition not only marks
Scriptural interpretation, but has certainly also been used in other theological disciplines as well.
A fuller rhetorical treatment has been attempted in the field of apologetics, notably by Mark
Edwards in Apologetics in the Roman Empire: Pagans, Jews, and Christians.71 When this in-
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depth form of rhetorical treatment has been used in the apologetic field, it has invariably been
utilized to consider the format of early Christian apologetics, since Aristotle’s rhetorical
guidelines were much more influential in the apologetic approaches of the early church.
However, with the Enlightenment the rational appeal became central to the near exclusion of the
emotional and ethical appeals. These more in-depth rhetorical approaches, while they are of
considerable value in these respective disciplines, are more than what is needed to analyze the
fairly blunt and inelegant approach to argumentation implemented by the New Atheists. A
consideration of their use of the three rhetorical appeals will suffice to show their overall
methodological approach.72
As we consider the New Atheists’ use of the three rhetorical appeals we need to keep two
things in mind. First, we must recall that for the past several centuries, attacks on Christianity
have used the rational appeal (logos) almost exclusively, and this is the method of argument that
traditional apologetic approaches have also utilized to respond. Thus, when we see that the New
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Atheists do not rely exclusively on the rational rhetorical appeal but rather advance their
argument predominantly, and perhaps most strongly and effectively, through the emotional
rhetorical appeal (pathos) and the ethical rhetorical appeal (ethos), this alone is sufficient
justification for using the rhetorical appeals to explore the New Atheist books. Second, we need
to remember that while the rational appeal has been given priority of place for the last several
centuries, the emotional and ethical appeals are not illegitimate forms of argument. They are not
“illogical” or “irrational.” Aristotle, on whose work subsequent consideration of the three
rhetorical appeals is based, notes the importance of the ethical and emotional appeals.
Aristotle places great emphasis on the emotional appeals and devotes significant time to
exploring how they work. One of the reasons Aristotle focused on the validity of the emotional
appeal is that he stressed that the when goal of rhetoric was to persuade, pathos along with ethos
and logos were all valid means to achieve that end. He writes:
Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available
means of persuasion. This is not a function of any other art. Every other art can
instruct or persuade about its own particular subject-matter; for instance, medicine
about what is healthy and unhealthy, geometry about the properties of magnitudes,
arithmetic about numbers, and the same is true of the other arts and sciences. But
rhetoric we look upon as the power of observing the means of persuasion on almost
any subject presented to us.73
Aristotle’s stress of the validity of the emotional appeal flows from his emphasis that
rhetoric is persuasive. He notes, “The Emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to
affect their judgements.”74 Rhetoric cannot be limited to logos and merely informing, but also
necessarily includes making use of emotional appeals. James Herrick, in The History and Theory
of Rhetoric, notes:

73

Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.2. Aristotle, Roberts, Bywater, and Solmsen, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 25.

74

Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.1. Aristotle, Roberts, Bywater, and Solmsen, Aristotle’s Rhetoric, 91.

67

As Aristotle views emotions, they are not irrational impediments to decision making.
Rather, they are rational responses to certain kinds of circumstances and arguments.
... Thus, emotional appeals need not be irrational and irrelevant elements of
persuasive discourse; they can become part of a carefully reasoned case.75
Mark Longaker and Jeffrey Walker, in Rhetorical Analysis, add, “Pathos is the emotion of the
audience. This mood or feeling motivates the audience to believe or do something. It is often said
that pathos—desire, fear, anger, love, and so on—moves a person to take action.”76 The use of
emotion to persuade is not, according to Aristotle, irrational, and it is often of great effect in
moving an audience from complacent agreement to action. Aristotle notes, “persuasion is
effected through the audience, when they are brought by the speech into a state of emotion; for
we give very different decisions under the sway of pain or joy and liking or hatred.77”
Not only does Aristotle place great emphasis on the emotional appeal as a means to
motivate hearers to action through persuasion, he also places a high value on the ethical appeal to
the character of the speaker. In this regard, he writes:
The orator must not only try to make the arguments of his speech demonstrative and
worthy of belief; he must also make his own character look right and put his hearers,
who are to decide, into the right frame of mind … it adds much to an orator’s
influence that his own character should look right and that he be thought to entertain
the right feelings toward his hearers; and also that his hearers themselves should be in
just the right frame of mind.78
In fact, as noted in an historical study of rhetoric:
Aristotle apparently held that of the three artistic proofs—logos, pathos, and ethos—
this last one, ethos, potentially was the most persuasive. When people are convinced
that a speaker is knowledgeable, trustworthy, and has their best interests at heart, they
likely will accept as true what the speaker has to say.79
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For Aristotle, the ethical appeal was developed within the content of the speech itself, rather than
being seen in the life of the orator. Corbett and Connors note:
The ethical appeal is exerted, according to Aristotle, when the speech itself impresses
the audience that the speaker is a person of sound sense (phronēsis), high moral
character (areté), and benevolence (eunomia). Notice that it is the speech itself that
must create this impression. Thus a person wholly unknown to an audience (and this
is often the case when we listen to a speech or read an article in a magazine) could by
his or her words alone inspire this kind of confidence.80
Aristotle “did not feel that the listener should concern himself unduly with the orator’s actions
outside of the immediate rhetorical situation.”81 However, other writers on rhetoric, notably
Quintilian, disagreed. Quintilian’s “good man theory” held that the character of the speaker was
of vital importance, and that depth of character must extend outside the confines of the speech
itself. “In Book XII of his Institutes of Oratory, Quintilian develops his concept of the perfect
orator. First, he is a good man and after that he is skilled in speaking.”82 While the way a
rhetorician presents himself or herself within communication is certainly important and needs to
be considered with care, I will also work with the broader understanding of Quintilian that the
character of the rhetorician outside the act of communication itself is of great importance.
While the ethical appeal involves the character of the speaker, it is important to note that
the ad hominem attack is not a component of the ethical appeal. While the two are related in that
an ad hominem attack has an effect upon the hearer’s understanding of the speaker’s character,
an attack upon the character of an opponent, by itself, is not an ethical appeal. Since such attacks
are frequent in New Atheist writings, however, it is important to consider how they may
function. If used carefully, with an audience that has been predisposed to a certain viewpoint, an
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ad hominem attack can work in concert with an ethical appeal. For example, if an audience
already has a distrust toward one party, and at least the likelihood of sympathy with the speaker,
a careful ad hominem attack can serve to further distance the hearers from the one party and
align them more closely with the speaker, whom they now see as of higher moral character. In
such a case, the ad hominem attack, while not been the ethical appeal itself, has furthered the
cause of the ethical appeal.
However, the opposite can also be true. If a speaker attacks an opponent using an ad
hominem attack that the audience finds to be unfair, inaccurate, or abusive, then the hearers are
just as likely to think less of the moral character of the speaker and reject the argument. In such a
case, an ad hominem attack can backfire from the standpoint of an ethical appeal. As Corbett and
Connors point out, “The effect of the ethical appeal might very well be destroyed by a single
lapse from good sense, good will, or moral integrity. A note of peevishness, a touch of
malevolence, a flash of bad taste, a sudden display of inaccuracy or illogic could jeopardize a
person’s whole persuasive effort.”83
From this brief overview of rhetoric, first from Aristotle and then from Quintilian, we see
two important themes. First, emotional arguments, while not being rational appeals, are not
therefore irrational. Second, ethical appeals may be the most persuasive of all. These two themes
will guide our understanding of the New Atheist arguments as we move forward through three
case studies from their books. They will also guide thoughts on how to shape a Christian
response.
Christian apologists frequently note that the New Atheists are weak or worse in their
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scholarship on the topic of religion.84 While that is true, it is equally important to recognize that
New Atheism is not a scholarly movement persuading people by its scholarly arguments. Rather,
it is a popular publishing phenomenon.85 At its heart, New Atheism is a populist movement
started by the publication of a series of best-selling books that has gained traction in popular
culture. As a popular cultural experience, New Atheism has been shaped by and in turn shapes
conversations about religion in American culture. Since that is the case, it is helpful to broaden
one’s approach in evaluating the New Atheism and to consider it as a popular cultural experience
rather than only as a scholarly academic endeavor.
84
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A rhetorical analysis of the core New Atheist writings will show that, while the New
Atheists utilize all three forms of rhetorical appeal to some extent, they work most powerfully
with the emotional and ethical appeals. In a culture that has historically placed great value on the
rational appeal, this does not mean, however, that the New Atheists should be dismissed lightly.
To the contrary, the New Atheists have the potential of being far more damaging to Christianity
with their emotional appeals than an isolated rational argument ever could as culture itself is
moving away from rational appeals in favor of emotional presentations. This transition from the
use of rational rhetorical appeals to the more prominent use of emotional and ethical rhetorical
appeals has been underway for some time. In fact, already in 2002 before the New Atheists
wrote, David Wilkinson made the case in an article entitled “The Art of Apologetics in the
Twenty-First Century” that Christians are losing ground in public appeal because they are not
making any serious contact with the wider public whereas the leading scientists (he specifically
names Richard Dawkins) are communicating directly with the public, and their communication
is a rhetorically persuasive one.86
In order to encourage a form of apologetics that will communicate at the level of cultural
critique, I will examine four examples of such emotional and ethical appeals from New Atheist
writings, working thematically with the categories of “Emotional Appeals Connecting Religion
with Violence,” “Emotional Appeals Challenging the Authority of Scripture,” “Emotional
Appeals Showing Religion Is Evil and a Detriment to Society,” and “Ethical Appeals Showing
the Moral Superiority of Atheism.” While I will present only a handful of samples demonstrating
the emotional and ethical appeals utilized by the New Atheists, I suggest that these are
representative of the larger genre.
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Case Study 1: Emotional Appeals Connecting Religion with Violence
While it is, in fact, sometimes difficult to find a clear and well-reasoned rational appeal in
the writings of the New Atheists, emotional appeals show up early and often. In fact I would
argue that the very first pages of the very first of the New Atheist books, Sam Harris’ The End of
Faith, set the example and tone for this form of appeal. In the very first paragraphs of his book,
Harris sets out an emotionally loaded scenario in which he makes a very clear case for linking
religions with violence. The segment is included in its entirety below to allow the full emotional
appeal to develop. Harris writes:
The young man boards the bus as it leaves the terminal. He wears an overcoat.
Beneath his overcoat, he is wearing a bomb. His pockets are filled with nails, ball
bearings, and rat poison. The bus is crowded and headed for the heart of the city.
The young man takes his seat beside a middle-aged couple. He will wait for the bus
to reach its next stop. The couple at his side appears to be shopping for a new
refrigerator. The woman has decided on a model, but her husband worries that it will
be too expensive. He indicates another one in a brochure that lies open on her lap.
The next stop comes into view. The bus doors swing. The woman observes that the
model her husband has selected will not fit in the space underneath their cabinets.
New passengers have taken the last remaining seats and begun gathering in the aisle.
The bus is now full. The young man smiles. With the press of a button he destroys
himself, the couple at his side, and twenty others on the bus. The nails, ball bearings,
and rat poison ensure further casualties on the street and in the surrounding cars. All
has gone according to plan.
The young man’s parents soon learn of his fate. Although saddened to have lost a
son, they feel tremendous pride at his accomplishment. They know that he has gone
to heaven and prepared the way for them to follow. He has also sent his victims to
hell for eternity. It is a double victory. The neighbors find the event a great cause for
celebration and honor the young man’s parents by giving them gifts of food and
money.
These are the facts. This is all we know for certain about the young man. Is there
anything else that we can infer about him on the basis of his behavior? Was he
popular in school? Was he rich or was he poor? Was he of low or high intelligence?
His actions leave no clue at all. Did he have a college education? Did he have a bright
future as a mechanical engineer? His behavior is simply mute on questions of this
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sort, and hundreds like them. Why is it so easy, then, so trivially easy—you-couldalmost-bet-your-life-on-it easy—to guess the young man’s religion?87
In this passage, Sam Harris is setting up his argument that religions are evil in part because
they cause violence. However, if that were all he were trying to do, he could have simply
mentioned a suicide bomber, and linked him to a particular religion, thus making his case
rationally. Why does Harris go to the lengths he does to describe the crime and carnage? Because
he wants to present an emotional appeal in this case, more than a rational one. It is hard to miss
the vivid presentation that Harris offers regarding the suicide bombing.
Harris notes that when the bomber boards, the bus is crowded, and headed for the heart of a
city. By mentioning the heart of a city, Harris draws an allusion to society as an organic whole,
in which the faith-deluded actions of one person injure the whole of society. Harris chooses to
describe the destination of the bus not as the business district or the shopping district or as the
city center, but as the heart of the city. Thus, the religiously motivated act of violence being
carried out strikes not a geographical area but a heart, setting up the charge the religion kills
society itself.
Notice the personalization that Harris brings to the victims. The couple that sits next to the
bomber is middle-aged, and we are given a snippet of their life to identify with them. They are
trying to decide what refrigerator to buy. These are common, everyday people. They are simply
carrying out the duties of everyday life. They could be any one of us. They are not fanatics, they
are not engaging in any high-risk or questionable endeavors. They are shoppers. We are all, at
times, shoppers. By focusing on commonality, Harris is by extension placing each one of us in
the seat next to the bomber—or perhaps our parents or our children or our friends or our
neighbors. The point is that this form of religiously motivated violence is indiscriminate. It could
87
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affect any of us at any time, so we all have a stake in eliminating this form of violence. The New
Atheists would say that the best way to do so would be to eliminate religions.
After setting the scene and allowing us to identify with the future victims, we are given a
glimpse into the mental state of the bomber. Harris initially describes the bus as being crowded,
but we come to see that it is not yet completely full. The complete carnage desired by the bomber
is not yet possible. However, after another stop, the bus is full to the point that the last seats are
taken and the passengers are gathering in the aisle. He smiles. He is happy that his destructive act
will affect the largest number of people he could reach. Harris makes sure we recognize that the
bomber is engaging in cold, calculated, premeditated murder. He hints at the bomber’s diabolical
plan by explaining that the bomber intentionally chooses to wait until a second stop to make sure
the bus is filled to capacity. Harris ends his account of the bombing act itself by saying that from
the bomber’s perspective, all has gone according to plan. This is no accident. This is
premeditated mass murder at its most malignant. By showing the reader the bomber’s pleasure at
the devastation he plans and anticipates, we are led to feel revulsion towards him—and by
extension, towards his motives, which are rooted in his religious faith.
For Harris however, feeling revulsion toward the bomber is not enough. Harris does not
want the reader to feel anger only toward an individual terrorist. Instead he wants his audience to
experience disgust toward the terrorist’s entire religion. This is why Harris offers the third
paragraph, narrating the scene that unfolds when the bomber’s family hears about the suicide
attack. We are told that they feel tremendous pride at their son’s accomplishment, but even that
does not implicate enough people in the deed for Harris. He goes on to tell of how the neighbors,
who here representing a broader swath of the entire religious group in question, celebrate the
wonderful event and offer gifts to the proud parents. Harris leads his readers to feel revulsion at
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this celebration of violence. Whereas rational people might bring presents to parents to celebrate
new life, such as the birth of a child, in the religious system Harris describes neighbors celebrate
the death of a child, so long as he takes infidels with him in a gory act of religious glory.
Finally, notice that Harris tries to plant the seed that what he has actually done is make a
rational argument. He states “These are the facts.” Facts are impersonal, rational things. Harris
makes the claim that he is dealing with the building-blocks of reason. In fact he is not, at least
not primarily. The facts could be presented thus: “Muhammed Bin Mohammed, age 19,
detonated a suicide bomb on a city bus just after it pulled out from Central Station, killing all 23
people on the bus, and also injuring five people on the street.” (While the names and figures are
fictitious, they parallel the details in Harris’ account.) Beyond that, Harris in the paragraphs he
actually wrote was not dealing in the realm of reason and fact, but in the realm of emotion. While
presenting to his reader that he is presenting a rational case, Harris actually pulls a bait-andswitch and substitutes an almost entirely emotional appeal instead.
Harris proceeds, in the closing paragraph of this illustration, to link religion to societal ills.
He mentions specifically education and socioeconomic status, but states that he could list
hundreds of other categories as well, such as race, gender, and the like. He then implies that the
root cause of the suicide bomber’s actions are deeper, and thus more problematic, than any of
these. The root cause for Harris is religion. If the problem were education, then address the
educational problem. If the problem were socioeconomic, then address income inequality. Both
of these are topics of lively debate in society today. However, Harris implies that religion should
be of far higher importance for society to address and “fix” than any of these others. Harris’
suggested “fix” for religion is its eradication.
For Harris in setting up this scenario, all has gone according to plan. It is a nicely executed
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tug on the reader’s heartstrings and it brilliantly sets up the central argument of Harris’ book that
faith causes violence and thus we must find a way to bring about the “end of faith.”

Case Study 2: Emotional and Ethical Appeals Challenging the Authority of Scripture as a
Guide to Morality
Sam Harris’ second book, Letter to a Christian Nation, is also solidly within the New
Atheists genre, and like its predecessor, it likewise demonstrates a heavy reliance on emotional
rhetorical appeals as just seen in the introduction to The End of Faith. In the passage examined
below Harris adds to the argument that religion and violence are connected as he goes a step
further to use tendencies to violence to make a subtle attack on the authority of Scripture as an
appropriate guide to morality. By seeking an emotional reaction against the moral authority of
Scripture, by extension the overall reliability of Scripture is also at stake. In his Letter to a
Christian Nation, Harris writes,
The idea that the Bible is a perfect guide to morality is simply astounding, given the
contents of the book. Admittedly, God’s counsel to parents is straightforward:
whenever children get out of line, we should beat them with a rod (Proverbs 13:24,
20:30, and 23:13–14). If they are shameless enough to talk back to us, we should kill
them (Exodus 21:15, Leviticus 20:9, Deuteronomy 21:18–21, Mark 7:9–13, and
Matthew 15:4–7). We must also stone people to death for heresy, adultery,
homosexuality, working on the Sabbath, worshipping graven images, practicing
sorcery, and a wide variety of other imaginary crimes.88
Harris begins his argument by referencing the Christian claim that the Bible offers a
“perfect guide to morality.” By referencing perfection, Harris gestures toward Christian claims of
inerrancy and holiness for their Scriptures. If Scripture is inerrant, Christians would claim that it
is historically accurate and non-contradictory in its content. Harris has this level of perfection in
his sights as he attacks the moral perfection of the Bible also. By referencing a guide to morality,
Harris suggests such biblical counsel has practical implications for daily life. At this point,
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however, Harris’ analysis of Scripture takes an ironic and humorous turn. Harris offers a series
of various situations that are coordinated with biblical commands. The listing moves from
common situations in which one could expect general agreement about moral behavior like
matters of parenting, through controverted public debates such as homosexuality, to specific
situations that are clearly religious including worshipping graven images and sorcery. While the
situations proceed from common to religious and from simple to complex, the biblical guidance
is simply and consistently violent and intolerant to an extreme. Whether one is working with a
wayward child, homosexuality, or sorcery, the common moral guidance is to kill. Harris
describes such consistent violence as “God’s counsel,” ironically playing upon the normal
associations of counsel with therapeutic care; and his description of this counsel as
“straightforward” deflects serious moral consideration through humor. Harris implies that God’s
direction for every situation will always be for Christians to kill. One can hardly be more
“straightforward” than that.
Harris’ irony and humor signal that he is not approaching this argument seriously. To do so
would require a much more rigorous standard of interpretation that would need to be applied to
all of the Biblical passages he is citing and an honest evaluation of how Christianity treats such
passages in relation to ethical guidance for its people. Harris, however, is not making a rational
appeal to persuade his readers. Instead, he is relying upon an emotional and ethical appeal.
Emotionally, Harris is highlighting teachings that would offend most of his readers, for example
the admonition to kill children when they “talk back” to their parents. He is also highlighting
situations that are emotionally charged because of a highly sexualized culture as he touches on
adultery and homosexuality. In addition, he shocks the reader when he uses the term “simply
astounding” by subverting the common cultural assumption of a benevolent deity at the heart of
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the Christian faith with a revelation of a violent deity whose consistent counsel is to kill.
In terms of an ethical appeal, Harris is building the case for a much larger argument that
limits the cultural influence of Christianity out of righteous anger and public concern. Harris
claims that Christianity fabricates rules and then imposes death upon those who disobey them.
Rather than call these rules “imaginary” up front, however, Harris strategically waits until the
end to label all of this fictitious. By that time, the reader will have moved from general examples
that belie common sense such as killing a child for talking back, through specific examples that
are complex and presently debated within the culture like homosexuality, to sectarian examples
that are much harder to define including working on the Sabbath and worshipping graven
images. If even Christians are not in agreement on what constitutes the Sabbath or worshipping
graven images, is it really just to command death as the penalty? Appealing to the reader’s desire
for fairness and the protection of life, Harris labels these matters “imaginary crimes,”
constructing a vision of the church as an institution that makes up rules to criminalize people and
then kills them for disobeying. The language of “imaginary crimes” is intentional. Through the
emotional argument comparing Scriptural morality to criminal behavior, Harris is seeking to
separate his readers from their seemingly crime-drenched faith and lead them to see the supposed
moral superiority of his atheistic position. By extension, if the moral authority of Scripture is not
to be trusted, then the factual accuracy of Scripture can also be called into question with ease. If
the moral teaching of Scripture is abandoned, then the historical teachings of the Bible are trivial
or irrelevant at best.
If the argument is rhetorically powerful, it is partly because Harris is building upon a model
of Scriptural interpretation that has been manifested by the church itself in the public square. The
use of proof texts without proper contextualization or communal deliberation did not originate

79

with the New Atheists. In fact, many readers would associate such proof texting with the church.
Several writers who have responded to the New Atheist movement have noted the literalistic
manner in which the New Atheists deal with Scriptural interpretation. They have compared the
New Atheist approach to Scripture with the approach used by Fundamentalists within
Christianity. Those who critique the movement often refer to the New Atheists as
“Fundamentalist Atheists.”89 The rationale for this designation rests on the idea that they interpret
Scripture in the same literalistic way that fundamentalist Christians interpret Scripture. In fact, at
times the New Atheists are even more literalistic in their interpretation of Scripture than are
fundamentalist Christians.90 That, however, is not because they are ignorant91 but rather because
they are shrewd. Desiring to persuade their readers that Christian religious texts inspire violence,
they use popular but erroneous methods of Christian interpretation to demonstrate how religious
texts sanction violence. Whether or not Christians truly interpret texts this way does not matter.
What matters is that their readers think they could.
The New Atheists’ literalism in interpreting Scripture is particularly obvious in dealing
with texts that seem to call for acts of violence on the part of followers of the Scripture in
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question. Any command given by God to His followers to kill, injure, or maim is taken with
absolute literality and utmost importance by the New Atheists. Of course, in the rare case when
any passages of Scripture urging tolerance or moderation or advocating mercy and charity are
brought up by the New Atheists, their tendency toward literal interpretations fades rapidly. The
New Atheists are more interested in fear-driven emotional appeals coming from violent passages
of Scripture than they are in presenting a rational appeal based in a reasoned interpretation of
Scripture using a balanced and respectable hermeneutical approach.92
In addition to a literalist method of interpretation, the New Atheists claim that people of
faith will act in literal accord with the teachings they interpret literally.93 Thus, the New Atheists
wed a literal interpretation of Scripture to the effect such a reading has on the lives of those who
actually believe.94 In order to hold the position that believers regularly act on their interpretation
of violent passages of Scripture, the New Atheists are extremely selective in the examples they
cite from the world. By way of distortion, the New Atheists amplify any hint of violence
perpetrated in the name of religion even if no direct causal link can be established and ignore any
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possible examples of good done in the name of religion, or under the influence of religion.95 This
unbalanced and exaggerated presentation of Scripture as given in the New Atheists is
immediately recognizable and easily refutable.96 In all likelihood, the New Atheists are not truly
guilty of such inexcusable ignorance on this topic; instead, they are rhetorically sophisticated in
their presentation of the ills of religion.
The New Atheists don’t have a serious interest in solid Scriptural interpretation, as a
rationally sustainable argument is not their primary intent. Instead, the New Atheists work with
Scripture to advance their cause along emotional and ethical lines, not rational ones. The basic
charge leveled against faiths by the New Atheists is that religion is evil, a charge supported
through setting before the readers a series of graphic descriptions of religiously inspired
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violence, leading to the ethical appeal the New Atheists actually have equal or likely, even
greater moral standing to influence culture with their views than do people of faith. In their
view, religion is not an incorrect but benign superstition to ignore, but an evil to eradicate.
The New Atheists do at times use some rational lines of reasoning regarding the historical
accuracy of Scripture, such as allegations that the Bible is filled with contradictions,97 Jesus did
not historically rise from the dead,98 or even that Jesus is not a historical figure at all, having
possibly never existed.99 However, the moral outrage against the ethical authority of the Bible,
built through the emotional appeal alleging that Scripture is the base cause of violence and
societal evil is a stronger, more creative, and more culturally persuasive line of attack put forth
by the New Atheists.
In this way the New Atheists tap into the cultural fear of intolerance sensed in religions.
Society has come to elevate tolerance to the highest virtue. Thus, Harris’ move to show extreme
intolerance on the part of Scriptural believers finds a ready and receptive audience in culture.
Harris argues here that if the Bible says to kill children simply because they talk back to their
parents, that is intolerant in the extreme. Then, the next step of the argument is to demonstrate
that if the Bible teaches something, it is logical to assume that Christians will follow through.
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Christians acting intolerantly based on Scriptural writings is, in the eyes of the New Atheists,
intolerable. When this is connected to the New Atheist insinuation that atheism is thus more
peaceful, more tolerant, and less violent than Christianity, then the New Atheist ethical appeal
can be fully recognized.

Case Study 3: Emotional and Ethical Appeals Showing Religion Is Evil and a Detriment to
Society
Richard Dawkins also relies heavily on emotional appeals in The God Delusion. In the
passage to be examined, he presents a more complex charge that religion is evil and a detriment
to society. Dawkins roots a substantial part of his criticism of religions in an allegation that the
character of the God worshiped by these religions is evil. The way that Dawkins uses the charge
that religions are evil matches well with a parallel cultural critique as documented by George
Yancey and David Williamson in So Many Christians, So Few Lions.100 Thus Dawkins’ message
has an attentive audience, and is at the same time readily reflective of the fears already lodged in
the readers’ minds. In describing God as evil, Dawkins is setting his readers up for an emotional
response that seeks to move his readers from a reverence toward God to a revulsion toward God,
and from adoration of God to anger at God. Dawkins does not stop his emotional appeal with
attitudes toward God, he also extends his emotional appeal to God’s followers as well.
According to Dawkins, those who follow such a God would be apt to act in an evil way, either
because their God demands such behavior or because their God, in his character, models such
behavior for them. Consider the following prominent and oft-quoted101 description of God in The
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God Delusion:
The God of the Old Testament is arguably the most unpleasant character in all fiction:
jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive,
bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynistic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal,
genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously
malevolent bully. Those of us schooled from infancy in his ways can become
desensitized to their horror.102
Note how Dawkins builds on the previous two arguments in this passage. First, his
connection of religion and violence is fairly obvious. He refers to several forms of murder openly
in the passage such as infanticide, genocide, filicide, and outright ethnic cleansing. The alleged
connection between religion and violence is apparent, but Dawkins uses this basic argument for a
deeper purpose. Perhaps more subtle is the way that Dawkins builds on the argument that the
authority of Scripture should be questioned. Dawkins works in this sub-argument with a single
word: “fiction.” By calling God the most unpleasant character in all of fiction, Dawkins subtly
but clearly undermines the authority of Scripture, and does so in a somewhat humorous and
mocking way, just as Harris did in the passage from Letter to a Christian Nation. While these
two basic lines of argumentation, accomplished through emotional rhetorical appeals, are present
and fundamental to the fuller argument put forth here by Dawkins, he also moves on to a more
complex charge that religions are evil and a detriment to society.
In the immediate context where this passage shows up in The God Delusion, Dawkins has
just completed his opening chapter clarifying that he is not arguing against an idea of God that is
simply standing in for the laws of nature. (Dawkins quotes Carl Sagan to this end, “if by ‘God’
one means the set of physical laws that govern the universe, then clearly there is such a God.
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This God is emotionally unsatisfying … it does not make much sense to pray to the law of
gravity.”103) Instead, Dawkins stresses that he is arguing against specifically supernatural gods.104
For example, in his Chapter 2, “The God Hypothesis,” Dawkins traces developments in the
understanding of God from polytheism through monotheism through a weak, supposedly
scientifically compatible version of theism (NOMA) and through agnosticism, with other stops
along the way. In this chapter, he is trying to show a progression from understandings of God as
many to ultimately non-existent. He notes, “I have found it an amusing strategy, when asked
whether I am an atheist, to point out that the questioner is also an atheist when considering Zeus,
Apollo, Amon Ra, Mithras, Baal, Thor, Wotan, the Golden Calf, and the Flying Spaghetti
Monster. I just go one god further.”105
In the specific passage under examination, Dawkins depicts the evil character of God in
language that carries an undeniable emotional power. Through the nouns he chooses, Dawkins
identifies God as a “control-freak,” an “ethnic cleanser,” and a “bully.” Each of these
designations is then preceded by a list of adjectives that are emotionally charged and culturally
resonant for the reader.
It is perhaps most appropriate that Dawkins begins this emotional appeal by listing an
emotion: God is jealous—jealous and proud of it. While jealousy as described of God as used in
Scripture is in fact a positive trait pointing to a shielding, protecting enactment of pure love, in
our current cultural usage jealousy is an almost entirely negative word, and that is exactly how
Dawkins intends it. He links God to the emotion of jealousy, and in so doing links God in our
mind to an immediate emotional alertness. The media is filled with stories of jealous lovers and
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the damage they can bring to partners who try to leave them. The common cultural advice to
partners being consumed by a jealous lover is to flee. Dawkins taps into this flight reaction by
describing God as being jealous. Later in the book, Dawkins returns to this theme as he writes,
“God’s monumental rage whenever his chosen people flirted with a rival god resembles nothing
so much as sexual jealously of the worst kind.”106
Dawkins’ initial description of God being jealous, in addition to setting the emotions on
edge, has the extra advantage for Dawkins of giving some degree of credibility to his subsequent
attacks. God is indeed described as jealous in the Bible, and in the very prominent location of the
10 Commandments.107 Dawkins begins his list with an accurate term, albeit with an inaccurate
meaning for the term, for God. This helps his cause as he begins from an authentic description of
God and then moves to increasingly vehement descriptions of his own making as he builds his
self-described humorous broadside. While the Bible does refer to God as a jealous God it does
not, for example, refer to him as a megalomaniacal God.
After beginning his description of God with the emotion of jealousy, Dawkins labels God
as a “petty, unjust, unforgiving control freak.”108 This pairing of “unjust” and “unforgiving”
catches the attention. By using two words back-to-back beginning with “un,” Dawkins further
roots his description of God in the negative. God is thus being depicted not just as somewhat
bad, but as the opposite of good. In fact, God here is described as the exact opposite of common
characteristics of him. God is often thought of as just, and even more frequently described as
being forgiving. Building on the credibility he established by first describing God as jealous, a
recognizably accurate term, Dawkins now undoes and reverses common positive impressions of
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God.
The final word of the second phrase of Dawkins’ description is “control-freak.” This is a
very important component in his understanding of who God is and what he expects or demands
from his followers. God is to be followed slavishly in Dawkins’ view. He is, as a control-freak, a
domineering presence in every aspect of a believer’s life. For a control freak, and a jealous
control freak at that, every thought and action of a follower must be brought into strict,
subservient conformity with the will of the deity. Service to such a deity is strictly set forth, and
utmost devotion is demanded. Dawkins bases many of his other ideas of a deity on this central
thought that God is a jealous control-freak.
Next in Dawkins’ paragraph is his description of God as an ethnic cleanser. The term
“ethnic cleanser” brings about an immediate emotional association with prominent examples of
ethnic cleansing near the time of publication, including in Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia
(Serbia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia).109 Those with an eye toward more current events could
relate with the recent tragedies in Iraq and Syria. For other readers, the horrors of the Holocaust
in World War II might come to mind. God, in Dawkins’ description, becomes the ultimate Hitler,
Slobodan Milosevic or ISIS jihadi. Later in his work, Dawkins sees ethnic cleansing as part of
the history of God’s people: “the ethnic cleansing begun in the time of Moses is brought to
bloody fruition in the book of Joshua.”110 He also compares supposed ethnic cleansing under
God’s direction with modern versions as he writes, “the invasion of the Promised Land in
general, is morally indistinguishable from Hitler’s invasion of Poland, or Saddam Hussein’s
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massacres of the Kurds and the Marsh Arabs.”111
With images of beheadings on beaches, suicide bombers in concert venues, active shooters
in shopping malls, schools, and sanctuaries, and even trucks used as tools of mass murder in
vacation paradises filling media screens on a regular basis and with a seeming spike in mass
murders perpetrated by openly religious shooters and bombers, this image is probably even more
emotionally powerful now than when Dawkins wrote it 10 years ago. The implication is obvious:
God is violent, and not just violent but violent on a massive scale. God himself, and his followers
by extension, are guilty of violence that ascends to the level of crimes against humanity. New
Atheism repeatedly voices this theme that religions are the most prominent sponsors of
worldwide violence. Furthermore, they are inherently intolerant, and thus unworthy of toleration
themselves. Based on these thoughts, the New Atheists conclude that, far from being a blessing
to humanity, God and his followers have become its greatest curse and therefore should be
silenced or at least controlled.
This larger theme of religious intolerance surfaces again in the final phrase of Dawkins’
famous paragraph, a phrase which testifies to his rhetorical art. Through homoioteleuton, he joins
the words “misogynistic, homophobic” and the longer series “infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal,
pestilential, megalomaniacal” as he drives forward with near poetic power to his conclusion of
God being a “sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.” While the use of “genocidal”
recalls his previous assertion that God is an ethnic cleanser, Dawkins uses the words
“misogynistic, homophobic, racist” to bring the malevolence of God closer in association to the
church’s presence in the public sphere.
Later in his work, Dawkins illustrates this character of God through Biblical stories.112
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When he relates the story of Lot offering his daughters to the men of Sodom for them to rape,
Dawkins writes, “Whatever else this strange story might mean, it surely tells us something about
the respect accorded to women in this intensely religious culture.”113 Then Dawkins notes the
similarity between the story of Lot and the story of the Levite and his concubine in Judges 19:
“again, the misogynistic ethos comes through, loud and clear.”114 Later, describing the conquest
of the Promised Land, Dawkins comments on the “xenophobic relish”115 that is demonstrated.
The words, “misogynistic, homophobic, racist,” set up Dawkins’ later discussion about outgroup hostility vs. out-group altruism and resonate with a cultural setting that is engaged in
religious battles over matters such as women’s roles, homosexuality, and race.
Dawkins also builds to his emotional climax by using a repetition of several themes.
Notably, he reinforces his charge that God is involved in ethnic cleansing by describing him as
genocidal, and further accentuates the charge of violence in God by surrounding that term with
infanticidal and filicidal. Dawkins wants to leave no doubt that God is violent—criminally
violent in each of these cases. As with other words in the phrase under examination, Dawkins
returns to the same themes in Chapter 7, again accusing God of mass murder and the murder of
children. There, he writes, “Do not think, by the way, that the God character in the story nursed
any doubts or scruples about the massacres and genocides that accompanied the seizing of the
Promised Land,”116 and he also notes that the Midianites “were the victims of genocide in their
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own country.”117 He also gives the examples of Abraham almost sacrificing Isaac118 and Jephthah
actually sacrificing his daughter.119 In this instance, Dawkins’ humor is worth printing. He relates
that the daughter spent two months in the mountains to bewail her virginity, and then, “At the
end of this time she meekly returned, and Jephthah cooked her. God did not see fit to intervene
on this occasion.”120 Thus, while Dawkins may be launching a humorous broadside against God,
his point is actually anything but light-hearted. Dawkins is quite serious. For him, God’s
character is an example of moral evil.
Since part of Dawkins’ overall argument found primarily in Chapter 7 is that Christians
take their morality from God as their role-model, then the moral characteristics of God also apply
to the moral characteristics Dawkins ascribes to Christians. Christians are required slavishly to
serve a control-freak God who demands the utmost allegiance from them and models highly
unethical and immoral examples of what such allegiance looks like. Christians, like their God,
are violent bullies with violence reaching to the level of crimes against humanity. Christians are,
like their God, hostile toward people not of their in-group, including women, homosexuals, and
people of other races. The Christian God is a most distasteful fellow, fictitious though he is in
Dawkins’ view. However, for Dawkins the greater problem is that Christians also are a most
distasteful lot, and they are all too real! The implication is that the world would be a better, safer,
more pleasant place without either Christians or their God.
Dawkins is here playing on a strongly emotional appeal to his readers. The characterization
Dawkins gives of God portrays him as hate-filled toward group after group—infants, women,
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homosexuals, minorities, and the like. By extension, Dawkins implies that faithful Christians
who follow the Christian God faithfully exhibit the same hateful tendencies. The natural
emotional response to hatred is hatred in return,121 which is exactly Dawkins’ desired goal. As
Dawkins depicts Christians and the Christian God as hateful, he hopes his readers will come to
hate Christianity as he does. As Dawkins depicts Christianity as intolerant, he hopes to make it
intolerable for his readers. Since society has elevated tolerance to the highest moral position, if
Dawkins can depict religions as being intolerant, he can also make the case that religion is
immoral and thus a detriment to society.
In addition to an emotional appeal, Dawkins supports his argument of the evil of religion
through an ethical appeal. He does this in two ways. First, he points to his own standing and
ability as a scholar. Second, he appeals to the ethical values of his readers and asks them to
evaluate where their sensibilities match better—with his depiction of Christianity or with
Dawkins and atheism.
The first form of this ethical appeal has been noted by Ian Markham in his book Against
Atheism: Why Dawkins, Hitchens, and Harris are Fundamentally Wrong. While not calling it an
ethical appeal, Markham notes that the New Atheists present “a very benign, quite attractive,
Oxbridge atheism,” featuring “the conversations and humor of the university common room, [an]
affection for the King James’ version of the Bible, and [a] love of choirs.”122 This “Oxbridge
atheism,” cultured and polite, peaceful and reasonable, is presented to give Dawkins and the
other New Atheists the ethical standing they seek to be heard despite the hard message they
121
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convey. In this particular passage, one sees the juxtaposition of different registers of language
such as “megalomaniacal” and “bully” to create a rhetorical display of confident erudition
marked by a subtle suggestion of humor.
The second form of the ethical appeal here functions as Dawkins uses language common to
his educated readers, such as “misogynistic, homophobic, racist.” In doing so, Dawkins is calling
on his readers to identify with his ethical standing and values, and to give him a hearing based on
shared moral standards. For example, those who are concerned about the problem of
“homophobia” will give Dawkins a hearing because Dawkins shows himself to be aware of the
problem. People concerned with women’s rights will note his use of the term “misogynistic” and
sense a kindred spirit in Dawkins as opposed to the Christianity with which they may have been
previously aligned. Someone who has been stung by racism will recognize in Dawkins someone
who empathizes with his or her plight, and will be more open to give the New Atheists a hearing
based on this ethical appeal.
At the close of the prominent passage from The God Delusion under examination, Dawkins
notes how Western culture has “schooled” people in the ways of this God and, through such
schooling, they have been “desensitized” to the horrors of his character.123 Here, we see another
common theme of the New Atheist writings: religious moderates provide cover for extremist
religious views and thus are equally responsible for violence. Dawkins argues here that the vast
majority of Western culture has been lulled into peaceful, blissful ignorance about the true
dangers of religion by more moderate, milquetoast versions of religions experienced in early
educational opportunities such as in religious boarding schools, which Dawkins experienced,
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and, for most of his readers, perhaps in Sunday School or Children’s Story Bibles.124 Dawkins
argues that due to the early influence of this religious teaching, faith traditions are given a far
higher respect in culture than they deserve.
In response, Dawkins fights against any privileged view of religious discourse that would
not allow it to be publicly attacked or its writings to be ridiculed. This, in fact, is the reason that
Dawkins writes about religion in the way that he does. What some in the church would call
sacrilegious, Dawkins would call realistic. For too long the church has been able to hide behind a
sacred privilege and Dawkins wants to be able to talk about religion in plain speech.
In the “Preface to the Paperback Edition,” Dawkins notes the rhetorical function of the
intentional sacrilegious humor he is using. In giving his own rhetorical analysis of the passage in
question, Dawkins acknowledges that he is often described as “‘strident’ or ‘shrill.’”125 Dawkins
counters that his “intention was closer to robust but humorous broadside than shrill polemic.”126
Dawkins explains that he is trying to desacralize religion and the language we use about religion,
with the overall goal of making religion the subject of concrete, clear, and plain speech. He
argues that he regularly reads stronger language in restaurant reviews, and that his choice of
words regarding religion should be less hurtful than those because “restauranteurs and chefs
really exist and they have feelings to be hurt, whereas blasphemy, as the witty bumper sticker
puts it, is a victimless crime.”127 For Dawkins, since God does not exist and is a “character in
fiction,”128 one should be able to talk about him freely.
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In the chapter of The God Delusion that contains the prominent passage we have been
examining, Dawkins offers examples of how theologians try to defend God and their obfuscating
theologizing. Instead, Dawkins will write about God in plain speech for the average reader, even
though he could write more academically if he desired. In fact, Dawkins demonstrates an
awareness of his academic tone when he describes how he sought to create the “incongruous
mismatch between a subject that could have been stridently or vulgarly expressed, and the actual
expression in a drawn-out list of Latinate or pseudo-scholarly words (‘filicidal,’
‘megalomaniacal,’ ‘pestelential’).”129 Dawkins is implying that enculturation in the JudeoChristian beliefs has caused otherwise educated people not to see the horror of the character of
God. When it comes to God, people are fairly foolish, and he, an intelligent scholar, is seeking to
use plain speech to help people recognize the moral failings of God and disrespect or disbelieve
him. His ethical appeal, then, is that he is an intelligent scientist who chooses to use plain speech
to reveal the horrors of religious discourse in order to educate the public who have been
desensitized to these horrors and encouraged to believe these things by theologians. The famous
quotation captures the rhetorical artistry of their emotional and ethical appeals.
Culture is primed and ready for the charge that Christianity is not a societal benefit, but in
fact a societal detriment. Religion is not a moral good, but a moral evil. When this suspicion is
already planted in culture, making a receptive audience for the attacks of the New Atheists, the
ethical appeal of the New Atheists also has a greater chance of success. Whereas previously
atheists had been seen as untrustworthy and immoral, and in fact one of the least trustworthy
groups in the United States,130 now the roles have been reversed. People of faith are seen as
immoral, so atheists can more readily proclaim their ethical appeal by claiming moral superiority
129
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over people of faith. Thus, the message of the New Atheists should, according to their ethical
appeal, be granted standing and respect.
Summary of the Use of the Rhetorical Appeals by the New Atheists
In summary, the New Atheists argue in an emotionally riveting way that religions are
violent, but they do not present this argument as an end unto itself. Instead, the New Atheists are
seeking to make the case that religions have no moral standing to be heard because of their moral
failings exemplified by their participation in violence. In fact, the New Atheists are taking a
historical argument used to silence atheism and now using it to silence religion. As Gregory
Peterson points out, “historically, atheism and immorality have often been equated. …
Presumably, since the atheist believes that there is no God to enforce the moral law, the atheist
has no external compulsion requiring the keeping of one’s word if it proves inconvenient.”131
Peterson then observes:
It is a shared theme of the new atheism that this argument is not only wrong, but that
it should be turned on its head. The new atheists almost uniformly claim that it is
modern atheists who hold the moral high ground, and that it is the practitioners of the
world’s religions that are immoral, both in historical practice and in fundamental
commitment.132
The foundational charge of the New Atheists is that religion is evil, a charge backed up
with emotional intensity through the graphic descriptions of religiously inspired violence. The
New Atheists engage in a prolonged emotional appeal to create fear of religions and
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corresponding intolerance for religions in readers of their works. The New Atheists couple this
emotional appeal with an ethical appeal based on their standing as scholars and scientists,
carefully cultivating a genteel, elite, trustworthy persona, coupled with a fiery fervor to root out
religious oppression. The New Atheists would argue that religions have no moral standing to
exert influence in culture due to their oppressive and violent track records, while the New
Atheists claim the moral high ground of toleration and peace. In this way, the New Atheists take
the calculated risk of joining an ad hominem attack to their powerful emotional and ethical
appeals. Based on the reaction of the culture, the risk seems to be paying off.
In large part we have been dealing with the three facets of the New Atheists’ arguments
that work by means of ethical and emotional appeals—namely that religions, in the accusations
of the New Atheists, are the most prominent sponsor of worldwide violence; that religions are
inherently intolerant, and thus unworthy of toleration themselves; and that religious moderates,
in the view of the New Atheists, provide cover for extremist religious views and thus are equally
responsible for violence.133 As to the other two main arguments advanced by the New Atheists to
support their overall claim that religion is an evil to be eradicated—namely, that faith is blind
faith rather than faith founded on fact, and that religion impedes the progress of science—they
are geared more toward a rational rhetorical argument in the New Atheists’ methodology. These
styles of claims are much more comfortably suited to the methods of apologetics in common
practice for the last several hundred years. For this reason, apologists have been much more
ready and prepared to defend Christianity against these last two forms of argument from the New
Atheists. Further rebuttal of these points is, therefore, not needed, although I will give a brief
consideration of some of the apologetic responses along these lines at the beginning of the next
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chapter. While these traditional rational apologetic responses to the New Atheists are important
and needed and have been given, I would also argue that the emotional and ethical rhetorical
appeals are significantly stronger in their challenge to Christianity. They are also much more
culturally attuned. For this reason, it is to the cultural compatibility of the New Atheists that we
now turn.

Cultural Analysis of the Challenge the New Atheists Pose to Christianity
James Davison Hunter, in his book, To Change the World, published in 2010, offers a
theory of cultural change that suggests that the church should be concerned about the challenges
of the New Atheists. By the time Hunter wrote To Change the World, he had been studying
religion and culture for over twenty years. In his 1991 Culture Wars, Hunter argued that not only
was American culture in conflict, but also the lines of cultural conflict in the United States had
shifted. Regarding the existence of the conflict itself, Hunter writes:
I define cultural conflict very simply as political and social hostility rooted in
different systems of moral understanding. The end to which these hostilities tend is
the domination of one cultural and moral ethos over all others. Let it be clear, the
principles and ideals that mark these competing systems of moral understanding are
by no means trifling but always have a character of ultimacy to them.134
It is not difficult to see the New Atheist challenge to Christianity in the terms Hunter sets forth
here. They would claim that a religious outlook has for millennia exerted the dominance of its
moral ethos over all others, and the New Atheists are pushing back to exert the dominance of
their moral ethos over any faith-based system.
However, the New Atheists represent a shift from the way Hunter set up the culture wars in
1991. At that time, Hunter argued that a cultural re-alignment had taken place. Whereas
previously in America, the cultural struggles had been between different religious
134
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denominations, the new alignment was between worldviews or “impulses,” namely an
“orthodox” worldview and a “progressive” worldview.135 Hunter makes clear that these new fault
lines cleave church affiliations into “orthodox” and “progressive” components. He notes,
“because of common points of vision and concern, the orthodox wings of Protestantism,
Catholicism, and Judaism are forming associations with each other, as are the progressive wings
of each faith community.”136 That is to say, Lutherans and Presbyterians were no longer
struggling against Catholics and Jews but instead “orthodox” Lutherans, Presbyterians,
Catholics, and Jews were struggling against “progressive” Lutherans, Presbyterians, Catholics,
and Jews. That was the situation Hunter described in 1991.
Now, with the rise to cultural prominence of the New Atheists, we might note that yet
another realignment has occurred. The New Atheists set themselves up not as aligned with either
the “orthodox” or the “progressive” camps, but rather they set themselves up over against all
religious worldviews, whether “orthodox” or “progressive.” For the New Atheist, the fault lines
are these: Any and all religious faith systems against atheism. The quest for the New Atheists
remains as described by Hunter: “the domination of one cultural and moral ethos over all
others.”137
With this understanding of the way the fault lines are drawn, we can now turn to his more
recent work, To Change the World, to see how either the New Atheists could have the possibility
of influencing an already sympathetic culture further, and to formulate a response as to how the
church could respond faithfully to rebuff the challenge of the New Atheists.
According to Hunter, culture can change, and can in fact change quite profoundly, when
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the proper forces align to bring this about. He lays out eleven propositions to show how cultures
function and how cultures change.138 The first seven propositions show the symbols,
interconnections, and power structures inherent in the way cultures work. The final four
propositions describe how cultural changes come about utilizing the structure described in the
first seven propositions. Cultures, according to Hunter, are more complex and deep-seated than
commonly assumed, and neither a strictly idealist nor a strictly materialist view of culture can
adequately account for the interrelations and accretions that comprise culture. This complex
cultural form is to a large extent shaped and controlled by elite authority figures within statusdriven power structures, and are only tangentially influenced by grassroots activism. Since
cultures are largely shaped by those respected as holding symbolic capital within the society, any
change must work within the structure of social capital as well. Based on Hunter’s theory of
cultural change, the New Atheists are well-positioned to make a persuasive argument in the
current cultural climate, even if that argument is not particularly rational or defensible.
Hunter’s theory about the nature of culture proposes that “a Ph.D. has more symbolic
capital than a car mechanic; a member of the National Academy of Sciences has more symbolic
capital than a high school science teacher, the winner of a Nobel Prize in literature has more
symbolic capital than a romance novelist.”139 While this may seem somewhat obvious, this line
of thought explains how the New Atheists receive a hearing despite the inherent weaknesses of
their arguments. Four of the five New Atheists have earned doctorates (Dawkins and Dennett
from Oxford, Harris and Stenger from UCLA), and the remaining one (Hitchens) was Oxfordeducated, and for a time served a time as a professor of “liberal studies” at the New School in
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New York. Thus, their academic credentials place them in a position to have a persuasive voice
in culture. This forms a component of the ethical rhetorical appeal utilized by the New Atheists.
In fact, Hunter, in his discussion about symbolic capital, specifically mentions the cultural
prestige of the National Academy of Sciences and Nobel Prize winners.140 Richard Dawkins
appeals to both groups in The God Delusion as examples of people who tend not to believe in
God. Dawkins notes the correlation between advanced scientific training and atheism. He notes
that “of those American scientists considered eminent enough by their peers to have been elected
to the National Academy of Sciences only about 7 per cent believe in a personal God.”141
Dawkins points to even lower levels of religious belief among Fellows of the Royal Society in
Britain. Among that group of scientists, “only 3.3 per cent of the Fellows agreed strongly with
the statement that a personal god exists … while 78.8 per cent strongly disagreed.”142 As to
Nobel laureates, Dawkins writes:
The efforts of apologists to find genuinely distinguished modern scientists who are
religious have an air of desperation generating the unmistakably hollow sound of
bottoms of barrels being scraped. The only website I could find that claimed to list
“Nobel Prize-winning Scientific Christians” came up with six, out of a total of several
hundred scientific Nobelists. Of these six, it turned out that four were not Nobel
Prize-winners at all; and at least one, to my certain knowledge, is a non-believer who
attends church for purely social reasons.143
The New Atheists are well-positioned, to be invested with great symbolic capital in society, and
Dawkins appeals to this quite openly.
Hunter’s propositions regarding the way in which cultures change argues that “Cultures
change from the top down, rarely if ever from the bottom up.”144 He notes, “the work of world140

Hunter, To Change the World, 35–36.

141

Dawkins, God Delusion, 100.

142

Dawkins, God Delusion, 102.

143

Dawkins, God Delusion, 100.

144

Hunter, To Change the World, 41. This is Hunter’s “Proposition Eight.”

101

making and world-changing are, by and large, the work of elites: gatekeepers who provide
creative direction and management within spheres of social life.” Thus, the New Atheists’
standing as holders of PhDs from highly respected institutions, members of prestigious societies
of science, authors published and reviewed by prominent sources, they find themselves among
the elite who can exert much force and give strong direction as gatekeepers of cultural creation.
Hunter also notes that “Change is typically initiated by elites who are outside of the
centermost positions of prestige.”145 Again, this description describes the New Atheists. A strong
claim could certainly be made that in the past century, the absolute center of elite power rested in
well-educated, coastal gatekeepers who were of a liberal Christian (Mainline Protestant)
persuasion, or at least of a moral persuasion compatible with liberal Christianity. The New
Atheists, obviously, do not fit in this absolute center of elite power, despite their impeccable
academic and publishing credentials. They are certainly of the elites, but not at the absolute
center of the elites. Thus, Hunter would indicate the New Atheists actually have a greater
probability to initiate cultural change.
Hunter further suggests that cultural change takes place most profoundly when related
networks of people and organizations with significant social capital converge for a unified
goal.146 In this way, Hunter seeks to debunk the myth of the “great man” who accomplishes
profound cultural change merely by the strength of his own ideas or personality. Hunter notes,
“The only problem with this perspective is that it is mostly wrong.”147 Rather, Hunter argues,
cultures change when strong individual leaders and other organizations align to bring about far
more profound change than any one person or organization could have accomplished
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individually.148 He argues that “when networks of elites in overlapping spheres of social life
come together with their varied resources and act in common purpose, cultures do change and
change profoundly.”149 Hunter also recognizes that:
Persistence over time is essential; little of significance happens in three to five years.
But when cultural and symbolic capital overlap with social capital and economic
capital and, in time, political capital, and these various resources are directed toward
shared ends, the world, indeed, changes.150
The alignment of individuals and institutions is taking place around the work of the New
Atheists, even as the New Atheists themselves represent trends at work in society. The New
Atheists are elite educators possessed of significant social capital due to their academic pedigrees
and positions in the scientific community. Other institutions are also aligning with them. The
media aligned with the New Atheists quite quickly, as the New Atheism was a publishing
phenomenon.151 The way the New Atheists align in culture shows an powerful combination of
elites endowed with symbolic capital communicating in a way that reaches the grassroots quickly
and broadly. Hunter offers a chart in which he lays out various levels of cultural change, entitled
“The Cultural Matrix.”152 At the top of the chart Hunter lists areas of strong social capital, where
cultural change can have a powerful impact. Here he lists institutions such as elite research
universities and elite NYC publishers. By and large the New Atheists either hold degrees from
elite universities, teach at elite universities, or both. This shows the potential for the New
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Atheists to have an outsized voice in the way they represent culture. However, the New Atheists
also function at the middle and bottom of Hunter’s chart as well. In the middle range of
influence, Hunter mentions television and film, and Dawkins in particular has developed
programs for television in Great Britain, In fact, Dawkins’ book, The God Delusion, in part grew
out of a television project.153 At the lowest level of the cultural matrix, Hunter lists journalism
and mass-market book publishing. Again, the New Atheists function in this level also.
Christopher Hitchens spent much of his career as a journalist, and the New Atheist books have
certainly sold well in the mass market of publishing. Thus, not only do the New Atheist have the
social prestige to work with cultural elites, but they also have the communication foundation to
spread their message more broadly in the overall cultural matrix.
Academia has also begun to align more and more noticeably with the goals of the New
Atheists, not necessarily in open tone, but in more subtle implementation of intolerance toward
religious practices in general, and religions professors in particular.154 The New Atheists are not
lone voices, and of course have not been from the first. The New Atheist movement has been a
popular cultural movement, in which the New Atheists happened to align with rising forces of
opposition to Christianity. They have been, perhaps, a particularly vocal exemplification of
cultural trends, but they have generally been representative of a rising anti-religious attitude in
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broader culture. The New Atheists also draw the support and alignment of other institutions and
carriers of cultural capital in a way that can make a significant impact on the culture.
For these reasons, the New Atheists are quite well positioned to make a significant change
in cultural outlook, even though the New Atheists themselves are very small in number. This
stands in stark contrast with Hunter’s assessment of the culture-making ability and position of
Christianity in America. Despite the solid majority of professing Christians in America, and
despite the large market for Christian literature, media, etc., Hunter argues that Christians:
have been absent from the arenas in which the greatest influence in the culture is
exerted. The culture-producing institutions of historical Christianity are largely
marginalized in the economy of culture formation in North America. Its cultural
capital is greatest where leverage in the larger culture is weakest.155
This meshes well with an observation made by David Wilkinson that Christians are losing
ground in public appeal because they are not making any serious contact with the wider public,
in contrast with scientists who are doing exactly that.156

Conclusion
For centuries Western culture saw atheism as immoral and untrustworthy, and Christianity
was seen as honorable and honest. Has that situation changed through the writings of the New
Atheists? The answer is yes. At least it certainly seems that atheism is on the ascendancy in
cultural acceptance. Whether this can be directly traced to the New Atheists is more difficult to
prove, as causality is always difficult to determine with precision. Without question, however,
the New Atheists have been prominent and prolific voices advocating for the advance of atheism
since 2004. In the research of David Kinnaman and the Barna Group we can see an increasing
recognition of New Atheist themes and authors. James Davison Hunter shows how the New
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Atheists are well-positioned to lead a significant change in cultural outlook.
How has this shift been undertaken? The New Atheists may well have led the way by
changing rhetorical tactics. Instead of relying extensively or exclusively on calm logic, the New
Atheists shifted the form of argumentation to feature emotional appeals and ethical appeals. The
description of God and his followers established by the New Atheists exerts power in
contemporary culture largely because it is not primarily grounded in rational appeals. Instead,
the New Atheists rely heavily on emotional appeals to shape an overarching ethical argument
that Atheism offers a more moral view, and thus represents a more respectable guiding voice in
culture, than does religion. The New Atheists’ appeals have been much stronger when using
emotional appeals than when using rational appeals. These arguments from the New Atheists,
when taken all together, constitute an ad hominem attack on religion. The New Atheists then
couple this emotional appeal with an overarching ethical appeal claiming the moral superiority of
atheism. In order for Christianity to respond, it must rebuild its own ethical standing. The
apologetic approach needed must recognize and respond to the particular attack of an ethical
argument against Christianity. Thus, what is called for is not first and foremost a rational
response on the part of Christianity, but an emotional and ethical response.
While atheism may not yet have supplanted Christianity as the moral and ethical guide of
secular society, the playing field has certainly been leveled in recent years. The cultural view of
Christianity is changing. That is not really in question. The question that remains is “how does
the church respond?”
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CHAPTER THREE
THE DEVELOPMENT AND SHAPE OF ENFLESHED APOLOGETICS
Having looked at several of the New Atheist writings, we move on to formulate an
appropriate apologetic answer. The New Atheist challenge that Christianity is a force detrimental
to society because of its intolerance, violence, and hatred calls for a lifestyle-oriented apologetic
approach. In response, Enfleshed Apologetics holds promise as a helpful way forward for the
church in its apologetic task. Scholarly work in this area is needed because the primary response
to the claims of the New Atheists has been through the use of traditional rationally-focused
apologetic methods. While these apologetic approaches do answer some of the arguments of the
New Atheists, they do not answer all of them and, more to the point, they do not adequately
answer the emotional and ethical appeals that are so persuasive in the popular culture.
The need to focus on an Enfleshed Apologetic response to the New Atheists does not mean
that more traditional, rationally-driven forms of apologetic response to the New Atheists are
inappropriate or unnecessary. Quite to the contrary, these responses are helpful and needed when
the New Atheists do make allegations against Christianity utilizing rational forms of
argumentation. Where a criticism is leveled, a response should be given. For this reason,
rationally-based apologetic responses to the New Atheists remain a needed component of the
overall apologetic response.1 However, rational arguments made by the New Atheists are not the
1

The publication of New Atheist books from 2004 to 2007 was followed by Christian responses which began
appearing in 2007 and have continued up to the present time. Richard Dawkins has taken to calling books published
in response to the New Atheists books (The God Delusion in particular), “fleas.” He remarks about “the remarkable
collection of ‘fleas’ that the book [The God Delusion] has gathered. … [W]e call them ‘fleas’ after a W.B. Yeats
poem that I had going round in my head at the time:
You say, as I have often given tongue
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most prominent arguments to take root in our culture and to limit one’s response to this approach
leaves other challenges unaddressed. To that end, I begin by showing some rationally based
responses to New Atheists arguments, but also that a more complete apologetic is needed to
respond to their emotional and ethical appeals.

The Need and Challenges of Rational Responses to the New Atheists
One of the primary rational arguments made by the New Atheists involves the issue of the
simplicity or complexity of God’s nature. Richard Dawkins claims that this question regarding
the nature of God is “the big one,”2 and he calls his framing of this question “the Ultimate

In praise of what another’s said or sung,
T’were politic to do the like by these.
But was there ever dog that praised his fleas?”
Dawkins, Brief Candle, 174. In Brief Candle in the Dark, Dawkins offers an image of several of the “fleas” he has
collected, including Thomas Crean, God Is No Delusion: A Refutation of Richard Dawkins (San Francisco: Ignatius,
2007); Thomas Crean, A Catholic Replies to Professor Dawkins (Oxford: Family, 2007); Kathleen Jones,
Challenging Richard Dawkins: Why Richard Dawkins Is Wrong about God (Norwich, UK: Canterbury, 2007); Mike
King, The God Delusion Revisited (Raleigh: Lulu, 2007); McGrath and McGrath, Dawkins Delusion; David
Robertson, The Dawkins Letters: Challenging Atheist Myths (Fearn, Tain, Ross-shire, Scotland, UK: Christian
Focus, 2007); Andrew J. Wilson, Deluded by Dawkins? A Christian Response to The God Delusion (Eastbourne,
UK: Kingsway, 2007); Michael Austin, Dawkins’ Dilemmas: Deluded or not Deluded? That Is the Question
(Camarillo, CA: Xulon, 2008); David Berlinski, The Devil’s Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions (New
York: Crown, 2008); Scott Reeves, The Dawkins Delusion: An As-I'm-Reading-It Response to The God Delusion
(Los Gatos, CA: Smashwords, 2010) e-book; and Ian Stott, The God Solution—Are You Ready? Revealing
America’s Social and Economic Collapse and the Coming World Government (Bloomington, IN: Xlibris, 2013).
Obviously the quality of books on the list varies widely, from reputable scholars including McGrath, Crean, and
Berlinski published through well-known publishing houses to self-published e-books. Dawkins characteristically
does not distinguish among them, and would tend to dismiss them all equally. In addition to the books listed by
Dawkins, reputable and helpful Christian responses to the New Atheism have included Ravi Zacharias, The End of
Reason: A Response to the New Atheists (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008); Haught, God; Douglas Wilson, God Is.
How Christianity Explains Everything: A Reply to Christopher Hitchens’ God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons
Everything (Powder Springs, GA: American Vision, 2008); Hart, Atheist Delusions; Amarasingam, Religion;
Johnson and Reynolds, Against All Gods; McGrath, Why God; Markham, Against Atheism; Lennox, Gunning for
God; David Bentley Hart, The Experience of God: Being, Consciousness, Bliss (New Haven: Yale University Press,
2013); Meister and Dew, God and Evil; and French and Wettstein, New Atheism. While I specified that the list
included above would be Christian responses, two additional works provide another perspective: Eagleton, Reason,
Faith, and Revolution and J. Angelo Corlett, The Errors of Atheism (New York: Continuum International, 2010).
Both are highly critical of the New Atheism, but from the standpoint of agnosticism rather than Christianity. For this
reason, the harsh critiques of Eagleton and Corlett may actually be more telling regarding the weaknesses of the
New Atheists than are the more expected and predictable critiques of Christian authors.
2

Dawkins, God Delusion, 113. In his later memoir, Brief Candle in the Dark, Dawkins writes that he
specifically nominates this point as the central argument of The God Delusion. Dawkins, Brief Candle, 419–20.
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Boeing 747 gambit.”3 This line of argumentation is certainly represented in other New Atheist
books as well.4 Dawkins’ argument here revolves around the logical progression from simplicity
to complexity. In Dawkins’ evolutionary outlook, that which is now complex must have started
in a simpler form, or been developed by something that is more simple than itself. A complex
object or being must have an explanation for its own existence in the form of a simpler being or
object from farther back. He writes:
The first cause that we seek must have been the simple basis for a self-bootstrapping
crane which eventually raised the world as we know it into its present complex
existence. To suggest that the original prime mover was complicated enough to
indulge in intelligent design, to say nothing of mindreading millions of humans
simultaneously, is tantamount to dealing yourself a perfect hand at bridge. … To
suggest that the first cause, the great unknown which is responsible for something
Dawkins also notes that this argument in The God Delusion brought about a large number of replies to the argument
about apparent design and the need of a designer, and he recognizes that the nature of the argument in the responses
also extended to the nature of God. He writes that his Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit, “led to a large number of alleged
replies to the point about God being complex and therefore no solution to the riddle of complexity. The replies are
all the same and all equally weak. They can be summed up in one sentence: ‘God is not complex but simple.’ How
do we know? Because theologians say so, and they’re the authorities on God, are they not? Easy. Win the argument
by fiat! But you cannot have it both ways. Either God is simple, in which case he doesn’t have the knowledge and
design skills to provide the explanation of complexity that we seek. Or he is complex, in which case he needs
explaining in his own right no less than the complexity that he is being invoked to explain. The simpler you make
your god, the less qualified he is to explain the complexity of the world. And the more complex you make him the
more does he require an explanation in his own right.” Dawkins, Brief Candle, 420. As Dawkins alludes, many
refutations of this argument have indeed been published. These responses, however, generally do not merely consist
of a bald-faced appeal to authority as Dawkins asserts. Instead, the apologists who respond use historical arguments,
grounded in solid, long-respected reason and logic, to show the errors in Dawkins’ own argumentation. However,
Dawkins refuses to engage the rebuttal on the level of reason, and instead tries to dismiss the arguments as appeals
to power and authority. This is a bald mischaracterization of the responses, and does nothing to further the
consideration of this substantive topic. Thus, with the New Atheists, an effort from apologist to engage in responses
with the use of reason does not go anywhere. The New Atheists simply show themselves to be disinterested in
rational theological dialog as their main strengths of argument lie elsewhere. For valid and helpful apologetic
rational responses to Dawkins’ Ultimate 747 gambit, see: William Lane Craig, “Richard Dawkins on Arguments for
God,” in God Is Great, God Is Good: Why Believing in God Is Reasonable and Responsible, ed. William Lane Craig
and Chad Meister (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2009), 13–31; Michael Behe, “God and Evolution,” in Craig
and Meister, God Is Great, 78–90; Alvin Plantinga, “The Dawkins Confusion: Naturalism ‘Ad Absurdum’: A
Review of Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion,” in Craig and Meister, God Is Great, 247–58; Feser, “The New
Atheists,” 154–77; Markham, Against Atheism, 14–16 and 76–78; McGrath and McGrath, Dawkins Delusion, 27–
28; Beck, “Evil;” God and Evil, 197–213; William Dembski, “Evil, Creation, and Intelligent Design,” in Meister
and Dew, God and Evil, 259–69; Karl Gilbertson and Francis Collins, “Evil, Creation, and Evolution,” in Meister
and Dew, God and Evil, 270–90; and Wilson, God Is, 30–31.
3

Dawkins, God Delusion, 113

4

For example, see: Dennett, Breaking the Spell, 240–48; Hitchens, god is not Great, 77–96; and Stenger,
God and the Folly, 165–98.
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existing rather than nothing, is a being capable of designing the universe and of
talking to a million people simultaneously, is a total abdication of the responsibility to
find an explanation. It is a dreadful exhibition of self-indulgent, thought-denying
skyhookery.5
In Dawkins’ attempt at a rationally driven argument, God must be ultimately simple because the
world as we see it is now complex. God could not, by Dawkins’ definition, ever be more
complex than the universe as it currently exists if he is to be seen as a cause for the universe as it
now exists. Thus, God, if he exists, which Dawkins of course thinks to be unlikely, is ultimately
simple and thus unworthy of the title of “God.”
An apologetic response based on rational appeals is very appropriate to the New Atheists’
challenges regarding the simplicity or complexity of God, as for example is done by Edward
Feser. After laying out a strong logical and far-reaching historical defense of the cosmological
argument in general,6 Feser turns to the particular New Atheist argument exemplified by
Dawkins’ 747 gambit. He writes:
Of course, a New Atheist might say that he isn’t convinced that any version of the
cosmological argument succeeds in showing that there really is something that could
not in principle have had a cause—something that is purely actual, or absolutely
simple, or which has a sufficient reason for its existence within itself, or which lacks
a temporal beginning. He might even try to argue that there is some sort of hidden
incoherence in these notions. But merely to ask “What caused God?”—as if the
defender of the cosmological argument had overlooked the most obvious of
objections—simply misses the whole point. A serious critic has to grapple with the
details of the arguments. He cannot short-circuit them with a single smarmy
question.7
He also notes:
Aquinas devotes around a hundred double-column pages of dense argumentation in
Part I of the Summa Theologiae alone—just after presenting the Five Ways—to
showing that to the cause of the world we must attribute simplicity, goodness,
5

Dawkins, God Delusion, 155.

6

See especially the section entitled “The Simplicity/Composition Approach” in Feser, “New Atheists,” 164–

7

Feser, “New Atheists,” 170.

66.
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infinity, immutability, unity, knowledge, life, will, power, and the like. ... Dawkins,
Krauss, and the other New Atheist writers offer no response at all to these arguments.
In fact it seems that they are entirely unaware that the arguments even exist.8
When topics like the cosmological argument are presented, both by the New Atheists and
by most apologists, the result is an argument based on logic and reason. Rightfully so as the
subject matter calls for such an approach.9 A problem arises, however, when rational appeals are
used to defend against New Atheist attacks that are predominantly ethical or emotional in nature.
When a strictly rational response is given to a challenge that is highly emotional due to a
misdiagnosis of the nature of New Atheist attacks, the result is incomplete at best. For example,
Ross Clifford and Philip Johnson make the mistake of thinking the New Atheists are making a
rational appeal when what the New Atheists are presenting often tends to be a thin veneer of
reason superimposed over what is in actuality a strong emotional or ethical argument. As a
result, their response misses the most powerful point of the New Atheist attacks. We see this
problem as they write:
The New Atheism movement is reactionary and propelled by rhetoric that scathingly
typecasts religious people as gullible and unintelligent. Some sneer that Christians
believe in an invisible imaginary friend. Beneath that rhetoric lie persistent objections
that, irrespective of our friendliness, will not evaporate.10
Although Clifford and Johnson recognize the rhetorical nature of the New Atheist attack,
they wrongly argue that the New Atheists focus primarily on logical appeals rather than heavily
utilizing emotional appeals and ethical appeals. Clifford and Johnson write that the New Atheists
accuse Christians of being “gullible and unintelligent.”11 They footnote this allegation with a
8

Feser, “New Atheists,” 175.

9

I have cited here extensively from Edward Feser largely because he devotes his entire essay to this
particular question. However, for another very good response to Dawkins’ Ultimate Boeing 747 gambit as a smaller
portion of a larger book, see Crean, God Is No Delusion, 10–19. Crean covers such topics as “An ‘argument from
complexity,’” “Can a designer be simple?” and “Must an omnipotent God be complex?”
10

Clifford and Johnson, Cross Is Not Enough, 70.

11

Clifford and Johnson, Cross Is Not Enough, 70.
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single reference, namely to the entirety of Dawkins’ The God Delusion, without further
specification. Clifford and Johnson follow that statement immediately with the claim that the
New Atheists “sneer that Christians believe in an invisible imaginary friend.”12 Actually, the
most prominent reference to New Atheists’ comments about imaginary friends comes not from
Dawkins, but from Sam Harris in his Letter to a Christian Nation. Clifford and Johnson present
this as a rational appeal against Christianity since the New Atheists reference intelligence.
However, it is actually an emotional appeal when used by the New Atheists. Let us look at the
more prominent quote about Christians having an imaginary friend from Sam Harris, and another
on a related topic from Christopher Hitchens, to see this point.
Harris writes, regarding the destruction of New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina:
Examples of God’s failure to protect humanity are everywhere to be seen. The city of
New Orleans, for instance, was recently destroyed by a hurricane. More than a
thousand people died; tens of thousands lost all their earthly possessions; and nearly a
million were displaced. It is safe to say that almost every person living in New
Orleans at the moment Hurricane Katrina struck shared your belief in an omnipotent,
omniscient, and compassionate God. But what was God doing while Katrina laid
waste to their city? Surely He heard the prayers of those elderly men and women who
fled the rising waters for the safety of their attics, only to be slowly drowned there.
These were people of faith. These were good men and women who had prayed
throughout their lives. Do you have the courage to admit the obvious? These poor
people died talking to an imaginary friend.13
Clifford and Johnson would suggest that this passage indicates that the New Atheist
challenge to Christianity is a rational, logical one rooted in the claim that Christians are
unintelligent. On the other hand, I would argue that this very passage does a much better job of
showing that the New Atheists do not primarily argue on logical grounds, but by using emotional
appeals. Harris is not calling people of faith stupid, he is mocking them emotionally by calling
12

Clifford and Johnson, Cross Is Not Enough, 70. Dawkins does use the terminology, “imaginary friend,” but
he uses it more as an illustration of childlike innocence. He cites A. A. Milne’s childrens’ poem, “Now We Are Six”
and its reference to “Binker” as an example of an imaginary friend. Dawkins, God Delusion, 347–52. Dawkins’
description of God as an imaginary friend is more benign, while Harris’ comment is far more cutting.
13

Harris, Letter, 52.
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for them to be pitied. Actually, the people in the cited paragraph had done the intelligent thing in
the face of rising flood waters; they had sought higher ground. Harris’ point is not to mock their
intelligence, but to evoke our pity at the dual facts that their God was impotent to save them and
they died not realizing this.
Harris’ intent to evoke pity with an emotional appeal rather than to make a rational point
can be seen in several ways. The primary indicator is that in the very last sentence Harris refers
to those who died believing in their impotent imaginary friend as “poor people.” By this I
understand him to be referring to their pitiful condition, not poverty in a monetary sense. Harris
does not call those who died foolish or stupid, which would indicate a more open attack on the
intelligence of the residents of New Orleans. Another mark of Harris’ emotional appeal is that he
remarks that a thousand people died and tens of thousands lost all their earthly possessions.
Harris is appealing to the heart rather than the mind of his reader. He is setting the reader up to
feel sorry for the victims of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans, because they were supposedly
failed by their God and as a result they lost everything. This is not a rational argument, but one
geared to evoke pity. Logically, faith had nothing to do with having one’s possessions destroyed
in a flood. If a Christian and an atheist had lived side by side on ground of equal elevation in
New Orleans, both would have lost their belongings. Faith played no role. The relative
intelligence of the atheist and unintelligence of the Christian would not have rendered a different
outcome in the face of Hurricane Katrina. Intelligence is not the issue in this passage from Harris
as he is not making a rational appeal to his reader. Harris is arguing emotionally, and I would
suggest that he is quite effective in his approach.
Even when the New Atheists seem to make a rational argument, the appeal is actually
emotional and ethical. Consider this section from Christopher Hitchens’ god is not Great. Here,
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at least, Hitchens attempts to compare religious origins with educational level. Hitchens writes:
One must state it plainly. Religion comes from the period of human prehistory where
nobody—not even the mighty Democritus who concluded that all matter was made
from atoms—had the smallest idea what was going on. It comes from the bawling
and fearful infancy of our species, and is a babyish attempt to meet our inescapable
demand for knowledge (as well as for comfort, reassurance, and other infantile
needs). Today the least educated of my children knows much more about the natural
order than any of the founders of religion, and one would like to think—though the
connection isn’t a fully demonstrable one—that this is why they seem so uninterested
in sending fellow humans to hell.14
On the surface, this may seem to support the claim that New Atheists argue rationally to
allege that people of faith are unintelligent. In fact, however, this is not primarily a rational
argument but an ethical appeal. If anything, one could make the case that Hitchens pays a
backhanded compliment to founders of religion who actually sought to meet humanity’s
inescapable demand for knowledge, and were hampered by the lack of scientific progress of their
era. Hitchens even mentions that “the mighty Democritus” essentially had no idea what the
world was truly like. Hitchens is not making the argument that people of faith are unintelligent,
nor that the founders of religion were unintelligent. If anything, by lumping early religious
leaders in with Democritus, whom Hitchens admires, he shows them a certain patronizing
respect.
What Hitchens is more interested in doing here is making the case for the ethical
superiority of the New Atheists. He is less making a statement that people of faith are
unintelligent than he is making a claim that the New Atheists are more appropriately attuned to
the scientific advances of the modern era, and therefore they are more authoritative voices to
hear and heed based on the now-known nature of the world. That is one form of ethical appeal
that Hitchens employs. He offers a second form of ethical appeal in the last sentence as he
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Hitchens, god is not Great, 64.
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mentions that atheist children do not feel the need to send others to hell. In this way, Hitchens
paints those who follow the leadership of the New Atheists as being more peaceful, more
tolerant, and more caring than religious believers who obsess about eternal torments for those not
like themselves. These two ethical appeals point to the moral superiority of atheism. What is not
present is a sustained rational appeal about the lack of intelligence on the part of people of faith.
Clifford and Johnson also suggest that the New Atheists charge people of faith with being
gullible. This claim by Clifford and Johnson is much easier to support. Yes, the New Atheists do
argue that people of faith are gullible. However, Clifford and Johnson’s suggestion that this
claim must be combatted with rational, rather than emotional or ethical appeals, fails to
adequately address the challenge. The charge of gullibility is an ad hominem attack that is paired
with a corresponding ethical appeal to the superiority of the New Atheist positon. What is needed
in the face of this ad hominem attack is not a rational argument to the contrary from Christians,
but instead a countering ethical appeal showing the trustworthy and steadfast nature of Christians
as they live their everyday life.
Clifford and Johnson misunderstand the New Atheists as being overwhelmingly rational in
their approach, arguing that their primary charges are that Christians are unintelligent and
gullible.15 As a result, their apologetic response fails to gain traction, even if it is not technically
wrong. Rational responses are needed, and helpful, but not sufficient. Additional approaches are
needed to counter the new challenges raised against Christianity. What is needed is not more
refutation of the New Atheists through rational argumentation, but an approach that builds a
positive alternative outlook to the harsh descriptions of Christianity provided by the New
Atheists. In addition, it would be helpful if this approach were practiced not only by a few
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intellectuals on behalf of the church but by all of the members of the church in all of their varied
walks of life. It is time to turn to a newer and less-tried form of apologetic response to the
lifestyle-oriented challenges of the New Atheists and look to a different methodology of
apologetics to make the positive case for Christianity. It is time to turn our attention to Enfleshed
Apologetics.
Background to Enfleshed Apologetics
A new Enfleshed Apologetic approach has developed over the course of the last 10 to 20
years primarily in light of postmodernism and the challenges it posed to the faith. It developed
largely without reference to or consideration of the New Atheists.16 In fact, on the rare occasions
that the New Atheists are referenced regarding Enfleshed Apologetics, the approach has been
dismissed as an unhelpful methodology.17 Contrary to this tendency, however, the Enfleshed

16

Perhaps one reason that writers addressing postmodernism have not recognized significant crossover
applicability for a similar apologetic approach between postmodernism and the New Atheists could be that the New
Atheists—being firmly rooted in empirical science and thoroughly modern in their outlook—can be quite critical of
postmodernism themselves. Sam Harris, for example, claims that “most forms of relativism—including moral
relativism, which seems especially well subscribed—are nonsensical. And dangerously so.” Harris, End of Faith,
178. For a fuller representation of New Atheist thought on this topic, see Harris’ entire section, “The Demon of
Relativism.” Harris, End of Faith, 178–82. Christopher Hitchens also shows himself to be no fan of what he calls
“the morally lazy practice of relativism.” Hitchens, god is not Great, 281. Earlier, Hitchens has already commented,
“But it is better for us not to fall into relativism.” Hitchens, god is not Great, 68. While it is a somewhat passing
reference, Richard Dawkins also shows himself to be averse to relativism, as he dismisses “Philosophers, especially
amateurs with a little philosophical learning, and even more especially those infected with ‘cultural relativism.’”
Dawkins, God Delusion, 282.
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Authors who have recognized the development of an Enfleshed Apologetic technique and rejected it for
application to the New Atheists include Morey in Embodying Our Faith and Clifford and Johnson, Cross Is Not
Enough. Morey is a strong advocate of Enfleshed Apologetics in many cases, but dismisses its helpfulness in
specific application to the New Atheists. Morey proposes Enfleshed Apologetics exclusively in a postmodern
context, without application to the New Atheist challenges to the Christian faith. For his summary of postmodernism
and the introduction of his call for an Enfleshed Apologetic approach in light of relativism and pluralism, see
Morey, Embodying Our Faith, 31–38. In fact, Morey specifically rules out Enfleshed Apologetics as a response to
the New Atheists. He claims, “as the so-called new atheism makes its appeal to the masses on the basis of reason, it
continues to give an avenue for a reasoned response.” Morey, Embodying Our Faith, 44. Clifford and Johnson, on
the other hand, are generally critical about Enfleshed Apologetics in general, and are expressly dismissive of its
helpfulness regarding the New Atheists. They describe their understanding of Enfleshed Apologetics thus: “One
approach touted as being necessary for post-Christendom is an embodied apologetic, in which my life as a follower
of Jesus is the apologetic. In this approach, instead of entering into discussions or debates, one must simply live a
life that attracts non-Christians to Jesus.” Clifford and Johnson, Cross Is Not Enough, 69; emphasis original.
Clifford and Johnson claim, “The embodied apologetic model reflects an overreaction to individuals who lack
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Apologetic approach should be seen as an important response to the New Atheists. Since the
most powerful criticisms of Christianity from the New Atheists are lifestyle-oriented, utilizing
emotional and ethical rhetorical appeals, a lifestyle-oriented approach as proposed through
Enfleshed Apologetics is most appropriate.
This move from the apologetic approaches common since the Enlightenment to Enfleshed
Apologetics points to a significant shift in the basic definition of apologetics. Most definitions of
apologetics given by modern apologists involve the words “rational” or “logical” or
“intellectual” in some form in the definitions themselves. These modern apologetic approaches
have been offered in primarily written or verbal form, and were rational in approach. Enfleshed
Apologetics goes a different direction.
Seeing lifestyle as a form of apologetics may seem like a new, unusual, or even improper
development, but it is actually an ancient apologetic approach with a rich history. Early Christian
apologists used this approach as they argued that the moral behavior of Christians was a
beneficial influence within society. Dennis Holligner notes, “In our postmodern world it can
again be a powerful apologetic as it seeks to show the coherence between our life-world
foundations and their expression in moral and ethical living.”18 Although it has an ancient
history, at present, Enfleshed Apologetics is just beginning to be explored.19 In order to see the
humility and enjoy the adrenaline rush of debates.” Clifford and Johnson, Cross Is Not Enough, 71.
18

Dennis Hollinger, “The Church as Apologetic: A Sociology of Knowledge Perspective,” in Phillips and
Okholm, Christian Apologetics, 191; emphasis added. In a similar vein, David Kinnaman and Aly Hawkins state
that the church needs to rediscover vocation and return to ancient church patterns and practices by recovering an
apologetic method rooted in the life of vocations. Kinnaman and Hawkins, You Lost Me, 201–2.
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The approach I am calling Enfleshed Apologetics is helpful overall in meeting the new challenges posed to
the church in a manner reminiscent of far earlier apologetic approaches as our current culture experiences a
diminishing of the role of reason. Any new era will not be suited by exactly the same apologetic approach as any
that has come before, as each challenge will be slightly different and unique, and once an era has left its mark it can
never be fully avoided. However, with the reduced role for reason that seems to mark the postmodern era, coupled
with the increasing intensity of lifestyle-oriented criticisms of Christianity that mark current culture as represented
by the New Atheists, an apologetic approach related to earlier efforts is appropriate. Enfleshed Apologetics is one
such approach.
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origin and development of Enfleshed Apologetics more clearly, we will first look at two
transitional categories that bridge the gap between predominantly rational apologetic methods
and an Enfleshed Apologetic. These two transitional categories are Humble Apologetics and
Historical Goodness Apologetics.

Precursors to Enfleshed Apologetics
One precursor to Enfleshed Apologetics arises in an approach called Humble Apologetics.
The primary contribution to this field was made by John G. Stackhouse in his book Humble
Apologetics: Defending the Faith Today. In a Humble Apologetic approach, the main focus is
humility on the part of the apologist, rather than any particular content being presented.20
Stackhouse notes that in many people’s minds, apologetics in general has earned a bad reputation
as being overly argumentative. As a humorous illustration of this problem, Stackhouse offers “a
whimsical definition: ‘Apologetics’ is ‘making someone sorry he asked why you are a
Christian!’”21 Based on his understanding of the problem apologetics has faced, Stackhouse
offers the clearest basis for the need for the Humble Apologetic approach as he writes, “It is this
penchant of apologists to turn people off and away, to annoy and repel rather than to engage and
20

The most prominent writer in the field of Humble Apologetics is Stackhouse, Humble Apologetics. Other
writers in the field include James W. Sire, A Little Primer on Humble Apologetics (Downers Grove: InterVarsity
Press, 2006); Morehead, “Fresh Agenda,” Bob Passantino, “The Golden Rule Apologetic,” Answers in Action,
accessed August 16, 2012, http://www.answers.org/apologetics/goldenapol.html; Wilkinson, “Art of Apologetics;”
and to an extent, Tim Keller, “The Advent of Humility: Jesus Is the Reason to Stop Concentrating on Ourselves,”
Christianity Today 52, no. 12 (December 2008): 50–53. For a contrary opinion, calling into question the usefulness
and validity of this approach as a form of apologetics, see Craig Parton, “Review of Mere Apologetics: How to Help
Seekers and Skeptics Find Faith by Alister McGrath,” accessed May 19, 2015,
http://www.phc.edu/UserFiles/File/_Other%20Projects/Global%20Journal/103/Parton,%20Book%20Review%20of%20McGrath.pdf. Parton links Humble Apologetics, referencing Stackhouse,
with McGrath’s version of Incarnational Apologetics. Parton claims—among other things—that “‘humble
apologetics’ reduces to focusing on the character of the apologist at least as much as on the actual message being
proclaimed. The story of Jesus plays second fiddle to the story of McGrath. … When the focus shifts to the character
of the apologist and his/her ‘authentic living’ of the Gospel, you can be sure that Christ and His saving office is no
longer of central importance.” Parton, “Review of Mere Apologetics: How to Help Seekers and Skeptics Find Faith
by Alister McGrath,” 3.
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attract, that acts as a foil for much of what this book promotes instead.”22 Thus, the shape of
Humble Apologetics is formed in reaction to the negative view of the apologetic task as being
overly argumentative and hostile.
For this reason, the development of Humble Apologetics shifts to the life of the Christian.
The theological basis is closely rooted in the incarnation, the word becoming flesh, in Jesus
Christ. The combination of humility rooted in the incarnation of Jesus and humility in the
Christian life is encouraged:
Our apologetics must be humble. It must be humble for several reasons, but chief
among these is that God himself comes to us in humility, seeking our love and
drawing us to him. The Lord Jesus Christ is our model of humility; the Holy Spirit of
God is our humble companion who helps us to follow Christ’s example as we
proclaim Christ’s message.23
Our approach as Christians is to be humble in part because God comes to us in humility, seeking
and drawing rather than compelling and demanding, and our approach to our neighbors should
follow accordingly.
Humble Apologetics is not a fully Enfleshed approach, however. It still functions as a
validation of careful, considerate, but rational methods of apologetics used since the
Enlightenment, while broadening the methodology. John Stackhouse accomplishes this is by
describing a model of “grace and truth.”24 While often an apologist has been rightly focused on
truth, the call to grace has been neglected. However, to neglect either grace or truth proves to be
detrimental to the other. Truth without grace is unlikely to be heard, and grace without truth is
unhelpful. Apologists must recognize that “offering one without the other is … actually harmful
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Stackhouse, Humble Apologetics, 137. Stackhouse is using a somewhat loose understanding of “grace”
here. While doctrinally speaking, “grace” refers to a gift of God, Stackhouse uses the term here more as a synonym
for “gracefulness.”
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to the gospel.”25 In this outlook, rationally-oriented apologetics is equated with “truth,” and is
strongly upheld as a valid and necessary apologetic approach. Humble Apologetics is aligned
with “grace,” in that humility on the part of the apologist should lead to a gracious presentation
of the truth in all apologetic methodologies including the rational apologetic. Thus, the life and
methodological approach of the apologist go hand-in-hand with the message of apologetics.
In summarizing Humble Apologetics one can argue that the central apologetic message
itself, while potentially remaining entirely rational and verbal in form, would be heard and
received better if it were to be presented with humility on the part of the apologist. Bob
Passantino writes:
If you apply the Golden Rule Apologetic every time you defend the Christian faith,
you will find that those of opposing beliefs will listen more closely to what you say,
respect your position even if they continue to deny it, give greater weight to your
arguments, and be more willing to examine their own beliefs. You will not only give
a good representation of Christianity, you will also be used by God to extend his
mercy and patience to others, just as it was extended to you.26
In this approach, while the lifestyle of the apologist is brought into focus, the message of the
apologetic proclamation itself is not changed. Truth and grace are held together. The apologetic
message, that is, the traditional, rationally-driven apologetic message, is unchanged and remains
central. The admonition is to present the message gently and humbly in order to be heard more
openly. Thus, Humble Apologetics focuses more on method than on message, but the importance
of the message itself is not in any way denied.
While Humble Apologetics begins to shift toward an Enfleshed Approach by recognizing
the importance of the apologist’s lifestyle, this format developed slightly before the New Atheist
books were published and so does not respond directly to the challenges presented there. A more
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recent development which serves as at least an indirect answer to some of the charges of the New
Atheists is a style of apologetics I am calling Historical Goodness Apologetics.27 Rather than
examining questions about the existence of God and related questions of truth and authority, this
approach directly addresses the questions and challenges posed to Christianity by the New
Atheists regarding the goodness of God and the goodness of His followers. It does so by looking
backwards into history to show that the church has been a force for good within society.
Historical Goodness Apologetics looks at the implementation of faith in the lives of Christians
and the actions of the church throughout history in order to begin to offer a response to the New
Atheist charges that Scriptural calls to virtue and service go unheeded in the lives Christians.
Unlike Humble Apologetics, Historical Goodness Apologetics does interact directly with the
New Atheists, but it does not directly make application to the current Christian life. Therefore,
like Humble Apologetics, Historical Goodness Apologetics serves as a transitional category
moving toward Enfleshed Apologetics, not as a fully Enfleshed Apologetic in itself. Historical
Goodness Apologetics can provide evidence for Christians living for the benefit of society in the
past (even in the very recent past), but it cannot actually live that good life in the present.
I describe this format as Historical Goodness Apologetics to differentiate it from what
some apologists describe as Historical Apologetics. Ergun Caner, for example, locates Historical
Apologetics in efforts to document the historicity of the life of Jesus Christ.28 This approach
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seeks to document the historical authenticity of the life of Jesus Christ and the accuracy of his
words and deeds, using the tools open to historical research to do so. The primary focus is on the
events of the life of Christ. As generally understood, Historical Apologetics does not deal with
events after the close of the first century AD. Historical Goodness Apologetics, however, is quite
different, being focused not just on historical evidences of the life of Jesus Christ, but on the
historical records of the positive effect that the church has had on society. Thus, the focus is not
just on the events in the life of Jesus, but on the effect that Jesus’ life and teaching had on the life
of the church flowing out into the world in the centuries since his life, death, and resurrection.
Likewise, Historical Goodness Apologetics is different from a History of Apologetics, such
as that offered by Dulles. A History of Apologetics approach does not seek to respond to any
particular challenge addressed to Christianity and offer current approaches to meet these
challenges. Instead, it offers a look at past challenges faced by the church and the means the
church used in the past to address these challenges. By contrast, Historical Goodness
Apologetics starts from current criticisms of the church, namely that it has been a force of evil
and a detriment to society, and it seeks to address that current challenge by documenting that in
the past the church has been beneficial to society. Historical Goodness Apologetics is not a
record of past apologetic approaches but rather a current and needed apologetic refutation of
charges against Christianity using the historical record of the church.
While this is a direct response to the New Atheists, the approach which is rooted in the
study of history still appeals primarily to facts and rationality rather than to the urge to put such
ideas into practice in the current life of the church. It thus remains a secondary or indirect
response to the New Atheist allegations and a transitional category moving toward Enfleshed
Apologetics. However, it does begin to offer an ethical appeal for Christianity to counter the
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claims of the New Atheists that religions should have little moral standing and that the atheist
worldview should be considered over Christianity.
In order to see the contrast that Historical Goodness Apologetics allows us to draw
regarding the benevolent or malevolent nature of Christians over time, remember how Richard
Dawkins describes the Christian God in his famous paragraph of The God Delusion. Dawkins
describes God as a “jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak.”29
Dawkins would infer that Christians, like their God, are jealous, petty, and controlling. By
contrast, writers using Historical Goodness Apologetics argue that it is worthwhile to examine
the actual record of history and see if Dawkins presents an accurate characterization of Christians
as being the opposite of charitable and generous, namely being jealous and controlling.
According to Historical Goodness Apologetics, in most of ancient history only Christians
as a cultural group can consistently be seen as not jealous and controlling. According to Dinesh
D’Souza, most cultures in the ancient world operated with a reward or alliance basis for any
seemingly generous act, while Christianity exemplified actual self-giving generosity without
expectation of return. In most ancient cultures, if people of another region or another class
suffered a tragedy, those not affected would be of the opinion that “yes, that is a problem, but it’s
not our problem.”30 Good deeds that were done in the ancient world, such as the funding of baths,
parks, and the like were done not for the common good of the poor or disadvantaged, but to raise
the status of the family name and testify to their family nobility and personal greatness. 31
Contrary to the allegations of the New Atheist that Christianity is jealous and controlling,
D’Souza points out that the prevailing idea of the ancient world which was based on a reciprocal
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reward system, “is not the Christian view, which demands that we act out of compassion, which
means ‘suffering with others.’… Christian humility is the very opposite of classical
magnanimity.”32
The Christian practice of caritas33 as opposed to classical magnanimity naturally flowed to
the care of the sick, leading to the development of health care in the ancient world. While human
compassion, especially with regard to the sick and dying, was rare among ancient Greek and
Roman cultures, D’Souza notes that by contrast:
It was the Christian spirit of mutual love and communal charity that astonished and
impressed the pagans and the Romans. The emperor Julian, seeking to revive
paganism in the fourth century, professed admiration for the way in which Christians
looked after their poor, their widows, and orphans, and their sick and dying. However
paradoxical it seems, people who believed most strongly in the next world did the
most to improve the situation of people living in this one.34
While D’Souza does not mention this explicitly, it is not hard to connect the dots to see that early
Christians recognized Jesus’ compassionate love for those who were sick and suffering, and they
sought to care and serve as Jesus had.35 As Christians put their desire to follow Jesus in the care
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of the sick into practice, they developed what we today would think of as a health care system
and hospitals. D’Souza notes, “In the West, the Christians built the first hospitals.”36 The contrast
with the care given to those who were sick and in need in ancient pagan cultures and in early
Christianity was profound. In times of plague, the pagans of Rome “thrust aside anyone who
began to be sick, and kept aloof even from their dearest friends, and cast the sufferers out upon
the public roads half dead.”37 By contrast, instead of running away from the sick and abandoning
them as the pagans did, Christians stepped in to provide care and dignity to those in need.
Thus a first way Historical Goodness Apologetics can address the challenges of the New
Atheists is by means of contradiction. While the New Atheists would claim that Christianity has
been detrimental to society, authors using Historical Goodness Apologetics look to history to
point out specific ways in which Christianity has been a blessing instead. This is seen, for
example, through the founding of hospitals and the development of other means of charitable
work. The second, deeper way that Historical Goodness Apologetics addresses the challenges of
the New Atheists concerns not how Christianity founded certain institutions for the betterment of
humanity or worked for the good of people in need, but how Christianity shaped the entire moral
outlook of Western culture. Put bluntly, without the positive guiding influence of Christianity on
Western culture, the New Atheists would not have a moral ground on which to stand to offer
their criticisms of Christian morality.
particularly for those who were sick. … So it was with the early Christians when they saw the sick and dying.”
Schmidt, How Christianity Changed, 128. Schmidt continues the theological justification for the care Christians
demonstrated in ancient society in a subsequent chapter as well. “The early Christians unequivocally rejected the
callous, inhumane culture of the Greco-Roman world. They saw each person as having a redeemable soul, and
therefore it was God-pleasing to nurture and nurse any and every person, regardless of his or her social status.
Because eternal life awaited all those who believed and died in Christ, life on earth was not the ultimate value. Even
if one died while caring for the sick, a greater and better life lay ahead; moreover, if a sick or dying person came to
see and accept Christ’s forgiveness, another soul was gained for eternal life. That kind of behavior was totally
foreign to pagan thought.” Schmidt, How Christianity Changed, 153.
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We have seen the allegations from the New Atheists that Christianity sponsors violence.
Such charges include the segment from Harris’ Letter to a Christian Nation discussing the
supposed Deuteronomical mandate to kill disobedient children and the segment from Dawkins’
accusing God of being a genocidal ethnic cleanser. However, for apologists practicing Historical
Goodness Apologetics, this style of criticism has a serious problem. The basis of the criticism
itself is rooted solidly in Judeo-Christian morality, which was not held in the ancient world
outside of followers of the Bible. The New Atheists here are attempting to criticize Christian
morality on the basis of ethics drawn from Christian morality.38 Another way to phrase this is to
consider the effectiveness of the New Atheists’ emotional appeals. When the New Atheists
describe what they interpret to be Scripturally-mandated violence, we are repulsed by the idea
that the Bible, when read in a surface manner, seems to advocate violence in some situations. So,
why are we today shocked and revolted by such descriptions of death and violence? Something
over time has changed in the moral makeup of Western society. David Bentley Hart argues that
the one overwhelming thing that brought about this change in Western society was specifically
Christianity. He claims:
Stated in its most elementary and most buoyantly positive form, my argument is, first
of all, that among all the many great transitions that have marked the evolution of
Western Civilization, whether convulsive or gradual, political or philosophical, social
or scientific, material or spiritual, there has been only one—the triumph of
Christianity—that can be called in the fullest sense a “revolution”: a truly massive
and epochal revision of humanity’s prevailing vision of reality, so pervasive in its
38

For a more detailed examination of this problem in the New Atheist approach, see Douglas Wilson in God
Is. Wilson shows that even the basic New Atheist claims that religions are evil rest on the premise that one can
define evil. The standards of evil that the New Atheists use to call religions evil are essentially the standards of
Christianity. Thus, the New Atheists are trying to maintain Christian morality without Christianity and without God,
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everything? One cannot easily justify the wrongness of poisoning things while at the same time dismissing the
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126

influence and so vast in its consequences as actually to have created a new conception
of the world, of history, of human nature, of time and of moral good. To my mind, I
should add, it was an event immeasurably more impressive in its cultural creativity
and more ennobling in its moral power than any other movement of spirit, will,
imagination, aspiration, or accomplishment in the history of the West. And I am
convinced that, given how radically at variance Christianity was with the culture it
slowly and relentlessly displaced, its eventual victory was an event of such
improbability as to strain the very limits of our understanding of historical causality.39
That is to say, the moral goodness of Christianity demonstrated in history is one of the most
shockingly effective means ever used to change the course of civilization—and, in light of the
charges from the New Atheists, it needs to be clarified—change it for the better.
The ancient world was not better off without Judeo-Christian morality, and the current
culture would not be improved if Christianity were to be abandoned either. The idea advanced by
the New Atheists that Christianity sprang upon an edenic, idyllic world of admirable morality
and poisoned everything is a gross historical fiction. The New Atheists, under the influence of
Western Civilization, have assumed that as morality is now, so it always has been, or that it
would have developed along a similar, or better, trajectory without the influence of Christianity.40
This is not the case. According to Hart, ancient morality, especially when it comes to the value
39
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and dignity of human life, was very different from what we take for granted today. It was only
under the profound and positive influence of Christianity, the triumph of which Hart considers to
be the only true revolution, which brought about the respect for human life we enjoy today.
The Christian view of life, which repudiated and replaced the coarser moralities that
preceded it,41 is fundamental and foundational to Western culture. In fact, this Christian morality
is so deeply engrained that it can at times become invisible which unfortunately allows the New
Atheists’ attempt to turn the now-embedded Christian view of the value of life against
Christianity itself. The very means of appeal chosen by the New Atheists to advance their
argument, notably the emotional appeal, is itself dependent on the widespread assimilation of
Judeo-Christian ethics into the Western mindset. The New Atheists are able to tug on emotional
heartstrings regarding mass murder and genocide because Christianity has, over time, vastly
elevated the value of human life in Western ideals. Ancients would have been as likely to relish
in the gore of genocide as to be repulsed by it. Likewise, the emotional appeals employed by the
New Atheists about supposed abuse and injury done to children in the name of religion would
have made little sense had Christianity not raised the status of children so significantly. Think
again about Harris’ claim in Letter to a Christian Nation that the main message of Scripture is to
beat and to kill, and then ask: why do we find this idea ethically and emotionally repugnant in
the first place? We find what we call abuse repulsive because of the morals given by
Christianity. The New Atheists can upset us regarding violence and abuse because Christianity
41

Schmidt describes the extent to which Christian morality supplanted that of ancient paganism. “‘When in
Rome, do as the Romans do.’ So goes an old saying. But when the early Christians arrived in Rome from Jerusalem
and parts of Asia Minor, they did not do as the pagan Romans did. They defied the entire system of Rome’s
morality.” Schmidt, How Christianity Changed, 48. Schmidt notes that a low view of human life, which was
distinctly different from Christian morality, was a hallmark of Roman society. A person was valued only if he was a
part of the political fabric and able to contribute to society, leading to the view that a person’s reason for being was
to further the affairs of the State. Schmidt, How Christianity Changed, 48. This low and utterly utilitarian view of
life demonstrated by the Romans “was a shocking affront to the early Christians, who came to Rome with an exalted
view of human life. Like their Jewish ancestors, they saw human beings as the crown of God’s creation.” Schmidt,
How Christianity Changed, 48.

128

has first raised our consciousness regarding the value of life.
Far from “poisoning everything” as the New Atheists would allege, Historical Goodness
Apologetics shows in multiple ways that the influence of the Christianity has been of great
benefit to society. Schmidt notes:
People who may think that current human charity and compassion in the Western
world, whether it is state welfare or voluntary charity, developed on its own as a
result of mere civilization, without the impetus and influence of Christianity are
misinformed. … In short, every time charity and compassion are seen in operation,
the credit goes to Jesus Christ. It was he who inspired his early followers to give and
to help the unfortunate, regardless of their race, religion, class, or nationality. …
These early Christians set a model for their descendants to follow, a model that
today’s modern secular societies seek to imitate, but without Christian motivation.
Sympathy toward the poor is a concept that comes from Christianity, for the rich and
well-to-do in Greece and Rome despised the poor.42
Historical Goodness Apologetics traces a dramatic shift in the valuation of human life
demonstrated in the early years of the church, tied to the twin understandings that humanity is
the special and priceless creation of God and that in the person of Jesus Christ, God himself
became one with humanity in the incarnation. When one looks at a human being and realizes the
implications of the incarnation, eyes are opened to see the dignity of God bestowed on mere
humanity. Historical Goodness Apologetics argues that Christianity is not an evil detriment to
humanity, and is not primarily responsible for the wide-spread violence against humanity alleged
by the New Atheists. The evidence shows otherwise. To perpetrate violence against humanity
would run directly counter to the Christian value of life, so unique in human history.
The category of Historical Goodness Apologetics is the most direct response so far to the
criticisms leveled by the New Atheists that Christianity is evil. Since the apologetic task is to
respond directly to the questions and challenges being raised, this sub-category of apologetics
can be very helpful in the current cultural situation. It does respond to the New Atheists at the
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same rhetorical level of attack, providing an ethical appeal for Christianity to counter the ad
hominem attacks of the New Atheists against the moral standing of Christianity. It is a direct
response to the emotionally significant appeals of the New Atheists, and counters with the
compassion of Christianity in history being demonstrated with equal emotional intensity. Such
an approach also begins to rebuild the ethical standing of the Christian apologist, thus giving the
Christian an opportunity to gain a hearing. This is a very important development in the way the
church responds to the New Atheists apologetically.
However, it is one thing to say that the church was a force for good in society in the past as
a counter to the claim of the New Atheists, it is quite another thing to demonstrate that the
church is currently working for the good of society today. The Historical Goodness approach to
apologetics fits the first of these two options, not the second. The approach focuses on past
evidence of the church’s goodness, and is intellectual in its orientation. It appeals to the minds of
the hearer, rather than the life of those who would follow Jesus Christ. Thus, Historical
Goodness Apologetics is not fully Enfleshed Apologetics. Rather it is an Evidential approach
that uses the facts of Christian life in history to counter New Atheist claims. While not being
fully Enfleshed Apologetics, Historical Goodness Apologetics can begin to build a bridge to
Enfleshed Apologetics as a helpful and needed apologetic reply to the New Atheists.

The Developing Shape of Enfleshed Apologetics
David Wheeler provides a helpful definition of Enfleshed Apologetics:
Incarnational Apologetics is the representative public and private lifestyle of a
Christian that validates to the world the absolute truths of the Bible. It should be the
natural result of a born-again experience and is communicated to the world through
both actions and attitudes of Christians as they consistently live out the tenets of their
faith in community with both the redeemed and the unredeemed.43
43
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In a proper understanding of Enfleshed Apologetics, doctrine and life are not placed in
competition with each other, but viewed rightly as working in conjunction with one another.
Wheeler writes, “The simple truth is that the incarnational life is merely living as Jesus lived by
balancing beliefs with behavior.”44 Wheeler does not downplay doctrine in favor of life. He seeks
a balance. Beliefs are not superseded by behavior; they are balanced by behavior. Neither one
can replace or substitute for the other. Christians should consistently live out their faith-driven
actions and attitudes, and in so doing validate the more theological tenets of their faith such as
Scriptural inerrancy, doctrinal authority, and the reality of the resurrection.45 Both lifestyle and
theology are held together tightly.
Both lifestyle and theology are important because the shape and approach of apologetics
are usually formed in contrast to a perceived challenge or problem. The perceived problem
shaping this particular approach is the charge of hypocrisy often leveled against Christianity. 46 In
response, an Enfleshed approach to apologetics seeks to strengthen the connection between
doctrine and practice, between belief and behavior. Wheeler notes:
While this approach [a rational apologetic approach focusing on a verbal message
while overlooking the call to live out the commands of Christ by meeting simple
human needs] values much knowledge, it often misses the point of living out a
transformed life and underestimates the impact, upon unbelievers, of an inconsistent
lifestyle.47

contrasts incarnational apologetics with informational apologetics, writing that: “Informational apologetics
represents the explanation of essential biblical tenants [sic]to the Christian faith. Incarnational apologetics represents
the actualization of those same biblical belief systems into the authentic expressions of a believer’s life. It is, in a
sense, wrapping one’s faith in the flesh of daily living.” Wheeler, “Apologetics, Incarnational,” 50–51.
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Enfleshed Apologetics does well to defend against the frequent charge that Christians are
hypocritical when they teach love in their words but seem to show indifference or worse in their
lives. Philip Kenneson points out:
It does absolutely no good for us to sit here and insist that the proposition “Jesus is
Lord of the universe” is objectively true while at the same time we live our lives in
such a way that this lordship remains completely invisible. If Christians feel
compelled to claim that Jesus is Lord of the universe, then that lordship must be
visible somewhere. … God called the church into being to bear witness by its
embodied life together that God has come to earth and dwelt among us, a mission that
should not have left things the way they were.48
As a response to the charge that Christians might speak the words of Christ but do not live
the life of Christ, Enfleshed Apologetics seeks to live a Christ-like life as those who bear his
name, bringing life in line with doctrine and thus attempting to reply to and refute the charge of
hypocrisy. This approach to Enfleshed Apologetics sees the apologetic endeavor strengthened as
members of the community “look more and more like Jesus.”49
The Christian lifestyle does not just serve to open the door for a later proclamation of an
apologetic message or serve as a precursor to the apologetic task. Instead, the life of the church
and the life of the Christian is the apologetic approach in itself. Tim Morey recognizes that the
church community itself, if it has been transformed by Christ, can serve as a powerful apologetic
testimony.50 Morey writes, “In living as a new creation we become the apologetic God means us
to be.”51 Thus, the life of God’s people is itself a method of apologetics. This is Enfleshed
Apologetics.
Instead of expecting doctrine to represent Christianity in the face of a contrary witness in
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life, an Enfleshed Apologetic approach recognizes that a rational apologetic approach must be
paired with an Enfleshed Apologetic approach as Christians live in ways that imitate the service
and humanitarian approach demonstrated in Christ himself. Thus Enfleshed Apologetics supports
and reinforces rather than contradicts the well-argued tenets of the Christian faith.
Enfleshed Apologetics seeks to pair Scriptural teaching with a representative lifestyle. Both
words and works have a proper place and are each inadequate without the other. A Christian is
by all means called to use words and teach doctrine, but stopping there is insufficient. Morey
writes, “It is not enough for us to talk about God’s love of the world—we have to enact it.”52
Words and works, beliefs and behaviors are brought together and held together. In terms of
apologetics, one could say that both traditional rational apologetic approaches and Enfleshed
Apologetic approaches are vitally needed, and neither one can replace the other. Both are
significant and both are in fact central components of the apologetic task. They need to be paired
rather than pulled apart.
Robert Webber provides a view of Enfleshed Apologetics in his 2002 work, The Younger
Evangelicals. He writes that the:
early church apologetic may be rightly called an “incarnational apology.” The church
is the continuation of the incarnation. It is the earthed reality of the presence of Jesus
in and to the world. Herein lies the ancient apologetic. The church by its very
existence is a witness to the presence of God in history (Eph. 3:10). There is only one
actual incarnation of God and that is in Jesus Christ, but the church, being his body,
sustains an incarnational dimension. The church is a witness to the presence of Jesus
in the world as it embodies and lives out the faith.53
As Webber brings in the topic of apologetics he does so by considering it as a continuation of the
incarnation. He sets up God’s presence in the world as a significant component of the unique
incarnation of Jesus. Thus the church as a continuation of the incarnation is also a continuation
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of the presence of God in and for the world. Being present with and among people is an
important understanding of the role of the church. Webber uses the term Incarnational
Apologetics for this approach as it is rooted in the idea that the church is the continuation of the
incarnational presence of God in the world.54
Webber continues to explore the church as an ongoing incarnation of the presence of God
among us in his subsequent book, Ancient Future Evangelism. One can see the idea of the church
as the incarnational presence of God among his people, but here Webber moves deeper into a
more active, engaged model of Enfleshed Apologetics. He writes:
The church is the witness to the reality of God’s activity in history … this witness of
the church is not in words alone. The church not only says God’s mission, it does
God’s mission because it embodies the very reality of God. The church by its very
existence makes the reality of God present.55
The church is both presence and action. Furthering the idea that the church is the incarnational
presence of God, Webber writes that “The church is not a mere collection of individuals, a
human entity, but in a mystical way it is a real and actual experience that connects with the Son
and the Spirit.”56 He further notes that the purpose of the church “is to become the embodied
reality of the rule of Christ over the lives of its people.”57
God’s presence in the world through his people is enacted in the lives of God’s people. The
church remains an apologetic in itself, not just because it embodies God’s presence but because
the people of the church live God’s love toward the lost. The presence of God in the church leads
to disciples carrying God’s work out into the world. Webber notes this connection and emphasis
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as he writes, “Because the church is the reality of God made present, the church itself is a womb
for disciple-making.”58 He adds, “The new disciple must be immersed in the life of the church
because it is the presence of God’s life in the world.”59
Gailyn Van Rheenen offers another example of Enfleshed Apologetics, also connecting it
with the earthly presence of God among his people. He notes:
Christianity is incarnational, unlike other world religions. This means that God
became man in the person of Jesus Christ. Thus, Christianity teaches that God came
down into our world and lived among humans as a human. Put another way, the
creator of the universe came to earth and got his hands dirty. We believe that the
incarnation teaches all Christians that they are to mix with ordinary people, share
their experience, and attempt to understand their beliefs.60
In this fascinating description, just as God “got his hands dirty” in the incarnation by coming
down into the world and living as a human, so the church should “mix with ordinary people.”
The church should, so to speak, get its hands dirty by engaging with people where they live, on
their ground. The church needs to share life with the world. The focus of Enfleshed Apologetics
is seen as mixing with those around, just as in the incarnation Jesus Christ mixed with humanity,
sharing the experience of the neighbor, just as Jesus shared our human experience. Thus the
church lives as a continuous presence with our neighbors.61 In this Enfleshed Apologetics
outlook, the shared life of a Christian and his or her neighbor becomes nothing less than a
continuation of Jesus’ incarnational presence with his neighbors across time and space.
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In Enfleshed Apologetics, relationships are central, just as relationships are seen as
foundational to Jesus’ ministry. Mikel Neumann points out, “Jesus’ life demonstrates the
importance of the incarnation. Jesus became human in order that people might have a
relationship with God.”62 Neumann elaborates, “relationship with human beings was
foundational for Jesus’ ministry. He took the time and effort to leave heaven and become
human.”63 This takes time. A relationship cannot be developed in passing. Neumann emphasizes
that as a part of Jesus’ incarnational task, focused on relationships, “he took the time to be
profoundly involved with his audience.”64 The focus of Enfleshed Apologetics on relationships
has significance for how the people of Christ continue his ministry in the world. It gives shape to
the way the church and Christians look outward into the world around them to form lasting,
loving relationships. In Christ, God established relationships with humanity.
While this foundation for relationships may seem to be limited only to those in Christ, the
implication of God’s broader work of creation is also significant. In a more basic and
fundamental sense, God has designed the created order with interwoven relationships and placed
everyone within this web of personal connections. As neighbors in the created order, all people
have a responsibility to sustain God’s creation and work for the good of those around us. God’s
loving design places human beings as the caretakers of his creation, and that includes care of our
fellow human beings through relationships. Due to our role in God’s creation we really are our
brothers’ and sisters’ keepers. We are placed by God in a network of relationships within the
created order. Those who would practice Enfleshed Apologetics diligently seek to cultivate such
relationships and do so in light of the good order that God has designed.
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Enfleshed Apologetics Applied to the New Atheists
Having looked at the theological justification for various forms of Enfleshed Apologetics,
we now move out of the realm of theory into the realm of practice as we consider authors who
respond to the New Atheists by beginning to apply Enfleshed Apologetics. Enfleshed
Apologetics began to develop before the main writings of the New Atheists, and thus the early
work in Enfleshed Apologetics obviously does not offer a response to them. A few writers are,
however, beginning to see Enfleshed Apologetics as a possibly helpful approach to the New
Atheists. This needs to expand since the New Atheist’s arguments have resonated in society
based on their use of the emotional and ethical rhetorical appeals and an Enfleshed Apologetic
provides the needed response to the lifestyle-oriented challenges of the New Atheists.
The first author we will consider who is beginning to use Enfleshed Apologetics to reply to
the New Atheists is Alister McGrath. In the book, Beyond Opinion: Living the Faith That We
Defend, he pens a pertinent chapter for applying new apologetic methods to the New Atheists
entitled “Challenges from Atheism.” McGrath lists and describes the various writings of the New
Atheists. He acknowledges the standard New Atheist charge that Christianity leads to violence. 65
However, his response at this point primarily is to show that atheism led to more violence in the
twentieth century than did Christianity, rather than calling for a form of Enfleshed Apologetics
among Christians.66 McGrath’s basic argument here is that violence is not so much attributable to
religion, or even to atheism, for that matter, but instead violence accompanies the possession of
power in society. He writes,
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Once, it was possible to argue that religion alone was the source of the world’s evils.
… Atheism argued that it abolished violence and tyranny by getting rid of what
ultimately caused it: faith in God. It was a credible claim in the nineteenth century
precisely because atheism had not yet enjoyed the power and influence once
exercised by religion. But all that has changed. Atheism’s innocence has now
evaporated. In the twentieth century, atheism managed to grasp the power that had
hitherto eluded it. But then atheism proved just as fallible, just as corrupt, and just as
oppressive as any belief system that had gone before it.67
McGrath goes on to argue that the most flagrant examples of the use of violence in the twentieth
century were perpetrated by atheistic regimes.68
While there is truth and accuracy to these claims, the fundamental problem is that this
approach merely tries to reduce religion to the lesser of two evils. Yes, violence can be a
problem in religion, but the same problem can really be far worse in atheism. Thus, religion may
be bad, but atheism is worse. While McGrath does go on to present a positive case for
Christianity as opposed to atheism, this particular component of the overall argument is perhaps
less helpful than other approaches. Christianity will not be well-received if it is merely the lesser
of two evils. The lesser of two evils is still an evil. Obviously a more positive presentation of the
faith is needed.69
McGrath comes closer to an Enfleshed Apologetic approach to the New Atheists in Mere
Apologetics: How to Help Seekers and Skeptics Find Faith. Here, McGrath points more
significantly to Enfleshed Apologetics. He writes that apologetics has a strongly positive
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dimension, “setting out the full attractiveness of Jesus Christ so those outside the faith can begin
to grasp why he merits such serious consideration.”70 He goes on to say:
As we shall see, one classic way of doing this is to show that Christianity is rationally
compelling. It makes better sense of things than its rivals. Yet it is vitally important
not to limit the appeal of the gospel to human reason. What of the human heart? Time
after time, the Gospels tell us people were drawn to Jesus of Nazareth because they
realized he could transform their lives. While arguments are important in apologetics,
they have their limits. Many are attracted to the Christian faith today because of their
belief that it will change their lives. Their criterion of validation is not so much “Is
this true?” But “Will this work?”71
In this section of his book, McGrath is working with the idea that apologetics has two basic
themes: defending and commending the Christian faith.72 McGrath includes this reference to the
Christian life as a way to “commend” the faith.73 McGrath describes a way of accomplishing this
with primarily verbal means. He says we should “help people realize”74 how wonderful
Christianity is and help people grasp the attractiveness of the faith. However, in this section of
the book, McGrath does not mention that one of the best ways to show the attractiveness of the
Christian life is to live an attractive Christian life. Demonstrating the beauty of the Gospel is
often best done with deeds, not just descriptions. McGrath does not deny or discount the
importance of Christian life here, he just doesn’t mention it at this point. More can and should be
said about lifestyle as a form of apologetic approach. Unfortunately McGrath doesn’t flesh out
this topic at this point in his work, although he does later.
It is vitally important as a means of commending the value and wholesome nature of
Christianity to see sacrificial love and service enacted in life. Of course, this “commending” role
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for the Christian life is needed, and McGrath is correct to recognize it as a form of apologetics in
this sense. However, McGrath here misses that in light of the lifestyle-oriented charges against
Christianity leveled by the New Atheists, a lifestyle-oriented approach to apologetics serves not
just a “commending” role, but also a “defending” role. McGrath recognizes that not all
challenges to the Christian faith are intellectual, although he recognizes that often they are.75 He
writes:
it is important to realize that not all of these difficulties fall into this category [of
intellectual questions]. Some are much deeper concerns, and are not so much about
problems with rational understandings as about problems with existential
commitment. French apologist Blaise Pascal (1623–62) once perceptively
commented: “The heart has its reasons, which reason knows nothing about.”
Apologetics aims to identify these barriers to faith, whatever their nature, and offer
responses that help to overcome them.76
While this is a key recognition, at this point of his text McGrath says the way to offer
responses to such existential qualms is by thinking through our own such struggles carefully.
“Apologetics thus encourages Christians to develop a ‘discipleship of the mind.’ Before we can
answer the question others ask us about our faith, we need to have answered them for
ourselves.”77 McGrath is accurate in his diagnosis of the range of challenges to Christianity, and
his suggested answers are not incorrect, they are just incomplete at this point. Questions about
the Christian life can be answered by talking about the Christian life, but they can also be
answered by living the Christian life.
McGrath becomes much more clear about this when he returns to the idea of lifestyle
apologetics later in Mere Apologetics. In his chapter on “Gateways for Apologetics” McGrath
suggests that methods such as stories and images, along with tools such as films, poetry, and
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works of art, along with more traditional methods of apologetics such as explanation and
argument, are helpful gateways to open the door for apologetics,78 and he adds lifestyle as an
additional possible gateway for apologetics.79 He writes:
the way in which Christians live and embody their faith can serve an important
apologetic function. Many are moved to ask about faith when they realize that their
friends seem to have something they do not—for example, a sense of peace or
purpose, or a deep-seated compassion and love for their fellow human beings.
“Where did that come from?” they ask, secretly wondering if they could possess it as
well. The love of God is both embodied and proclaimed when Christians serve their
neighbors in the world. … Living out the truth can be thought of as an “incarnational
apologetic,” itself a powerful witness to that truth. We need more than just
arguments; we need to show that the Christian faith is life-changing and lifeempowering.80
Since McGrath includes this description of “incarnational apologetics” under the heading
of “gateways for apologetics,” it is tempting to understand him as saying that lifestyle is not an
apologetic approach in and of itself, but instead just a means to open a door to a true apologetic
discussion. However, elsewhere in Mere Apologetics, McGrath expresses plainly that lifestyle
can indeed be seen as a valid apologetic approach in its own right. For example, his concluding
chapter is entitled, “Developing Your Own Apologetic Approach,” and he explains that his
method throughout the book has been to “help you develop your own approach. … My concern
throughout this work has been to help you and encourage you to develop an apologetic method,
rather than simply presenting you with a list of apologetic answers.”81 In that chapter, he
specifies that one of the ways apologetics is best done is “through the example of our lives and
attitudes.”82 Thus, while McGrath could be read as indicating that Enfleshed Apologetics is only
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a precursor to apologetics, he also at times makes more clear that it is a valid apologetic
approach in its own right as well.
McGrath is certainly open to a variety of apologetic approaches, and his writing shows that
the field of apologetics needs to be construed in a wider way than it had been in the modern era.
He is perceptive in his recognition that not all challenges to the Christian faith are intellectual,
and he later advocates the Christian life as a form of apologetics, but at times he misses the
opportunity to connect the dots. Enfleshed Apologetics comprises a helpful addition to the
apologist’s approach as he or she shares life with friends who may have questions about the
Christian faith that are not intellectual in nature, for example if they have an outlook that may be
discolored by exposure to the toxic criticisms of Christianity leveled by the New Atheists.
The second author making some use of Enfleshed Apologetics as a means of replying to
the New Atheists is Paul Louis Metzger. His book Connecting Christ calls for a more complex
analysis regarding the New Atheists. Metzger recognizes that many are coming to view
Christianity as an opponent to the common good, and he specifically states that “Perhaps the
greatest antagonist against religion in any form today was Christopher Hitchens, who in his book
God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything speaks of religion’s courtship with fascism
over the centuries.”83
In response to Hitchens and the New Atheists, Metzger takes the opposite approach from
Historical Goodness Apologetics. Instead, Metzger acknowledges that too often in the past
violence has in fact been a part of the church’s history. He writes,
Fascism and other related evils have indeed grievously marked the church throughout
its history, as illustrated by the church’s oppression of other faiths during the
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Inquisition, its association with the Hitler regime during the Holocaust, and its
execution of ‘witches’ in Salem, Massachusetts, in the 1600s, to mention but a few.84
Metzger argues that “fascist ways have horrifically impacted the church’s witness over the
centuries; such evils committed in the name of Jesus actually deny Jesus, failing to account of
the triune God’s identity, claims, and ways.”85
While these comments are given in the section of Metzger’s book that most closely deals
with the New Atheists, he addresses problems of violence and abuse within the church in other
chapters also. He does so most prominently in Chapter 4, “Why Should We Apologize?” Here,
Metzger comes closest to saying that Christian apologetics should mean to say we are sorry for
the various problems associated with Christianity over the centuries. Metzger references “the
need in post-Christendom for Christians to be redemptive in their witness and make apologies for
the past and present failures of the church.”86 In addition to the problems previously listed such
as the Inquisition and the Holocaust, Metzger also points to problems in the way the church dealt
with Native Americans or First Nations people87 and problems with how much of the church
interacted with the African American civil rights movement.88 Metzger gives several reasons to
propose that saying “I’m sorry” is a valid form of apologetics, including that Christians “bear the
same name as those guilty of victimization,”89 that “confession of sin is viewed in Christian
Scripture as a mark of growth in righteousness,”90 and finally, “If Jesus can apologize, so to
speak, in that he died our death, taking our penalty to himself as his own as the sinless one, then
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how in the world can we think we shouldn’t apologize for the church’s’ actual and inherited
sins?”91
Metzger advocates that the church use what he calls “relational-incarnational apologetics”
in their response to the current cultural condition. Relational-incarnational apologetics:
goes beyond simply addressing what people think and want and focuses attention on
why they think such thoughts and what it is they truly need. … As Christ’s witnesses
we are called to engage people relationally. Encountering people relationally entails
addressing them as more than simply rational beings or as cultural creations with
religious appetites. God’s Word did not become incarnate primarily to share
incredible ideas about God or to promote a heavenly marketing plan or business
strategy. He became incarnate to share life with us and to take us home to his Father’s
house through his costly sacrifice.92
In this approach, people are not seen merely as brains, merely rational beings, to be filled
with information, but as people to be loved in relationships. Also one notes that this model of
Enfleshed Apologetics points specifically to Jesus’ sacrifice of atonement. The value and depth
of Christ’s relationship with us is seen ultimately in sacrifice, and understanding the profundity
of God’s relationship with humanity requires understanding the profundity of the atonement.
Metzger locates his relational-incarnational apologetic in the nature of God since within the
Trinity God is in relation and in Christ God becomes incarnate. Metzger sees the church’s
apologetic task flowing from these facets of God’s nature. He also places emphasis on the life of
the Christian in discipleship as the shape of his relational-incarnational apologetic. In particular,
he sees the Christian life as one formed by love. He writes:
The more we as Christ’s church exercise sacrificial love so our views about Christ
can be heard, the more we will be heard. … No matter what happens, may we never
stop sharing Jesus’ sacrificial, redemptive love in word and deed, for Jesus is calling
us as his community to live into and out of his life as the ultimate apologetic.93
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In a theological justification for his argument that the church needs to function in relationships
and in response to the charge of violence inherent in the church, Metzger makes the argument
that the Triune God, because of relational space within the Trinity, makes space for relationships
and otherness in human thought as well.
The triune God’s identity revealed in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus creates
space for otherness because God has relational space within his own being for
otherness. Over against fascist and totalitarian tendencies present in various monistic
ideologies, which champion the one over the many, the triune God, whose being
signifies unity in diversity, creates relational space so that we can be one yet many as
God’s people and give space to those outside the church to live freely in relation.94
In response to the charge raised by the New Atheists that the church has at times used
violence in its past, Metzger writes, “We must not simply bear witness with true words but also
in loving actions. How can it be otherwise when God’s gracious and true word became
incarnate? The Word became deed.”95 He also argues that “it is certainly important that as
Christian apologists we take seriously our christological and trinitarian convictions, but it is
equally and exceptionally important that we live them out.”96
As he nears the conclusion of his chapter about the challenges posed by Christopher
Hitchens, Metzger argues:
Discerning followers of Jesus do not seek to take back America from their enemies
by lobbying for one’s own kind of people over against the common good; they lay
their lives down for others, including their enemies, for the uncommon God who
seeks after the common good of all. We fight not as the world fights, and our battle is
not with flesh and blood, but with the spiritual forces of evil in the heavenly realms
(Ephesians 6:12). We wrestle through the Word and in prayer, not compelling people
by force but loving them and appealing to them in view of God’s mercies to be
reconciled to God. Discerning Christians evangelize, not by pushing but by leading
people to Christ.97
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Metzger does well in recognizing that Enfleshed Apologetics is a proper response to the New
Atheists and can be used alongside approaches such as Presuppositional Apologetics, Classical
Apologetics, or Evidential Apologetics. However, Metzger’s exploration of the New Atheists
themselves is minimal, so he is not able to develop a carefully tailored apologetic response to the
specific challenges posed by the New Atheists. In fact, the only work he interacts with is
Hitchens’ god is not Great, and that in only one sentence.
While Metzger’s interaction with the New Atheists is brief his prescriptions for apologetics
are appropriate and helpful. As with McGrath, Metzger draws a contrast between the ways of the
world and the ways advocated by the church. He gives a truer and more profound exposition of
Christian methodology than we have seen developed in Enfleshed Apologetic writings so far.
Metzger reminds his reader that “We fight not as the world fights. … We wrestle through the
Word and in prayer, not compelling people by force but loving them.”98 Note that Metzger
specifies that the way Christians demonstrate love is by laying down their lives for others. The
method of Christian apologetics is not by enforcing a superior power, but by self-giving
sacrifice.
This approach described by Metzger serves as a direct refutation of the charges of the New
Atheists. Consider, for example, the famous passage from Richard Dawkins’ The God Delusion
where he alleges that Christians, in following after the violent tendencies of their most
unpleasant God, engage in misogyny, racism, homophobia, and more. Note that each of these
activities are rooted in power struggles. Misogyny is the struggle for one gender to dominate
over the other, forcing it into subjection. Likewise, racism seeks to use power to elevate one race
and dominate another. These are modes, as Dawkins points out, of bullying.
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Metzger counters that Christians work differently. Whereas Dawkins charges Christians
with fighting exactly the way the world fights, with power struggles and with bullying, Metzger
says that Christians should shun the ways of the world and demonstrate love and sacrifice, an
approach that eschews earthly power struggles. Metzger’s work is marked by calls for Christians
to seek ways to serve rather than be served, even laying down ones’ life even for ones’
enemies.99 The only full refutation of the New Atheists’ charges is an enacted, enfleshed one, not
a verbal one. Metzger’s argument that Christians persuade not by force but by sacrificial love is
particularly powerful.
This is a needed argument against the New Atheists because they charge that Christians are
overwhelmingly interested in seeking political power to enforce their closed-minded views and
values on the rest of society. Hunter points to this problem as he notes that faith “has become
highly politicized. Non-Christians view Christianity politically and Christians themselves stake
out their own positions in ideological terms.”100 The New Atheists make the same accusations.
Dawkins claims that “religious fanaticism is rampant in present-day America,”101 and that the
religiously politicized climate in the United States “would have horrified Jefferson, Washington,
Madison, Adams, and all their friends.”102 For these reasons, the charge that Christians are
seeking to “take back America” as Metzger notes,103 can become a true obstacle for Christians
trying to share their gospel-centered love with those around. This barrier of mistrust needs to be
reduced or removed before the gospel can be heard, and Metzger rightly advocates an apologetic
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method in which “Discerning followers of Jesus do not seek to take back America,104 but rather
serve in self-giving, sacrificial love.
The third example of a fuller Enfleshed Apologetics is a fine collection of essays directed
in response to the New Atheists, Religion and the New Atheism: A Critical Appraisal, edited by
Amarnath Amarasingam. In this work, Amarasingam gathers together recent apologetic
responses to New Atheism. Several of the authors included in this volume recognize the
prominence of the charge from the New Atheists that religion is violent or evil. However, of the
13 essays in his work, only one considers Enfleshed Apologetics as an appropriate response:
Gregory Peterson’s “Ethics, Out-group Altruism, and the New Atheism.”
Peterson’s insights do merit careful consideration. Peterson is responding to the New
Atheist argument that Christianity teaches only in-group altruism, coupled with out-group
hostility, while evolutionary biology gives a sufficient rationale for out-group altruism. In
response, Peterson argues that evolutionary biology provides only a contingent basis for outgroup altruism,105 while Christianity has a much stronger grounding for the concept in its
theological framework.106
The significant point of Peterson’s argument revolves around where he locates the noncontingent expectation for out-group altruism in Christianity. He locates it not in the text of
Scripture, but in the person of Christ as the basis for the Christian life.
Christianity begins with the encounter with Christ, both as a historical figure who
lived some two thousand years ago, and as a real presence today. … As such, Jesus’
life and action are revelatory, pointing to God’s identity and providing, through his
life and teaching, a model and point of reflection for living a truly good life.107
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He adds, “The theological starting point of the Christian faith is not a book, but a person and an
understanding of that person’s significance.”108 What sets Peterson apart is that he references
Jesus, but also goes on to draw out the implications for followers of Jesus in their lives of
discipleship.109 After noting that “Christianity begins with the encounter with Christ,”110 he
moves on to point out that while out-group altruism is in fact taught in the text of Scripture, “if
the language of discipleship is taken seriously, it implies something much more: a following
after the pattern that Jesus has set.”111 This move from text to life is the movement from a
traditional apologetic approach to an Enfleshed Apologetic approach, and it is done specifically
in response to the charges of the New Atheists.
Peterson makes one other notable move in his brief description of Enfleshed Apologetics.
He moves the grounding for out-group altruism outside of an exclusively incarnational model to
see the call to care for those different from oneself in God’s order and plan for the world. He
writes, “A concern for the other, the outsider, can be found in the life and teachings of Jesus, but
it can also be connected to the broader Christian worldview. By the Christian account, the world
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is itself created, and the creation is affirmed as good.”112 Peterson notes the implications of this
move as he points out that the goal of Christian life then is “a life engaged in service and
commitment to the other.”113 As the capstone of this line of argumentation, Peterson writes that
“Rather than being a foreign element reluctantly grafted onto it, the concern for the other,
including the radically other, is at the heart of the Christian understanding of the moral life,
embodied in God’s own creative and redeeming actions.”114 Here Peterson is focusing on
relationships and the way that relationships turn us outward toward the world. The world that the
Christian is called to address is affirmed by Peterson as good, and a valid and valuable place for
worthwhile service. As the Christian is turned outward to serve in the Father’s world, he or she
sees the neighbor as the recipient of love and service. Peterson points out that the Christian
approach to dealing with the neighbor differs dramatically from the New Atheist approach, at
least the approach demonstrated in their publishing style. Peterson asks the question:
How best can I love my neighbor? The new atheist solution seems to be to vilify my
neighbor as publicly as possible, threaten to remove their children, and then forcibly
educate them with opposing ideas. Perhaps this would work, but it could hardly be
called love. Love, it would seem, requires engagement and encounter, without being
weak or unprincipled. … True concern for the other involves engagement and even
sacrifice, even when that engagement and sacrifice is not reciprocated or deserved.115
While laying a good foundation, Peterson does not devote significant time to showing a
framework for what such an Enfleshed Apologetic approach would actually look like. The field
of Enfleshed Apologetics needs to be filled out in order to offer richer and fuller response to the
challenges of New Atheism. The examples we have seen are a helpful beginning of applying
Enfleshed Apologetics to the New Atheists, but more development is needed.
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Enfleshed Apologetics Put into Practice
Enfleshed Apologetics holds significant promise for addressing the challenges of the New
Atheists, but the approach is marked by the general problems of a lack of depth and a lack of
development. Tim Morey provides one of the more comprehensive views of Enfleshed
Apologetics in Embodying our Faith: Becoming a Living, Sharing, Practicing Church, but even
Morey notes, “The term embodied apologetic is commonly used among younger churches, but
very little has been said about how we might construct such an apologetic.” 116 While the topic
needs additional development, Morey goes farther than most in showing in practice what an
Enfleshed Apologetic could look like. In his book, he suggests one concrete shape that such an
apologetic might take, and he writes that he hopes others would follow him and suggest other
concrete shapes as well.117
In laying out a form of an Enfleshed Apologetic approach, Morey proposes that such an
approach should be experiential, communal, and enacted in order to satisfy three societal
hungers: for transcendence, community, and purpose. Morey writes that the Enfleshed
Apologetic facets of experiential faith, communal faith, and enacted faith correspond with the
three hungers he identified and these features “are interrelated and will have considerable
overlap in the church’s practice.”118 Morey describes how these facets of Enfleshed Apologetics
develop in the life of a congregation corporately and the lives of the members individually:
As we become a community of people who look more and more like Jesus, we begin
to practice a communal apologetic. In our congregation we find certain ministry
structures, including high-commitment membership, small groups, and hospitality, to
be especially helpful in cultivating this.119
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As Christians come to resemble the life of Christ in their own personal life, they are led into
community, into high-commitment engagement, and into hospitality towards those around them.
It is important to note that while the congregation seeks to implement Enfleshed Apologetic
strategies through intentional ministry structures, the applied work of Enfleshed Apologetics is
not the sole responsibility of a few trained experts within the congregation. Enfleshed
Apologetics permeates the lives of individual members. This is seen in the reference to
hospitality. In Morey’s example, hospitality is not just practiced by the congregation, perhaps on
Sunday mornings or by trained leaders such as the pastor. It is also implemented by the
membership individually.
Morey illustrates this as he shares a story of this, and his congregation’s, Enfleshed
Apologetic approach to a young woman who suffered a devastating miscarriage two days before
her due date. The woman, named Michelle, was not a member of the congregation Morey served,
but worked at a Starbucks where Morey often visited. When Morey heard of the tragedy, he
visited her in the hospital. “We wept together, talked about and prayed to the God she didn’t
know if she believed in.”120 After the memorial service, which Morey conducted, members of the
congregation made meals for Michelle and her boyfriend and sent them cards, putting into
practice individually the hospitality fostered by the congregation corporately. 121
Morey writes:
Our faith must be lived out in ways that show God’s compassionate heart. … As we
consider how to embed an enacted apologetic in the fabric of our congregations, our
ministries of compassion and justice stand out as especially relevant. Along with
worship gatherings and smaller expressions of community, our congregation has
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made compassion one of the three central ministries that we urge everyone to
participate in.122
This focus on compassion practiced by Morey’s congregation in large-scale ways led to the
compassion shown to Michelle in her time of need. Morey explains that when he started having
conversations with Michelle and her boyfriend, they were wary of him because of his church
connection:
They were a little wary of me as a pastor and made it clear they were not interested in
church or talking about God. But the door to spiritual conversation began to open one
day when I told them a story about our church’s compassion work. Our congregation
is deeply involved in issues of poverty and disease in Africa and our own city. They
were surprised that a church would be so involved in real-world issues (“I thought
you guys just kind of sat around and talked about what you believed and in what you
are and aren’t supposed to do”) and were particularly fascinated by our work in
Africa.123
Because of the congregation’s Enfleshed Apologetic work in international compassion, doors
opened for Enfleshed Apologetic work on a local and personal scale as well. This is but one
example of how Enfleshed Apologetics could be applied in the life of a congregation and the
lives of the congregation’s members.
One additional example of Enfleshed Apologetics applied to actual life sitnations is
provided by Paul Louis Metzger in Connecting Christ. Metzger tells the story of his friend,
“Rick,” who moved to Baghdad, Iraq in the days following the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.
“Rick was helping assess and meet the needs of the poor, distributing food and caring for
children and the elderly, renovating schools, and helping with a transition from emergency relief
to community development in the war zone.”124 Rick, however, decided to engage in an even
deeper shared life experience, and so, “As time went on, Rick decided to try to move into a
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dangerous, crime-ridden, inner-city neighborhood”125 in Baghdad. Metzger writes about the
inroads Rick made in an impoverished, violence-prone community through his decision to live
among the people of the community, pray for them, and seek opportunities to share life with
them. As Rick became more accepted in the community and was welcomed into people’s homes,
he had the opportunity to share his faith and present stories from the Bible with his hosts.126 This
level of loving encounter bears promise for the field of Enfleshed Apologetic work.
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CHAPTER FOUR
VOCATIONAL APOLOGETICS
After looking at the writings of the New Atheists in some depth and considering various forms of
apologetic approaches that work together to respond to them, it is time to move on to a proposal
for a more fully developed Enfleshed Apologetic response to the New Atheists. The role of
apologetics is to respond to challenges to Christianity. The responses must be appropriate to the
questions asked, starting from the standpoint of the challenger, not from the familiar ground of
the apologist. When new challenges arise, or when challenges arise that have not been faced for
some length of time, the apologetic response needed may look significantly different than what
had gone before. Apologetics needs to be a responsive discipline. Having looked at the specific
forms of challenges presented by the New Atheists and the culture influenced by them, the
needed response cannot be merely rational or intellectual in nature, but also, or even primarily,
lifestyle oriented.

A Theological Framework for Enfleshed Apologetics
Enfleshed Apologetics offers helpful contributions to the field of apologetics responding to
the criticisms of the New Atheists. It is now time to take these helpful contributions and develop
a solid theological foundation for Enfleshed Apologetics. For this theological foundation, we will
turn to a creedal format showing the Triune nature of God, and consider the implications for a
Christian life lived in vocation.
In a theological understanding of Enfleshed Apologetics guided by a creedal framework,
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we begin with the Father as the giver and sustainer of life, who places human beings in the world
to work on his behalf and preserve it. The Father places his people in the world as his agents of
help and support. Humans are called by God in their various positions in life to care for the
world even as the Father would care for it and everything in it. Of course, this extends also to
fellow human beings. As God’s agents on earth, his people are to provide as God would provide
for his people. Enfleshed Apologetics, then, is the active living out of the work that God has
called Christians to do and placed before them as his representatives in the created order.
A creedal framework for Enfleshed Apologetics would then turn from God the Father to
focus on Jesus Christ. This creedal framework calls Christians, even in the field of Enfleshed
Apologetics, to see Jesus primarily as redeemer first, and then as example. A creedal format
focuses us on the primary work of Christ: he was crucified for us and for our salvation and rose
again on the third day. Jesus’ saving work, rather than his exemplary life, must be held as the
central background and foundation of an Enfleshed Apologetic. Christ’s exemplary life,
however, is not left out. The implications of seeing Jesus, first, as redeemer and, second, as
example point ahead to Enfleshed Apologetics. Christ’s work is and remains his saving work.
Our life of service plays no role in that work of salvation. Since our relationship with Christ is
firmly established by his work rather than ours, our efforts are now freed up to be directed
outward to the neighbor and, therein, serve as an Enfleshed Apologetic.
To say that Christ is proclaimed primarily as redeemer and only secondarily as example,
however, certainly still allows Jesus’ life to be used as an example to be emulated at all. Once
salvation is seen as clearly separated from any human work, then it becomes admirable, even
vital, for Christians to follow Christ’s example. The goal is not to please God or earn salvation,
but to serve those whom God has placed around us. Martin Luther, in his Church Postil, makes
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clear that there is indeed a role for the exemplary life of Christ. He writes:
When you now have Christ in that way as the basis and chief blessing of your
salvation, then the second part follows, namely, that you take Him as an example and
devote yourself to serving your neighbor, just as you see that He devoted Himself to
you. Then faith and love are both active, God’s commandment is fulfilled, and the
person is cheerful and fearless to do and suffer anything. Therefore, just look at this:
Christ as gift nourishes your faith and makes you a Christian. But Christ as an
example uses your works, which do not make you a Christian, but rather they come
from you who have already been made a Christian. Now as far as gift and example
are separate, so far are faith and works separate. Faith has nothing of its own, but
only Christ’s work and life. The works do have something special from you, but they
should also not be your own, but belong to your neighbor.1
As is typical of Luther, once the primary issue of salvation is clearly established and the
secondary issue of the human life modeled on Christ becomes the topic of consideration, the
focus shifts from God to the neighbor. God does not need our works, and he does not need our
Enfleshed Apologetic. Our neighbor does. Luther writes:
We receive Christ not only as a gift by faith but also as an example through love
toward our neighbor, to whom we are to give service and do good as Christ does to
us. Faith brings and gives Christ to you as your own with all His possessions. Love
gives you to your neighbor with all your possessions. These two things [faith and
love] constitute a true and complete Christian life.2
The Christian rejoices in salvation through Christ’s work received by faith, and then turns
outward toward the neighbor in a life of service that imitates Christ’s service. In this way, the
saving message of the church is preserved in its position of primacy, but yet the Christian life is
not neglected. The message of the church is that of salvation in Christ’s actions for us, his death
and resurrection. Then flowing from that, the life of the Christian is one of humble service in the
world. Christ is savior, but he is also example. In the church the proclamation of Christ and his
saving work remain absolutely central. While central, however, it is not alone. Works do follow
faith. Enfleshed Apologetics does flows forth from the work of Christ, but without
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supplementing salvation it or supplanting it.
As part of the second article of the creedal framework, the works that flow out focus on
Christ’s ongoing rule and reign in the world. However, this ongoing reign is not at all in the crass
political means envisioned by the New Atheists and feared by a culture that resents the idea of
theocratic rule. Instead, the ongoing reign of Jesus mirrors the establishment of the reign of
Jesus. Christ’s reign was established in his sacrificial death on the cross on behalf of his people.
His defeat in death was his victory as king. As his reign was established in sacrifice, so also it is
extended in sacrifice. Jesus continues to reign following his death, resurrection, and ascension,
but this reign on earth is radically misunderstood if it is seen as seeking earthly power and
political clout. Rather, Christ rules through the humble service of his people. As Christ sacrificed
for the good of his people, thereby establishing his reign, so his people continue that reign by
serving the needs of those around them. This is accomplished through meeting the earthly needs
of those in the world where God has placed his people.
A creedal framework for Enfleshed Apologetics then moves from the saving work of Christ
to the work of the Holy Spirit as the one who guides and directs God’s people in their Christian
lives of service. The Father and the Son empower people of faith, but empower them to serve
rather than dominate, by sending forth the Holy Spirit. The Father places his people into his
world to continue to preserve and sustain life through the work of his people. This is the same
world into which the Son came. The Son came not just as a token of God’s presence among his
people, but to bring peace and reconciliation through his sacrificial suffering, death, and
resurrection. The Son now extends his loving service to humanity through the ongoing work of
his redeemed people. In this same world, the Holy Spirit works both to gather and to send. The
Holy Spirit gathers the church around Christ, and then sends the members of the church out into
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their daily lives of love and service. In this way, under the guidance of the Spirit, an Enfleshed
Apologetic approach flows from salvation outward into service. The message of salvation is
never diluted or downplayed, but given full respect as the Spirit first points Christians back to
Christ and then guides them out into the world.
A creedal framework for Enfleshed Apologetics, allowing God’s work to be his alone and
fully sufficient for salvation, frees the Christian life to be open to the entire spectrum of human
life as a fruitful field of service. Enfleshed Apologetics is driven by the actual needs of the
people among whom God places his followers. The Father places his people in the world to
serve. The Son, by accomplishing salvation fully and separate from any of our efforts, sets his
people free to serve in whatever capacity is needed. The Spirit both points the Christian back to
the affirmation of his accomplished salvation in the work of Christ, and points the Christian back
out into the Father’s world to serve the needs of the neighbor freely and without hindrance. This
creedal theological framework helps us articulate how Enfleshed Apologetics finds its fulfilment
in Luther’s understanding of vocation.

Analysis of The Ecclesial Response To Cultural Change
To understand how the creedal framework for Enfleshed Apologetics focusing on God’s
work to preserve and build up his people in creation functions in practice, we turn back to James
Davison Hunter. Just as Hunter offered a helpful analysis of the dynamics of culture that have
led to the popularity of the New Atheism, so too he offers helpful directives for the church’s
response. While not mentioning the New Atheists specifically, Hunter certainly recognizes the
effects of similar arguments as a part of what he calls the problem of difference. He writes:
As Christianity has moved from being the dominant culture-shaping influence to just
one among many, its historic role as defender of social order has dissolved … many
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Christian leaders continue to aspire to play a role, but in playing it they will be
viewed (and are viewed) as much as a danger to the social order as a support.3
Hunter analyzes that current Western culture suffers from the twin problems of difference and
dissolution, with the latter particularly contributing to a form of nihilism.4 Hunter uses the paired
terms “difference” and “dissolution” to articulate the challenges of pluralism and relativism.
Regarding “difference,” Hunter writes, “The challenge of difference is rooted in the everpresent, indeed unavoidable realities of modern pluralism.”5 The challenge of difference or
pluralism has been present to a degree throughout history to those who lived along trade routes
or engaged in travel. Now, however, due to urbanization and the ease of communication and
travel, the effect of multiculturalism is felt by an unprecedented percentage of the population.
“The incidence of pluralism has increased massively, which means that average people
experience it more frequently and more intensely than ever before in human history.”6 In the
past, the challenge of difference was stabilized by a strongly dominant culture, but “pluralism
today—at least in America—exists without a dominant culture.”7 He notes that “as the Christian
community has lost its prominence in American public life and the culture has pluralized, the
grammar of Christian faith has become more strange and arcane, less natural and more foreign,
spoken awkwardly if at all.”8 This is what Hunter presents as the challenge of “difference.”
By “dissolution,” Hunter is indicting the deconstruction and relativism sometimes
described as flowing from postmodernism. “By dissolution, I refer to the deconstruction of the
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most basic assumptions about reality.”9 Regarding “dissolution” he points particularly to the
breakdown in language of a connection between signified and signifier in which “words are
emptied of their meaning. The forces of dissolution, then, lead us to a place of absence, a place
where we can never be confident of what is real, what is true, what is good; a place where we are
always left wondering if anything in particular is real or true or good.”10 The end problem of
dissolution for Hunter is that, when such confidence is broken down, the only things that remain
irrefutable are “will and power—that is, a will to power rooted in desires and judgments that
have no justification but are their own measure of moral worth and significance.”11
Hunter’s use of the word “negation” connects tightly to his understanding of the word
“dissolution.” Negation establishes identity through angry separation from people and ideas with
which one disagrees. Negation does not present a positive alternative, it primarily seeks to tear
down what has been built by those considered to be enemies. This functions as “the
condemnation and denigration of enemies in the effort to subjugate and dominate those who are
culpable.”12 Hunter links fear, anger, and revenge tied to a will to domination with the concept of
negation. When meaning and agreement are broken by dissolution, leaving only the will to
power remaining, the result is the path of negation. Negation points to that place of absence
devoid of any certainty, where one can perhaps see what should not be, but cannot make a
definitive statement as to what should be.
Hunter’s use of nihilism is tied to his thoughts on negation and dissolution, and his
construal of nihilism is particularly interesting and pertinent. On the one hand, he acknowledges
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that “radical skepticism leading to radical nihilism is, of course, rare. Apart from a few celebrity
nihilists and a few disaffected graduate students, there are actually few consistent relativists or
committed postmodernists for the simple reason that it is not livable. Dissolution is always a
matter of degrees and yet, even in its approximations, it is highly toxic.”13 He states that
“Nietzsche … was the first to understand radical skepticism of this kind and its portentous
implications for the Western world.”14 He argues that much of Western culture is fundamentally
nihilist at least in approximation.15
In response to the twin problems of difference and dissolution with the related challenges
of negation and nihilism, Hunter proposes the twin responses of affirmation and antithesis. These
two responses form the call to “faithful presence,” and are worth considering carefully. He points
out:
The pairing of “affirmation” and “antithesis” appears asymmetrical at first.
Affirmation would seem better paired with negation, and antithesis would seem better
paired with synthesis. There are several reasons why these are not paired. The first is
that unlike “antithesis” which is constructive opposition, representing a contradiction
and resistance but with the possibility of hope, the concept and practice of “negation”
have become expressions of nihilism. It offers nothing beyond critique and hostility.
It is antagonistic for its own sake. This, it would seem, is contrary to the gospel.
“Synthesis” is problematic because it presupposes a blending and an accommodation
with that which it opposes. “Affirmation,” by contrast, does not require assimilation
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with its opposition to validate actions or ideas generated by the opposition of which it
approves.16
To the challenge of “difference,” Hunter encourages affirmation. Affirmation involves
recognition of the good that is present in the work of others, even if that work is done by
someone significantly different. Thus, affirmation continues to recognize the importance of all of
God’s creatures working for the good of a creation that is fallen, but not destroyed. Hunter notes,
“Affirmation is based on the recognition that culture and culture-making have their own validity
before God that is not nullified by the fall.”17 Affirmation celebrates the beauty, truth, and
goodness witnessed in creation,18 even when good is accomplished by those who do not
recognize the creator.
Through affirmation, a Christian can, for example, commend the humanitarian work done
by a secular relief agency, even if the Christian does not fully agree with all the positions on
which the relief agency is based. Affirmation does not imply full agreement in all details, with a
complicit degree of acceptance. Rather, affirmation allows for disagreements in background
theory to remain, while recognizing unity in outward actions. A Christian and a New Atheist
could both donate generously to a disaster relief fundraiser. The Christian could affirm the New
Atheist’s generosity, and even rejoice in the fact that people in need are being helped. This act of
affirmation, however, in no way implies that the Christian agrees with the beliefs of the atheist.
This is why Hunter emphasizes “affirmation” rather than “synthesis,” for the latter would imply
that both parties have come to a new trajectory based on interaction with the other.
In response to the challenge of “dissolution,” Hunter calls for Christians to offer an
“antithesis.” Antithesis involves providing a positive alternative to the position with which one
16
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disagrees. It is not enough to point out problems. That is merely the path of negation. Rather, a
Christian is called to provide a better alternative. The essence of the idea of antithesis is an
outlook of construction rather than destruction. Antithesis fully accounts for the problems of
culture and does not gloss over them. Indeed, antithesis seeks to subvert the detrimental
structures of society. However, the subversion is to be done in a way that builds a viable, better
way. Hunter writes:
In our present historical circumstances, this means that the church and its people must
stand in a position of critical resistance to late modernity and its dominant institutions
and carriers. ... But here again, let me emphasize that antithesis is not simply
negational. Subversion is not nihilistic but creative and constructive. Thus, the
church—as a community, within individual vocations, and through both existing and
alternative social institutions—stands antithetical to modernity and its dominant
institutions in order to offer an alternative vision and direction for them.19
The problem, alleges Hunter, is that rather than offering an antithesis to culture, the church
has instead sought to influence the culture through its drive to influence the political process. In
this way, the church has fallen into the path of negation. “By nurturing its resentments,
sustaining them through a discourse of negation toward outsiders, and in cases, pursuing their
will to power, they [Christians] become functional Nietzscheans, participating in the very
cultural breakdown they so ardently strive to resist.”20 What the church should do instead is
provide a positive alternative, an antithesis, to the void that is represented in culture. The church
should not spend its energy primarily attacking the culture where it disagrees, but instead offer
“more of a bursting out of new creation from within it.”21 When the church disagrees with a
component of culture, which is not uncommon, often the first instinct is to lobby political leaders
to force a change by legislating against the perceived wrong. As a use of the will to power, this is
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a work of negation. It is also a work of negation because it causes the church to be defined by
what it is against, by what it seeks to oppose.
What the church should spend more time and effort doing, Hunter would argue, is building
alternative positive structures within the culture. This would offer not a negation of the
component with which the church disagrees, but a true antithesis. That is, Christians should offer
a constructive counter-reality that provides the possibility of hope. As Hunter very wisely notes,
Christian responses to cultural challenges can easily go wrong either if they fail to offer a
constructive alternative,22 or if they assimilate problematic thoughts or philosophies which lead
them to be less than authentically Christian.
As a way of living in the manner of offering affirmation and antithesis rather than negation
and nihilism, Hunter advocates an enactment of a ministry of “faithful presence” on the part of
the church. He asserts that just as God in Christ has become present with us, so Christians are to
identify with, and become present for, those around us.23 As Hunter develops a theme of “faithful
presence” he is able to move considerably beyond Peterson’s advocacy of out-group altruism, by
calling on Christians to be present “to each other,” which includes the stranger and those outside
the community of faith,24 “to our tasks,”25 and “within our spheres of influence.”26 Hunter gives
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an overview of his theology of faithful presence as he writes:
Thus, when the Word of life is enacted within the whole body of Christ in all of its
members through an engagement that is individual, corporate, and institutional, not
only does the word become flesh, but an entire lexicon and grammar becomes flesh in
a living narrative that unfolds in the body of Christ; a narrative that points to God’s
redemptive purposes. It is authentic because it is enacted and finally persuasive
because it reflects and reveals the shalom of God.27
It is significant that Hunter sees that faithful presence specifically points to God’s
redemptive purposes. It is a presence that is enacted. It is an engaging, living presence that
through life experience points to the saving work of God himself, remembered and seen in the
loving, sacrificial lives of his people. Love lived in faithful presence seeks to reveal God’s work
and God’s activity among his people. For this reason, Hunter calls for ongoing thought toward
developing a practical application of his call to a “faithful presence.” Hunter notes,
Before more can be said of a practical nature here, let me make a caveat: volumes
could and should be written to address the question surrounding practical application.
It is essential to address this question through further biblical and theological
reflections. Every bit as important are stories from individuals, organizations, and
churches that are creatively practicing faithful presence, whether by instinct or by
conscious design. For all that could be said, my purposes here are modest; to be
suggestive rather than comprehensive.28
I intend for this chapter of the dissertation to be an expression of the need recognized by Hunter
to address questions surrounding the application of a theology of faithful presence. Luther’s

David Bentley Hart’s moving description of seeing the unattractive in the light of God: “To be able, however, to see
in them [disabled child, the derelict, the homeless, the impoverished, the diseased, etc.] not only something of worth
but indeed something potentially godlike, to be cherished and adored, is the rarest and most ennoblingly unrealistic
capacity ever bred within human souls.” Hart, Atheist Delusions, 214. To say that in Hunter one sees strong echoes
of Hart does not imply that one is drawing upon the other. In fact, Hunter does not list Hart in his bibliography and
gives no indication of having interacted with him at the point of writing To Change the World. Rather, I would
suggest the two sound like echoes of each other because both draw from the proper wellspring of Christian
understanding which sees love for all as a hallmark of the Christian faith, in stark contrast to the interpretive efforts
of the New Atheists to paint religions in a highly negative light.
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doctrine of vocation will serve as the guide for how to apply an Enfleshed Apologetic response
to the New Atheists in ways that are both concrete and contextual, recognizing both presence and
place.

Vocational Apologetics
Martin Luther’s doctrine of vocation can provide a helpful guide for developing Enfleshed
Apologetics in a way that embraces Hunter’s ideas of affirmation and antithesis. It offers the
opportunity both for affirmation of the common good within culture, including the common good
advocated by the New Atheists, without assimilating or synthesizing that which is contrary to its
message. It provides a vitally needed antithesis by enacting a positive and up-building alternative
to the moral challenges posed by the New Atheists, without resorting to straight negation in
responding to challenges.
In order to provide a basic understanding of Luther’s teaching on vocation, I will give some
attention to his writing and thought, but ultimately it is not my intent to offer an in-depth study
on the theological particulars of Luther’s doctrine of vocation.29 Rather, it is my intent to present
Luther’s doctrine of vocation as a means to an end. That is, I plan to utilize Luther’s basic and
central understanding of vocation—namely that God calls all Christians to serve their neighbors
in all walks of life such as family, community, employment, and the church—as the framework
for demonstrating the shape of an Enfleshed Apologetic model. I will provide some elaboration
of Luther’s views on vocation for clarity and specificity, but the broader intent is to utilize
insights from Luther regarding vocation to shape an apologetic method. I will argue that Luther’s
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For such treatments, from contrasting viewpoints, see Einar Billing, Our Calling (Rock Island, IL:
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understandings of vocation and various kinds of righteousness30 will provide a theological
foundation that can guide the church in an Enfleshed Apologetic approach that answers the
charges of New Atheism. I will seek to demonstrate two things. First, understanding Luther’s
doctrine of vocation through the lens of two kinds of righteousness clarifies for apologists the
nature of an Enfleshed Apologetic. Second, understanding Luther’s doctrine of vocation through
the lens of three kinds of righteousness enables the Enfleshed Apologetic to engage the
challenges of the New Atheists.
As the field of Enfleshed Apologetics encourages Christians to live out their faith in daily
life, some writers have already turned to the work of Martin Luther to seek guidance for the
desired integration of faith and life. Robert Webber offers thoughts about Christian Vocation, but
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It is sometimes described as two kinds of righteousness and sometimes called three kinds of righteousness
at various times by Martin Luther and Phillip Melanchthon. For a thorough development of these concepts see
Robert Kolb and Charles Arand, The Genius of Luther’s Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2008) in particular the first
essay, “‘Our Theology’: Luther’s Definition of the Human Creature through ‘Two Kinds of Righteousness’” and
Joel Biermann, A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2014). Kolb and
Arand use terminology for two kinds of righteousness, using “passive righteousness” or “righteousness coram Deo”
as the first kind of righteousness and “active righteousness” or “righteousness coram mundo” as the second kind of
righteousness. A broader treatment of various kinds of righteousness, in the thought of both Luther and his close coworker Philip Melanchthon, is offered in Biermann’s Case for Character. Biermann shows that Melanchthon makes
a distinction between civil righteousness and righteousness of faith. Biermann, Case for Character, 86–103. Later,
he points to Luther’s terminology of righteousness coram Deo (which is passive) and righteousness coram mundo
(which is active). Biermann, Case for Character, 119. Biermann explains, “Luther’s enumeration of the varieties of
righteousness, not atypically, is somewhat less than thoroughly systematic.” Biermann, Case for Character, 119n42.
Quoting from Luther’s Works 26:4, he cites Luther, “For righteousness is of many kinds. There is political
righteousness. … There is ceremonial righteousness. … There is, in addition to these, yet another righteousness, the
righteousness of the Law or the Decalog, which Moses teaches. … Over and above all these there is the
righteousness of faith or Christian righteousness, which is to be distinguished most carefully from all the others.”
Biermann, Case for Character, 119n42. Biermann summarizes, “Talk of two kinds of righteousness, then, is
burdened with a certain amount of ambiguity, an ambiguity exacerbated by the multiplication of synonyms for the
various types of righteousness produced by both Luther and his younger colleague. One could easily compile a list
of a score of righteousnesses named by the two reformers.” Biermann, Case for Character, 121. Biermann himself,
on page 127, suggests a “three-kinds-of-righteousness framework” which includes 1) a “righteousness that applies to
all people, regardless of a person’s standing before God, whether justified coram Deo or not 2) righteousness of
salvation or alien righteousness, which would roughly correspond with what Kolb and Arand call “passive
righteousness,” and 3) actual righteousness or righteousness of the law, which would correspond with what Kolb
and Arand label “active righteousness.” Biermann, Case for Character, 127.This proposal will utilize Biermann’s
terms for these three kinds of righteousness, namely governing righteousness, justifying righteousness, and
conforming righteousness. Biermann, Case for Character, 129. In particular, the concept of “governing
righteousness” will be helpful in fleshing out the concept of “affirmation,” and “conforming righteousness” will be
useful in showing a vibrant concept of “antithesis.”
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he uses vocation as a means of assimilating new members into the church, not as an apologetic
approach.31 Paul Louis Metzger calls for the church to adopt what he terms a “relationalincarnational apologetics”32 and he makes significant use of Martin Luther as he develops his
apologetic methodology, focusing on Luther’s theology of the cross.33 In addition, Alister
McGrath makes use of Martin Luther’s thoughts about the interplay between reason and faith.34
While there has been an interest in making use of Luther’s theological insights for the shaping of
an enfleshed form of apologetics, no appropriation has yet been made of Luther’s teaching on
vocation for directing faith in action as a form of Enfleshed Apologetics. I hope to build on
Gregory Peterson’s undertaking which locates Enfleshed Apologetics in a creedal framework
under the first article,35 answer Hunter’s call for practical application of his concept of faithful
presence,36 and add the component of Luther’s thoughts on vocation as a new way of shaping the
current discussions of Enfleshed Apologetics. This will function in response to the ethical and
emotional appeals made by the New Atheists in their challenges to Christianity. I am proposing a
new category under the umbrella of Enfleshed Apologetics, which I am calling Vocational
Apologetics.
Luther’s Doctrine of Vocation
A Christian’s calling, or vocation,37 tends to be seen in two different ways. Due to this
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variety of understandings of vocation, it is necessary to spend some time working to understand
how the term “vocation” has been used and then clarifying how Luther used the concept.
In the Roman Catholic tradition, vocation is a call to the work and life of the church.38 Karl
Holl, in his article “History of the Word Vocation (Beruf),” traces this view as far back as the
Vita Antonii of Athanasius, written about 360 AD. This work describes how St. Anthony, while
on his way to church, recalled the joy in sacrifice shared by Christians who preceded him, and a
“divine voice led him also as he took the last step and withdrew completely into the depth of the
wilderness.”39 Holl suggests that the sign of separation (from civilization) was the mark of a
calling that separated the true disciple of Christ from the half-hearted disciple.40 He then adds:
Such a call (Ruf) meant not only renunciation; it was also highest grace. Whoever
departed from the world shook off by that act his whole previous life and also all the
sins of that life. … The liturgy of the ordination of the monk established all of this
securely. Even the novice in his initiation was told that God had called him and made
him worthy to be a disciple of Christ—for the full monk even the words Apostle of
Christ were used. To the monk it was expressly stated that he had now received a
second baptism and he was admonished to live a life worthy of his calling.41
This view is not unique to Roman Catholicism, however. In much of Protestantism as well,
the exclusive link between a “calling” from God and professional church work is quite strong.
Nancy Pearcey, in her book, Total Truth, has pointed out that across the church, “ordinary work
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is actually denigrated, while church work is elevated as more valuable.”42 She describes the
experience of a student at a Christian college “where the unspoken assumption was that the only
way to really serve God was in full-time Christian work.”43 The thought that vocation is tied
exclusively to church work is still widely held across the church by both Roman Catholics and
Protestants.44 While this view of vocation is somewhat less prominent today than it was in
Luther’s time, it is still present.45
Perhaps even stronger, however, is a second view of vocation that links vocation
exclusively with occupation. Many Christians, in their desire to expand vocation beyond just the
confines of church work, move into the realm of work and occupations, but go no further. David
Kinnaman and Aly Hawkins, in You Lost Me, are representative. They write that vocation is a
“powerful, often ignored intersection of faith and calling,”46 but they miss the opportunity to
extend vocation to service to the neighbor outside of a job. They write:
Millions of Christ-following teens and young adults are interested in serving in
mainstream professions, such as science, law, media, technology, education, law
enforcement, military, the arts, business, marketing and advertising, health care,
accounting, psychology, and dozens of others. Yet most receive little guidance from
their church communities for how to connect these vocational dreams deeply with
their faith in Christ. This is especially true for the majority of students who are drawn
to careers in the fields of science, including health care, engineering, education,
research, computer programming, and so on. These young Christians learn very little
in their faith communities about how to live honestly and faithfully in a world
dominated by science—much less how to excel in their chosen scientific vocation.
Can the Christian community summon the courage to prepare a new generation of
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professionals to be excellent in their calling and craft, yet humble and faithful where
God has asked them to serve?47
This exclusive relationship of vocation and work becomes even more clear in this thought
from Kinnaman and Hawkins: “One hallmark of the exiles is their feeling that their vocation (or
professional calling) is disconnected from their church experience.”48 Note that vocation is
specifically referred to here as “professional calling,” not including anything outside of paid
work. Kinnaman and Hawkins then go on to elaborate, “Their faith is ‘lost’ from Monday
through Friday. The Christianity they have learned does not meaningfully speak to the fields of
fashion, finance, medicine, science, or media to which they are drawn.”49 Kinnaman and
Hawkins link vocation with a job, that which is done Monday through Friday. They also note
that “Callings may include science, math, medicine, business, congregational ministry, art,
music, or any number of other vocations.”50 They do not, however, extend vocation outward
from a job.
Thus, we can see that if vocation is not equated exclusively with professional church work,
it is tied to an occupation.51 William Placher recalls, “When I was in high school, ‘vocational
education’ meant courses in auto shop and typing, for people who weren’t going on to college.
‘Vocation’, I suppose just meant ‘a job.’”52
Luther, however, sees vocation in a different way.53 Luther recognizes the work of the
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church and the importance of occupations. But Luther sees vocation as distinct from, and
operating within, both of these categories. Vocation, for him, is broader than any occupation,
whether it be within the church or without. Marc Kolden, in an article entitled “Luther on
Vocation,” writes:
The popular view of Martin Luther’s teaching about Christian vocation is that it has
to do with one’s occupation. That is when one is “called” to follow Christ one’s
occupation becomes a “calling” in which one serves God. This is not a completely
wrong interpretation of Luther as much as it is one-sided and incomplete.54
Luther broke with the medieval Roman Catholic understanding that vocation was a special
calling held only by priests, monks, and nuns. Luther’s view on this matter becomes clear in one
of his great 1520 treatises, entitled “To The Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning
the Reform of the Christian Estate.”55 In this treatise, Luther identified three “walls” which
needed to be broken down in order to reform the church.56 The medieval Roman Catholic
understanding of vocation represents the first of these three walls. Luther writes, “In the first
place when pressed by the temporal power they have made decrees and declared that the
debate (in general, although of course the specifics of how that calling takes place are a subject of heated debate
between denominations … the basic recognition of the call is generally held). At issue is the nature of a second
calling. Einar Billing speaks of the “call to God’s kingdom,” but then “the word ‘calling’ took on its second
meaning, that which now concerns us.” Billing, Our Calling, 6. Placher writes, “generally, when the Bible talks
about ‘call’ or ‘vocation,’ it characteristically means a call to faith or to do a special task in God’s service. … Some
scholars therefore argue that the initial call to faith or calls to a special mission are the only biblically warranted
meaning of the word ‘call.’ But it is always dangerous to argue that something did not exist just because the
historical record does not mention it.” Placher, Callings, 4–5; emphasis original. Preece adds a third category to the
two mentioned so far, separating church work specifically from other work in general, thus categorizing vocation as
“1) the gospel message calling people to become God’s children; 2) the work each person does as, for instance, a
farmer or prince; 3) the calling to or entering of the office of preaching.” Gordon Preece, The Viability of the
Vocation Tradition in Trinitarian, Creedal, and Reformed Perspective: The Threefold Call (Lewiston, NY: Mellen,
1998), 61. For the purposes of this study, we will combine Preece’s third category, the calling to the office of
preaching with his second category, the calling to the work each person does (and Luther’s broader understanding of
this category, as will be described in detail later).
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temporal power had no jurisdiction over them, but that, on the contrary, the spiritual power is
above the temporal.”57 Luther attacks this “wall” of reserving the vocation of religious life to a
higher state as he writes, “It is pure invention that pope, bishop, priests, and monks are called the
spiritual estate while princes, lords, artisans, and farmers are called the temporal estate. This is
indeed a piece of deceit and hypocrisy.”58 Luther gives his rationale for this claim by writing, “all
Christians are truly of the spiritual estate, and there is no difference among them except that of
office. … This is because we all have one baptism, one gospel, one faith, and are all Christians
alike; for baptism, gospel, and faith alone make us spiritual and a Christian people.”59 For Luther,
all Christians are called by virtue of their baptism into an equal estate with none elevated above
another based on a further vow, such as that of priesthood or monasticism. In this way, Luther
placed himself against the medieval Roman Catholic understanding that vocation meant a call to
a specifically religious life.
Luther not only showed a disagreement with the medieval Roman Catholic understanding
of vocation, he also opened a space for vocation wider than the common understanding of just
occupation. Instead, Luther points a man to his duty to his family and his neighbors in addition to
his responsibilities in an occupation. Again addressing the medieval tendency to elevate spiritual
works over earthly ones, Luther attacks the idea that spiritual pilgrimages were helpful, and
instead points to the needs of a family. He writes that “people think that going on a pilgrimage is
57
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a precious good work. This is not true.”60 Instead, Luther writes, “God has commanded that a
man should care for his wife and children, perform the duties of a husband, and serve and help
his neighbor.”61 Luther lambasts that a man can waste large amounts of money on a pilgrimage
thinking he is fulfilling an honorable undertaking because it is a spiritual task, all the while
permitting “his wife and child, or his neighbor at any rate, to suffer want back home.”62 Luther
encourages an advisor to show a man who thinks a pilgrimage is a noble undertaking “how to
use the money and effort for the pilgrimage for God’s commandments and for works a thousand
times better by spending it on his own family or on his poor neighbors.”63 For Luther, duty to
family and neighbors is more noble than the supposedly spiritual undertakings encouraged in
medieval piety.
Interpreters of Luther’s thought on vocation also note that his usage of the term broadens
the understanding significantly to include family and neighborly relationships in addition to
occupational responsibilities. Gustaf Wingren notes in Luther on Vocation that it is important to
emphasize that vocation is not confined to occupation, but also includes biological orders such as
fathers, mothers, sons, and daughters.64 Gene Edward Veith in his book God at Work, locates
specifically the family as the central focus of Luther’s view of vocation. He writes: “The family
is the foundational vocation. Other earthly authorities grow out of the authority exercised in the
family. ‘For all other authority is derived and developed out of the authority of parents,’ says
Luther in the ‘Large Catechism,’ relating parenthood to the other vocations.”65
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That is not to say that Luther in any way denied the connection between vocation and
occupation. Luther found great value in all legitimate occupations, with a special emphasis on
the jobs many would see as lowly and less honored by society. He writes:
Just as those who are now called “spiritual,” that is, priests, bishops, or popes, are
neither different from other Christians nor superior to them, except that they are
charged with the administration of the word of God and the sacraments, which is their
work and office, so it is with the temporal authorities. They bear the sword and rod in
their hand to punish the wicked and protect the good. A cobbler, a smith, a peasant—
each has the work and office of his trade, and yet they are all alike consecrated priests
and bishops. Further, everyone must benefit and serve every other by means of his
own work or office so that in this way many kinds of work may be done for the
bodily and spiritual welfare of the community, just as all the members of the body
serve one another.66
Kolden has also pointed out that Luther’s view of vocation includes not only family but
also occupation. He says that Luther’s great contribution to the understanding of vocation is that
we carry out God’s command to love our neighbors “exactly by discharging the duties of our
occupations.”67 He notes:
Luther’s point is that people can serve God in whatever situation they find
themselves. To have a divine calling, they need not do something “religious.” Thus,
Christian vocation includes all aspects of life—family, community, education,
citizenship, paid and unpaid work, and long-term and occasional responsibilities of
other types.68
Let us consider this by looking at three vocations, one representing each of the possible
classifications of vocations: a friar, a farmer, and a father. The Roman Catholic understanding of
vocation would recognize that the friar is in a vocation, but would say the other two are not. The
next level of understanding would recognize the farmer as holding a God-given vocation as well.
Luther, then, would go one step farther and recognize fatherhood as a vocation established by
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God also. In fact, in many ways, Luther would prefer the vocations of the farmer and the father
over that of the friar because they are able to serve those around them in more tangible ways.
More than that, the father and the farmer are doing a God-directed work, while the friar is
actually doing a man-created work that violates God’s will by taking him out of his earthly tasks
and responsibilities.69 For this reason, we will not focus as much on the friar, but instead consider
the farmer and the father. Both are legitimate vocations, even though they do not involve church
work. The vocation of father is valid, even though it is not a professional positon. Each vocation
has particular, unique duties to fulfill for the good of humanity.
The farmer is positioned in such a way that if he does not do his vocation, others suffer,
and if he does his vocation well, many others may benefit. The primary role of this vocation, of
course, is to grow food. Other vocations, such as merchant or miner have other roles to play, but
theirs is not the responsibility to grow food for others. If a farmer diverts his attention to mining,
then people may not be fed. It is the responsibility of each vocation to fulfill its own unique role
for the common good. The responsibility of the father is to provide for his children, including
feeding them. For a small child, this may mean literally gathering food on a spoon and placing it
in the baby’s mouth.
Thus, both the father and the farmer in their vocations have the responsibility of feeding
people, but even that shared responsibility is carried out in different ways. It would not be a
farmer’s vocation to travel 500 miles to place food in the mouth of a stranger’s baby, nor would
it be the vocation of a father to travel to a farm and drive a combine through a wheat field. If
either one were to do so, he would be acting outside of his specific vocation. The distinctions of
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responsibilities from one vocation to another do not negate the importance or validity of each
vocation, and the variety of vocations are all needed for the smooth functioning of society. Thus,
a friar, a farmer, and a father all have vocations, which may in some cases overlap at points, but
each one also has separate, distinct responsibilities not given to the others which need to be
carried out within that specific vocation.
If we were to present ideas of vocation on a scale, from narrow to broad, Luther’s positon
would be at the broad end of the scale. At the narrow end would be the medieval Roman
Catholic understanding that vocation applies exclusively to priests, monks, and nuns and their
work of prayer. In the middle of the scale would be the view held in much of the Protestant
community that vocation includes all jobs, whether jobs in the church or jobs in the secular
realm. A painter holds a vocation as much as a priest, a metalworker is just as called as a monk,
and a nurse works in a calling as much as a nun. But Luther’s understanding of vocation is even
broader. Vocation, for Luther, encompasses not only a job, but every facet and station of life as
we are called to serve one another in love. This includes relationships with family members,
friends, and neighbors in vocation, in addition to those we serve through our occupations.70 It is
70
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Luther’s broad understanding of vocation that is most helpful in addressing the criticisms that the
New Atheism puts to Christianity.
While this may seem to be only a definitional difference, Luther’s inclusion of nonprofessional categories within the topic of vocation is important to the way Vocational
Apologetics works to respond to the New Atheists. As we saw in Chapter Three, Enfleshed
Apologetics provides a helpful focus on relationships. Luther’s teaching on vocation, with his
important inclusion of non-professional relationships such as family and neighbors can bring
greater strength and clarity through its focus on where these relationships are found and how
they are established. This, in turn, shows the importance of vocation for the task of Enfleshed
Apologetics.
Luther’s Doctrine of Vocation as It Functions in Two Kinds of Righteousness
In the twentieth century, two works came to light as key interpretations of Luther’s
teaching on vocation, albeit with somewhat different points of emphasis: Einar Billing’s Our
Calling and Gustaf Wingren’s Luther on Vocation. Essentially the variance in understanding
Luther’s teaching on vocation between these two comes down to the distinction between law and
gospel.71 Billing sees vocation as being inseparably tied to the gospel, asserting that for Luther,
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“the call is primarily a gift, and only in the second or third place a duty. His teaching of the call
is primarily gospel, only in the second or third place a commandment.”72 Wingren, on the other
hand, locates vocation under the law, writing, “The cross of Christ is grouped with the law, the
old man, vocation, the earth. But the resurrection of Christ belongs with the gospel, the new man,
the church, heaven.”73 For Wingren, vocation becomes the way in which we experience the law
on earth, before attaining to the gospel in heaven.74
Veith attempts to find a middle ground on the connection between law and gospel in the
term vocatio/Beruf. He points out that when vocation is viewed as what we do in our work there
is a relationship to the law and the cross, but Luther’s view of vocation is not so much what we
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do (law) as what God does through us (gospel). He writes,
What is distinctive about Luther’s approach is that instead of seeing vocation as a
matter of what we should do—what we must do as a Christian worker or a Christian
citizen or a Christian parent—Luther emphasizes what God does in and through our
vocations. That is to say, for Luther, vocation is not just a matter of the Law—though
this is a part of vocation that neither Luther nor this book will neglect; rather, above
all, vocation is a matter of Gospel, a manifestation of God’s action, not our own. In
this sense, vocation is not another burden placed upon us, something else to fail at,
but a realm in which we can experience God’s love.75
Veith also points out that in a great reversal, just as God works through us for the good of our
neighbor, even so God is also hidden in our neighbor. God’s good work through us to our
neighbor ends up also being our service directly to God disguised in our neighbor. Veith writes,
Indeed, just as God is hidden in vocation, Christ Himself is hidden in our neighbor:
“As you did it to one of the least of these My brothers”—fed the hungry, gave drink
to the thirsty, welcomed the stranger, clothed the naked, visited the sick, came to the
prisoner—“you did it to Me” (Matthew 25:40). It turns out, we serve Christ after all,
but we do so by serving our neighbors.76
Among Billing, Wingren, and Veith, we see a difficulty in working with the topic of
vocation under the heading of law and gospel. Billing preserves the heart of the gospel as not just
God’s work, but God’s saving work rooted in the forgiveness of sins. However, his linking of
vocation to the gospel (through the Christian being “called” by God to receive the gift of
salvation) is not what vocation is assumed to mean in common usage. Wingren falls on the other
extreme, but runs the risk of making vocation into a law-driven burden, with vocation serving as
yet another hammer of the law to point out a Christian’s many failures in each of the many
vocations a Christian holds. Veith, in trying to find a middle ground, runs into difficulty
regarding a strict definition of “gospel,” in that not all that God does is gospel just because God
does it. This is true of God’s work in general; just because God does something does not make it
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gospel. God also judges and chastens, which are functions of the law. God’s work of the gospel
is rooted in his work for the salvation of humanity anchored in Jesus’ death and resurrection for
the forgiveness of sins. Both chastening and forgiving are works of God, but only the latter is of
the gospel.
If this distinction is true of God’s work in general, it is also true of God’s work through his
people in their various vocations. There are vocations in which the holder of the vocation rightly
needs to exert discipline or punishment (including the vocation of parent), and according to
Veith the holder of that vocation would be acting on God’s behalf in doing so. However, this
would be God acting through human vocation as a work of law, not gospel. Again, just because
the work is to some extent ascribed to God does not make it thereby inherently of the gospel. We
find challenges in each of these three attempts to work with vocation under the heading of law
and gospel.
Perhaps, then, a better way forward in the debate between those who would locate vocation
under the gospel (following Billing) and those who would locate vocation under the law
(following Wingren) would be to view the entire topic of vocation instead through the lens of
Luther’s teaching on the various kinds of righteousness.77 This approach preserves the gospel as
gospel, frees the Christian to engage in service under the law but without the burden of seeking
thereby to merit God’s favor, and provides a very important focal point, the neighbor, directing
vocational service there.
For Luther, the issue of vocation might best be seen as a question not of “Who has a
vocation, church workers or all workers?” or “Is vocation an issue of law or of gospel?” but a
question of “Whom has God placed around me to love and serve?” This recognizes vocation as
77
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part of God’s good design for the world. Rather than focus on whether a church worker or a lay
worker has a vocation, Luther would place the focus of vocation on the one who receives
whatever good is done through a calling. For Luther, vocation focuses not on the specific type
work, or even on the worker, but instead on the neighbor, and how each specific vocation
(whether work-oriented or family-oriented or community-oriented) serves the neighbor in the
distinct ways open to that particular calling.
For example, to use two vocations cited by Luther—a cobbler and a smith—a broad
understanding of vocation recognizes the work of each, but the focus is on how the needs of the
neighbor are served. If the neighbor needs new shoes, then the cobbler serving in his vocation is
able to serve the neighbor’s need by making a high-quality pair of shoes. This is a work of the
cobbler, but the focus is to meet the need of the neighbor. If, on the other hand, the peasant needs
new shoes for his horse, it would not be the cobbler’s vocation to serve in that way. Instead, this
need would be met through the vocation of the smith. Of course, these examples deal with
vocations on a professional level, but the idea could be expanded to include family vocations as
well. If a child needed a pair of shoes, the cobbler’s vocation could meet that need to provide the
shoes. However, the parent also has a calling, to assist the child to put the shoes on and maintain
them. In each case, the purpose of the vocation, whether professional or personal, is to help and
serve those around. In his 1520 treatise, “The Freedom of a Christian,” Luther writes,
We shall also speak of the things which [a Christian] does toward his neighbor. A
man does not live for himself alone in this mortal body to work for it alone, but he
lives also for all men on earth; rather, he lives only for others and not for himself. …
He cannot ever in this life be idle and without works toward his neighbors, for he will
necessarily speak, deal with, and exchange views with men.”78
Luther makes clear that these works directed toward the neighbor have nothing to do with a
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person’s righteousness coram Deo, in which man remains completely passive. He writes in the
very next paragraph from the quotation cited above,
Man, however, needs none of these things [referring to the good works a man does
for the benefit of his neighbor] for his righteousness and salvation. Therefore he
should be guided in all his works by this thought and contemplate this one thing
alone, that he may serve and benefit others in all that he does, considering nothing
except the need and the advantage of his neighbor. Accordingly the Apostle
commands us to work with our hands so that we may give to the needy, although he
might have said that we should work to support ourselves. He says, however, “that he
may be able to give to those in need” [Eph. 4:28]. This is what makes caring for the
body a Christian work, that through its health and comfort we may be able to work, to
acquire, and lay by funds with which to aid those who are in need, that in this way the
strong member may serve the weaker, and we may be sons of God, each caring for
and working for the other, bearing one another’s burdens and so fulfilling the law of
Christ [Gal. 6:2], that is, it finds expression in works of the freest service, cheerfully
and lovingly done, with which a man willingly serves another without hope of
reward; and for himself he is satisfied with the fullness and wealth of his faith.79
A few paragraphs later, Luther writes,
[The Christian] ought to think: “Although I am an unworthy and condemned man, my
God has given me in Christ all the riches of righteousness and salvation without any
merit on my part, out of pure, free mercy, so from now on I need nothing except faith
which believes that this is true. Why should I not therefore freely, joyfully, with all
my heart, and with an eager will do all things which I know are pleasing and
acceptable to such a Father who has overwhelmed me with his inestimable riches? I
will therefore give myself as a Christ to my neighbor, just as Christ offered himself to
me; I will do nothing in this life except what I see is necessary, profitable, and
salutary to my neighbor, since through faith I have an abundance of all good things in
Christ.”80
Luther’s focus on the neighbor and his or her need is in no way separated from an even more
important focus on the prior work of Jesus Christ on our behalf. The two are tied inseparably
together.
While we were unworthy and our works were worse than worthless, Christ bestowed upon
us all the riches of righteousness and salvation. This is the prior and absolutely necessary ground
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for the vocational focus on the neighbor to follow. Christ first gives himself to us, and then
Christians give themselves to the needs of the neighbor. Christians then have no need to focus on
their own needs, they are already satisfied in Christ. This frees Christians to focus on the needs
of the neighbor.
Luther continues:
Behold, from faith thus flow forth love and joy in the Lord, and from love a joyful,
willing, and free mind that serves one’s neighbor willingly and takes no account of
gratitude or ingratitude, of praise or blame, of gain or loss. He does not distinguish
between friends and enemies or anticipate their thankfulness or unthankfulness, but
he most freely and most willingly spends himself and all that he has, whether he
wastes all on the thankless or whether he gains a reward. As his father does,
distributing all things to all men richly and freely, making “his sun rise on the evil
and on the good” [Matt. 5:45], so also the son does all things and suffers all things
with that freely bestowing joy which is his delight when through Christ he sees it in
God, the dispenser of such great gifts.81
In this portion of Luther’s writing we see a solid grounding for out-group altruism, as advocated
by Peterson. The call to living the Christian life through vocation is not grounded in slavish
obedience to a text, but instead in the relationship with a personal God, known through the
actions of Jesus Christ. As Jesus offered himself for the salvation of humanity and offered
himself for all without thought of the worthiness of the recipient or the possibly for the recipient
to repay his sacrifice, Christians also are called to serve wherever the need is demonstrated,
without giving thought to gratitude or ingratitude, repayment or lack of compensation, profit or
cost, or any other distinguishing mark. Friend or enemy, family or outsider, all are equally
eligible to receive help from Christians as Christians themselves have been the beneficiaries of
undeserved and unpayable blessings from Jesus. This out-group altruism, to use the term
advanced by the New Atheists, is grounded in the loving response experienced due to a
relationship Christians have with Jesus Christ. Whereas the New Atheists have at best a tenuous
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grounding for out-group altruism, with a more probable case for mere reciprocal altruism,
Christians have an unquestionable mandate to serve those around them based on a relational
understanding of the work of Jesus Christ.
Luther goes on to write:
Just as our neighbor is in need and lacks that in which we abound, so we were in need
before God and lacked his mercy. Hence, as our heavenly Father has in Christ freely
come to our aid, we also ought freely to help our neighbor through our body and its
works, and each one should become as it were a Christ to the other that we may be
Christs to one another and Christ may be the same in all, that is, that we may be truly
Christians.
Surely we are named after Christ, not because he is absent from us, but because he
dwells in us, that is, because we believe in him and are Christs one to another and do
to our neighbors as Christ does to us.82
Here we see in Luther’s teaching on vocation an idea of an ongoing presence of the incarnation
of Christ among his people. Specifically, in the vocational service rendered by Christians, God is
made present to his people. This is not to say that the Christian life is salvific for the Christian or
the neighbor in any way. The work of a Christian in vocation is not the same as Christ’s sacrifice
on the cross. Rather, the work of a Christian life is based on a theology of noted need, paired
with specific ways to meet that need which vary from vocation to vocation. As God in Christ saw
the ultimate need of humanity for reconciliation and responded in a manner appropriate to the
noted need in his death and resurrection, so the Christian is to see the need of the neighbor and
respond in a manner appropriate to the noted need.
At various points in this chapter we have mentioned vocations such as friar, farmer, father,
cobbler, smith, miner, and merchant. Each of these God-given vocations has a specific work to
do to meet the needs of those around them, guided by the shape of their vocation. When people
step outside their vocation to try to meet needs not naturally addressed by their vocation they
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may end up neglecting their own vocational opportunities to the detriment of those around them.
Within each of the many and varied vocations that God gives, people are called to do that which
is at hand to their particular calling and thus serve the neighbor in that specific way. Through
such varied vocations, people work together to build a stronger society and yet work individually
contributing to what is appropriate for their vocation.
Vocational Apologetics thus leads to the questions, “What can I do to address the need of
my neighbor?” or, “What would God have me do to serve my neighbor’s need?” as the guiding
principle for Christian action, recognizing that Jesus then serves the neighbor through our
vocational service. Christians today can serve confidently, say, in the vocations of farmer or
father since the need for the sustenance of those around can be served in these ways. The
Christian recognizes that God is in fact providing the gift of food through the vocation of the
farmer, and God is providing food along with many other needs through the vocation of a father.
The result is that God is serving our neighbor through us, not that we are serving God through
our neighbor.
However, a note of caution is needed. Luther writes:
In our day we are taught by the doctrine of men to seek nothing but merits, rewards,
and the things that are ours [that is, the focus shifts from the needs of the neighbor to
our own need to do good works]; of Christ we have made only a taskmaster far
harsher than Moses [that is, we have lost the salvation proclaimed in the pure
gospel].83
The life of a Christian cannot seek to replicate that central, all-important event in the life of
Christ. For a Christian to live with such intent would detract from the love Jesus has shown in
making the once-for-all sacrifice to bring life. This emphasis must remain central: the message of
Jesus’ sacrificial death for the salvation of fallen humanity is of foundational importance to the
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proper understanding of the Christian life. The works of a Christian life seen through vocation
flow from God’s saving work in Christ, without contributing anything to it. The prior message of
salvation in Jesus must be bound firmly together with any thought of the subsequent life of a
Christian in vocation, or the balance of the Christian life is thrown out of proper perspective.
When the focus of vocation is located under the law whereby we try to please God, we also
note that we lose both the beauty of the gospel as the free gift of salvation and we lose the focus
on the neighbor as the recipient of good works for the neighbor’s good. Kolb and Arand point
out, “By confusing the two kinds of righteousness, or by collapsing one into the other, the
medieval church ultimately undermined salvation and failed the neighbor.”84 This recognition is
of vital importance. When vocation is misunderstood, in addition to losing a focus on the gospel
message of salvation, it also loses a focus on the needs of the neighbor, since any good done for
a neighbor is really a means of seeking personal reward from God. Again Kolb and Arand
explain,
Works done on the premise of becoming righteous before God are ultimately works
done not for one’s neighbor but for the glory and salvation of self. Our neighbor’s
needs then become little more than means to an end. … Whatever benefit [our good
works] give the neighbor is collateral, like “icing on the cake.” In the process, the
neighbor either becomes instrumentalized as a means to an end or devalued as of little
use.85
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The problem of the neighbor becoming instrumentalized is entirely possible in any outlook
on vocation that does not clearly distinguish God’s saving work from the following action of
humanity, rooted in a law/gospel distinction. Trouble arises when the purpose of vocation is seen
as a tangible, earthly form of the law, in which its purpose is to drive us to repentance and to
receive the gospel. When the purpose of vocation is to drive us to our knees in repentance due to
the struggles we have with our neighbor on earth, then the neighbor is pushed back in importance
to becoming little more than a hammer God uses to hit us over the head in order to get our
attention regarding our need for forgiveness. Our relationship with our neighbor then is not
actually about the needs of our neighbor, but about our own needs to recognize our sinful failings
and seek forgiveness. As Kolb and Arand note above, “Our neighbor’s needs then become little
more than means to an end,”86 this time the end being our recognition of our need for the gospel.
This misunderstanding of vocation becomes especially problematic in light of the criticism
from the New Atheists that God is jealous and seeks slavish service to him for no purpose other
than to satiate his megalomaniacal need. Christians who live seeking to please God by their
actions rather than seeking to meet the need of the neighbor fall into the trap set by the rhetorical
work of the New Atheists. Writers such as Dawkins would insinuate that Christians, in their
headlong rush to placate a vicious and violent God, actually become a detriment to society as
they subjugate the needs of the neighbor under the demands of a jealous God. When Christian
vocation is properly understood in light of the two kinds of righteousness, this criticism from the
New Atheists is significantly mitigated as the attention of Christians is turned away from the
demands of God (which have already been satisfied in full by Christ under the first kind of
righteousness) and toward the needs of the neighbor.
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The criticism from the New Atheists is a real problem when the two kinds of righteousness
are misunderstood or misapplied. When vocation is linked with law and the cross, which sooner
or later becomes linked with the “Second Use of the Law,” then the neighbor is lost in vocation
as the function of the law is not to help or serve the neighbor but to crush and kill the sinner in
response to the demands of a harsh, violent, vindictive God. Then the neighbor becomes
marginalized and instrumentalized, and vocation becomes only a painful means to drive us to the
gospel.87 Good works are, of course, of no good before God, but, in this view, they are actually of
very little use before the neighbor either. Rather than driving us to repentance and forgiveness,
the good works of vocation lead us to care for those around us.
Kolb and Arand show that Luther’s thoughts on the two kinds of righteousness create a
different understanding of the role that good works play in the Christian life, in two key ways.
First, our active righteousness (righteousness coram mundo) does not contribute to our salvation
(our righteousness coram Deo) which remains entirely passive, entirely a gift of God’s grace.
Second, however, this does not mean that active righteousness is of no value in the world.
Faith makes us righteous in the eyes of God. Good works serve a different purpose.
Pastors are to urge Christians with a stipulation: “Help your neighbor, not because it
saves you, but because it is good for your neighbor and because it is the way in which
God intends humanity to be enjoyed.”88
Regarding vocation, Wingren writes, “In heaven, before God, vocation has as little to contribute
as do good works. Good works and vocation (love) exist for the earth and one’s neighbor, not for
eternity and God. God does not need our good works, but our neighbor does.”89 Here, the
neighbor is in full view, and there is no mention people being crushed by the weight of the law
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through vocation. The Christian is simply freed to love and serve the neighbor as needed. This is
the great benefit of the two kinds of righteousness.
Again, Wingren writes,
The hand, the body, and their vocation belong to earth. There is no redemption in
that, but that is not the idea. The purpose is that one’s neighbor be served. Conscience
rests in faith in God, and does nothing that contributes to salvation; but the hands
serve in the vocation which is God’s downward-reaching work, for the well-being of
men.90
The focus of vocation should rightly be the need of the neighbor, not the unworthiness and sin of
the doer. Locating vocation primarily as a function of the law in the law/gospel dichotomy
always runs the risk of making the purpose of vocation to point out sin. Lex semper accusat.
Locating vocation primarily in the category of active righteousness frees the Christian to serve
joyfully, rather than fear the crushing weight of the law. Can a struggle or failure in vocation turn
the Christian to prayer and repentance? Of course—after all active righteousness is a function of
the law—but that is not the primary point. Instead, the need of the neighbor is kept clearly in
focus.
Regarding the direction of vocation, Wingren writes:
Works belong to the earthly realm, in service to others, directed downward in
vocation which bears altogether the stamp of the earthly realm. And vocation is most
purely and really served when through the gospel it has become clear that vocation
has nothing to do with salvation. God receives that which is his, faith. The neighbor
receives that which is his, works.91
Good works, such as those done in and through vocation, are here clearly and distinctly
separated out from any notion of salvation. This sets vocation free to rejoice in good works done
in service of the neighbor on earth. Seeing vocation as a function of active righteousness under
the two kinds of righteousness frees vocation to function as it is intended—producing good
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works for the benefit of the neighbor.
Veith also notes the proper direction of good works done in a Christian’s vocation. He
writes,
Genuine good works have to actually help someone. In vocation, we are not doing
good works for God—we are doing good works for our neighbor. This locates moral
action in the real, messy world of everyday life, in the conflicts and responsibilities of
the world—not in inner attitudes or abstract ideals, but in concrete interactions with
other people.
The purpose of vocation is to love and serve one’s neighbor. This is the test, the
criterion, and the guide for how to live out each and every vocation anyone can be
called to: How does my calling serve my neighbor? Who are my neighbors in my
particular vocation, and how can I serve them with the love of God?92
Veith shows here that Luther’s understanding of vocation, carefully understood in the framework
of the two kinds of righteousness, directs Christians outward into the world to serve those around
us, and to do so in very tangible ways through the structure of vocation. In this way, we
recognize that God does not need our good works done in vocation. Vocational service is not
directed toward God. Rather, it is directed toward the neighbor.
Steven Hein, in an article entitled “Luther on Vocation: Ordinary Life for Ordinary Saints”
writes, “Christ indeed intends us to serve him, but Luther realized there is one hitch that we must
never forget. He does not need anything from us.”93 While God does not need anything from us,
that is not true of the human beings around us. Hein continues:
92

Veith, God at Work, 39–40; emphasis original. Kenneth Hagen, in his article, “A Critique of Wingren on
Luther on Vocation,” also makes the point that vocation is intended to serve the neighbor for the neighbor’s own
sake, but he sets this thought into his argument against Wingren’s view of vocation. He writes, “This analysis of
Luther’s ethic shows that one key ethical norm is that the Christian loves the neighbor for the neighbor’s own sake,
not as a means for some further good or reward but as an end in itself. The direction of Christian love is thisworldly, and that is where it stops because one’s neighbor is that important and deserves that much.” Hagen,
“Critique of Wingren,” 265. On the next page he shows how this is lost to Wingren: “The vocation of love, serving
the neighbor, is not optional. The whole structure of God’s world is ordered so that the neighbor is served in and by
vocation. Wingren has voided the very goal and direction of vocation in Luther. In Luther the direction of vocation
is the neighbor. In Wingren the direction is the self—all the works of the law aimed at killing the self.” Hagen,
“Critique of Wingren,” 266.
93

Steven Hein, “Luther on Vocatio: Ordinary Life for Ordinary Saints,” Reformation & Revival 8, no. 1
(Winter 1999): 133.

192

But, as Luther noted, our neighbor needs us and the gifts, skills, time and blessings
that the Lord has entrusted to us. Our spouse, our children, those who live next door,
fellow employees, the customer, the client—those whom we encounter where we
live, work and play—these are the ones who need our goods and works of service.94
Hein also notes, “Here then was Luther’s economy for faith and works: place your faith in God
and send your works off to your neighbor.”95 Again in harmony with Luther’s understanding of
two kinds of righteousness, Hein remarks, “Faith in Christ is first expressed in fear and love of
God. Then our love of God becomes channeled into loving service toward others. Our
justification through faith in Christ is thus expressed in life through loving service to our
neighbor.”96
Thus, as Luther’s teaching on vocation understood through the lens of two kinds of
righteousness shows, genuine good works actually have to help someone. In vocation, we are not
doing good works for God, who doesn’t have any need for them; instead we are doing good
works for our neighbor who does need them, with the understanding that God himself is working
for the good of our neighbor through our vocation. The farmer’s vocation is God’s means of
feeding his people. A parent’s vocation is God’s means of caring for children and providing for
their needs. This locates moral action in the real, messy world of everyday life, in the conflicts
and responsibilities of the world—not in inner attitudes or abstract ideals, but in concrete
interactions with other people encountered in the varying vocations of life. The purpose of
Christian good works, done through vocation as understood in two kinds of righteousness, is not
to please God. Or, to speak in a manner reminiscent of the New Atheists, good works are not
done to placate a jealous, bloodthirsty, vicious God by slavishly seeking to serve him. Instead,
good works done through vocation have the purpose of seeking to make the lives of those around
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us better, to the extent that is possible for any given Christian in his or her circumstances. Thus, a
two kinds of righteousness view of vocation contributes directly to an Enfleshed Apologetic
response to the New Atheists.
We have seen the creedal framework for Enfleshed Apologetics take shape through the
development of a Vocational Apologetics approach rooted in the writing of Martin Luther. This
creedal framework includes an understanding of God the Father as the creator who placed his
people in the world as caretakers and mangers of the created order. In fact, the Father extends his
benevolence in the work of creation through his people who use the created gifts of God given to
them to serve and provide for those around them. Kolb and Arand point out, “God carries out his
work by enlisting human beings as instruments of his creative activity for the good of his
creation. … Luther describes creatures as ‘the hands, channels, and means through which God
bestows all blessings.’”97 God’s expectation that his people serve as his hands and feet for
carrying out his work of preserving his world directs the Christian outward into engagement with
the neighbor. Vocation sees the neighbor as being served by God with the bounty of creation
through the generosity of his Christian people. The Father sustains life through his people as
through instruments in his hands. Kolb and Arand explain, “By enlisting our active engagement
within the world, God makes us coworkers or partners in his ongoing work of sustaining the
human community within the world and preserving creation’s resources.”98 A creedal framework
for Vocational Apologetics begins with God’s creation and the Christian looking outward for his
or her position within it to work as the Father’s representatives toward those in need. In fact,
Luther would claim that through vocation, Christians have no other reason for living on earth
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than to be of help and service to those around them.99
We have also seen in a creedal framework that, despite the mandate for Christians to turn
outward to work in God’s stead for the sustaining of his creation, this outward work in no way
contributes to the work of salvation. The active righteousness that marks the Christian’s
involvement in sustaining God’s created order follows, and is no way contributive to, the passive
righteousness by which Jesus bestows redemption on fallen humanity through the unaided work
of his sacrificial death and resurrection. Once the issue of salvation has been recognized as
fulfilled in Christ, this sets the Christian free to focus outward on the needs of the neighbor rather
than to focus inwardly on the need to please God by his or her actions in a way that contributes
to salvation. The neighbor is not misplaced in attention, but made central by the sufficient work
of Christ for salvation.
A creedal framework for vocation then culminates in the work of the Holy Spirit who
maintains the connection between the message of salvation fulfilled in the work of Jesus Christ
and the focus of the Christian life on the needs of the neighbor. The Holy Spirit keeps the work
of Christ before the Christian, and would never allow that message to be obscured in any way
that would detract from the accomplished actions of Jesus. The Holy Spirit then sends the
Christian out into the world in a manner that may look identical to the way God places all people
in the created order. However, while the manner of sending (and in fact the results of work in the
created order) may look indistinguishable, under the third article work of the Holy Spirit,
Christians are sent into the created order fully mindful of the way Christ has met the ultimate
needs of humanity, with an eye towards meeting the outward needs of the neighbor. As Kolb and
Arand summarize, “The Holy Spirit gives us a new orientation that is less egocentric and more
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exocentric, oriented toward other people, precisely because it is christocentric.”100
All people are placed in vocation, whether they recognize that as a calling from God or not,
whether they are Christians or not. Richard Dawkins, for example, has served in the vocation of
professor, author, and family man, among others. By all accounts, he has done so diligently and
well, and in fact through his foundation he is seeking to work for the betterment of humanity,
which is to be commended. A Christian may have similar vocations, and from all outward
appearances Dawkins and a faithful Christian serving in similar vocations may seem very
similar. But under the calling of the Holy Spirit, the Christian also sees this as following Christ’s
love by serving others even as Christ as served us and given himself for us. The outward works
viewed under the first article work in the created order of vocations may look the same, but the
motivation guided by the calling of the Holy Spirit under the third article provides a difference
for viewing Christians in their vocations.
Contribution of Luther’s Doctrine of Vocation to Enfleshed Apologetics
When the topic of Vocation is seen through the lens of the two kinds of righteousness, then
we can readily see that Luther’s focus on the neighbor in light of vocation drives us back into
culture. Kolb and Arand explain the connection:
If the creature of faith no longer does good works for the purpose of selfimprovement or enhancing one’s standing with God, but instead for the sake of
others, it means that an entirely different arena is opened up in which our active
righteousness finds its proper place; within creation. Faith in the God who justifies is
at the same time faith in the God who created the world. Thus, faith embraces the
world as God’s good creation. … The passive righteousness of faith returns us to
creation. The concept of the passive righteousness of faith in Christ eliminates all of
our works from consideration when thinking of how we can justify our lives to God,
using them to secure our relationship with him. This concept relocates these works in
the world God created for human beings in the first place; they belong there for the
sake of others, for the common good. Here the Lutheran doctrine of justification
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expresses itself in a robust doctrine of vocation that the Christian embraces as one
reenters creation.101
Kolb and Arand point out that the neighbor lives in the created world. The neighbor also lives in
culture. We relate to our neighbors in culture as a part of the created world. As a corollary,
apologetics always works within a given culture, and is bound to the questions asked by the
target culture and linked to the problems posed by the target culture. Veith notes, “Recovering
the doctrine of vocation can help Christians influence their culture once again as they carry their
faith into the world, into its every nook and cranny, through the plenitude of vocations.”102
Apologetics functions as a responsive discipline, and an apologetic approach based in vocation
can respond to a wide variety of issues, reaching into “every nook and cranny” of life. Flowing
from that we can consider how vocationally-shaped Enfleshed Apologetics can be used to
respond to the criticisms of the New Atheists.
Other than Tim Morey in his book, Embodying our Faith, nobody provides an in-depth
plan or strategy for what an Enfleshed Apologetic looks like or how it functions. Recall that even
Morey notes regarding Enfleshed Apologetics, “very little has been said about how we might
construct such an apologetic.”103 As of yet, there is no well-developed blueprint for what an
Enfleshed Apologetic approach looks like. In turning to Luther’s teachings on vocation, we will
find just such a needed and practical pattern for Enfleshed Apologetics.
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Luther’s teaching, while being firmly and rigorously rooted in theology is also eminently
practical and specifically located for application and implementation. Vocation is directed
toward the neighbor to meet the neighbor’s need. Kolden shows that when we carry out God’s
command to love our neighbors, this makes love concrete.104 He notes that as we live our
everyday lives, confronted by the needs of our neighbors:
The specific requirements of our work will prevent us from being paralyzed by global
or idealistic expectations about “love of neighbor” and will enable us to focus on the
particular piece of God’s all-encompassing work that we can accomplish. This insight
has the potential to make many types of work more tolerable or attractive and to
reduce the “glamour” of those jobs that draw us primarily for selfish reasons.105
Thus, the need of the neighbor as viewed through Luther’s teaching on vocation both provides a
solid, concrete starting point for Christians’ engagement with the culture and it prevents
Christians from becoming overwhelmed by the enormity of the needs of the entire world around
them. The question, “Where does one start?” can become crippling. Vocation gives clarity and
focus to what needs and problems can be addressed and in what priority.
The guidance provided through a proper understanding of vocation frees Christians to
make a difference in the most likely areas to have a beneficial effect. What should a Christian
do? Don’t start by seeking to serve far outside a practical sphere of influence. Instead, start by
meeting the needs noticed through the various vocations in which God has placed a Christian.
These are the specific places where he or she can most likely make a positive difference. Then,
work outward from there. This model does not preclude service on a larger stage or a global
scale,106 but it starts in a more local, tightly connected manner before branching out.
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That is, parents should attend primarily to the needs of their family before moving outward
from their vocation as parents. However, those parents will likely also have vocations as
neighbors to the people who live around them, and the needs of those close by also should
receive attention and care, but to a less involved degree than the nuclear family. Likewise, these
same parents may be employed and have a paid or professional vocation, where they will enact
God’s love in their relationships with coworkers. Then, these same servant-hearted Christians
might become involved in community activities such as redevelopment projects, literacy support,
housing refurbishment, and the like. On the next level, perhaps on a more episodic basis, these
same Christians might join a group from their church to serve in a larger capacity by
participating in a domestic or international mission trip. In these ways the reach of vocation
begins to expand as Christians fulfill what is theirs to do, recognizing that each particular station
is a valid and valuable gift from God and a means to serve the neighbor.
Kolb and Arand show how these expanding spheres of vocation function in Luther’s
theology:
Luther believed that the social web of mutually constitutive relationships in which
people carry out their work is not a matter of arbitrary social construction. With other
reformers, Luther believed that when God created human beings for community with
each other, he placed them and bound them together in comprehensive spheres or
structures of life (genera vitae), which might be called created orders or walks of
life.107
Kolb and Arand point out that in the Large Catechism Luther ordered these structures in four
groups including marriage and family life (domus), economic life (oeconomia), public life
(civitas/politia), and religious life (ecclesia).108 Various interpreters of Martin Luther define these
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spheres of vocational influence in slightly different ways. For the purpose of this work, I will
largely follow Kolb and Arand with the four categories of Family, Work, Public Life, and the
Church as the titles for the spheres within which Christians live out their vocations.109
While exact naming of the spheres of vocation varies, the sentiment that these various
locations of vocation tie Christians to a very concrete world to serve in very concrete ways is
commonly held. Robert Benne, in his book Ordinary Saints notes, “The general, overarching
calling of each Christian is made concrete in specific callings. God the Spirit works through us to
serve others in particular places of responsibility.”110 Veith adds, “Indeed this is the purpose of all
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vocations: to love and serve our neighbors. God does not tell us to love humanity in the abstract,
but to love our neighbor: the actual, tangible human being whom He calls into our lives.”111
Vocation will often start with those nearby, either in relationships or in the various events
and needs of life. As one begins to recognize various vocations, the web of interaction becomes
more complex. Vocation starts within a family, but Veith shows the degree of complexity even
within the sphere of the family. He writes:
The most fundamental estate in God’s design is the family, with its offices of
marriage—comprising the vocations of husband and wife—and parenthood—with its
vocations of mother, father, and child. God brought each of us into existence by
means of our parents and so called us into a family, with its subsidiary vocations of
brothers, sisters, aunts, uncles, and grandparents. God may then call us to form a new
family of our own, calling us to marriage and parenthood. Again, each person has
many vocations in the family: an individual may be the wife to her husband, a mother
to her children, and a child to her mother (not to mention being a sister to her brother,
a cousin to her cousin, and so on).112
Vocation starts with families, but then it necessarily reaches out from there. As families
live together in a model of the overflowing love that God shows for us, they are uniquely
positioned to engage the world around them in love. A well-balanced family starts from the
strength of vocation vested there, but God has called individuals into various spheres of vocation
and, even as they serve in the family, they are also called to serve in other areas as well. This
points to Hunter’s call to reach out to “the other,” noted briefly at the beginning of the chapter
and examined in more depth later in this chapter. Benne makes clear that “our own love cannot
be limited to our spouse and family. ... Families strong in love must share it with the world,
usually through their efforts in other callings but sometimes directly in person-to-person service
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when occasions call for it.”113 Benne argues that, “families strong in love are particularly able to
welcome the stranger, whether that stranger is a foreign student, a lonely neighbor, an orphan, a
handicapped child, or even a ‘difficult’ child of their own.”114
As one begins to recognize various vocations, the interactions continue to become more
complex. Hein helpfully recognizes the hands-on nature of this complexity. As human beings
called into service in various vocations, we are called into direct relationships with others in
specific times and places. Hein sees this concretely centered focus for vocation coming directly
from Luther’s thought:
Luther recognized that our neighbor is determined by where we are placed in life. We
are limited and dependent creatures who have been called by the Gospel to live
within the communities that make up our vocational call. This context we could call
our circle of nearness, which particularizes and limits our call to serve. Here we
encounter real flesh-and-blood people with names and faces. Luther did not believe
that we have been called to love some abstract humanity. This does not mean that
love is limited to simply my station and its duties. Our circle of nearness also includes
the stranger whom we encounter in our path with emergency needs as we tend to our
station and its duties.115
Hein anchors our spheres of vocation in the actual experience of the world, with our circle of
nearness made up of people with names and faces, including not just family members or coworkers but even the stranger who may be near to our vocational service at that time. The
complexity of vocational service arises from the fact that God’s people have been called to
various vocations and are doing God’s work in those concrete areas of service as situations arise.
Because of this complexity, there will always be various vocational services to various people
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fulfilled as need and occasion require. The circumstances of our location will often dictate what
sphere has the strongest effect at any given time. As Christians work through this complexity,
serving in the spheres of family, work, public life, and church, God’s love will be exercised in
tangible, recognizable ways in the world.
As vocation points us back into the created world, back into culture, it does so in hands-on
and helpfully direct ways. The most important opportunities for faithful presence in vocation are
often with those who are closest to us—family, and then neighbors, expanding out to coworkers,
and on from there. A woman who is a surgeon has a vocational responsibility to seek to work for
healing in her patients during her working hours, but she may also have a vocation as a mother in
which she is to care for her children and provide for their physical, emotional, and spiritual
needs. This personal calling as a mother is more foundational, and thus more prominent, than the
professional calling as a surgeon. A woman in her vocation as a mother is likely to be a part of
her children’s lives for decades, while that same woman in her vocation as a surgeon may be a
part of her patients’ lives for only a few days or weeks, and on a much less profound level.
However, the immediacy of life events also exert an influence on the overlapping,
interconnected spheres of vocation. The surgeon may ultimately have a stronger and more lasting
relationship with her child than with any of her patients. However, when she has a patient on the
operating table in front of her, she had better give full priority to the person whose life is a stake
when the circumstances of life place a scalpel in the surgeon’s hands. I have personally
experienced the interaction of vocational spheres in an operating room. My wife and I are
blessed with six children, all of whom have been born by C-section. During the birth of our first
child, all electronic devises were strictly banned in the operating room. However, by the time our
last child was born, one of the nurses in the operating room was talking with a family member on
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her cell phone, trying to determine the location of a set of car keys, while the surgery was taking
place. Was the nurse’s long-term relationship with her family member of more lasting
significance than her relationship with my wife? Undoubtedly. We had never met that nurse
before the day our child was born, and we have never seen her since. However, one might think
that for the time of the surgery itself, perhaps attending to my wife’s and child’s needs might
have been a higher priority than locating a set of keys!
While within personal vocation needs are prioritized based on relationships and the needs
of the situation, starting with those nearby and working outward, in the apologetic application of
vocation the actual impact may be somewhat different. In a Christian’s personal life lived in
vocation, the strongest focus is placed where the most influence is possible, or where one has the
greatest opportunity to offer care within the variety of vocations to which a person is called, with
work expanding out from the central base of family and proximal neighbors. However, in
Vocational Apologetics, the greatest influence in apologetic terms, may well be from interactions
somewhat outside the immediate spheres of family or proximal neighbors. While a father’s
strongest and most lasting impact through personal vocation should be with his family, this is
unlikely to be looked upon as a noticeable apologetic endeavor in the eyes of the world. On the
other hand, a Christian who volunteers one day a week to read with underprivileged children in
an impoverished school district, as that activity is seen by teachers, staff, and parents in the
school, would likely have a stronger Vocational Apologetic impact than the time the father
spends reading with his own children each night. The long-term impact of the latter is likely
stronger on a personal level, but the visible impact of the former is likely to provide a stronger
apologetic message. As apologetics itself is to be a responsive discipline, so also Christians
living in their variety of vocations need to be responsive to the human care needs around them
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and serve as appropriate to the situation.
Luther’s Doctrine of Vocation as it Functions in Three Kinds of Righteousness
To see how Christians can come alongside culture to help and serve guided by the love of
Christ, we return to Hunter for guidance. Hunter reminds us that in an age of digital media in
which we are spending more time relating with others through a screen, actual presence seems
less vital than it once did.116 Vocation however, points us back to the real, physical neighbor with
real physical needs, thus fulfilling Hunter’s call for “faithful presence.” As Hunter stresses,
“faithful presence” must include relationships not just with others within the body of Christ, but
also and especially with those outside the community of faith.117 This interaction takes place,
according to Hunter, in affirmation and antithesis.118
While the two kinds of righteousness terminology from Luther and other early reformers is
helpful in clarifying the outward direction of vocation, another formulation of the topic from
Luther and Melanchthon—three kinds of righteousness—provides greater clarity in
understanding outward-looking initiatives with and alongside secular culture. The two kinds of
righteousness distinction was particularly helpful in clarifying the role of vocation in light of
justification and sanctification. However, we have also seen a distinction between the way the
Father calls all to vocations in creation under the first article of the creed and how the Holy Spirit
under the third article of the creed uses specifically Christians in their vocations. In this way,
while the outward works of a Christian and a non-Christian may be identical in vocation, the
spiritual motivation may in fact be different. This distinction can be considered with greater
clarity through the lens of three kinds of righteousness. Joel Biermann examines these categories
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of three kinds of righteousness in A Case for Character: Towards a Lutheran Virtue Ethics and
this formulation is particularly well-suited to fulfill Hunter’s call for affirmation as one
component of a “faithful presence.”
An understanding of vocation, rooted in various kinds of righteousness, can provide a
means to implement the call Hunter makes for demonstrating “faithful presence” to those outside
the community of faith. It does so first by recognizing that those outside the community of faith
also are valuable contributors to the needs of the neighbor. They also have valid vocations. They
also serve those around them for the common good. This can be seen in the way that Biermann
points to three divisions of righteousness. The three kinds of righteousness expounded by
Biermann are governing righteousness, justifying righteousness, and conforming
righteousness.119
Biermann’s first kind of righteousness, “governing righteousness,” recognizes the ability of
all people to contribute to the common good, whether they happen to be Christian or not.
Biermann writes, “the first righteousness is the righteousness that applies to all people,
regardless of a person’s standing before God, whether justified coram Deo or not. A key aspect
of the first kind of righteousness is its grounding in the recognition that God’s will (that is, the
law) has been revealed and is still present throughout all of creation.”120 This kind of
righteousness, exercised through vocation, recognizes and commends the common ground of
moral understanding even between Christians and the New Atheists.121 When a New Atheist
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decries violence, or urges support of humanitarian causes, or a myriad of other options in a
largely shared view of overall morality, a Christian—guided by Biermann’s understanding of the
first kind of righteousness—can applaud the New Atheist (or anyone else) and affirm their cause
whole-heartedly. In this way, Luther’s doctrine of vocation enables the church to engage in the
affirmation encouraged by Hunter by seeing that all acts done for the good of humanity are
works of civil righteousness, and thus the church can commend all good acts that are done
regardless of who does them. And yet, this affirmation in no way requires the synthesis of false
doctrine or practice. Affirming that a New Atheist can (and does) do good work in supporting
and encouraging humanitarian causes in no way leads a Christian to affirm the New Atheist’s
belief that there is no God, or that God’s existence is at least highly questionable.
In this way, governing righteousness enables Christians to practice affirmation (to use
Hunter’s term) regarding the good that all people, including the New Atheists, do in their
vocations. This recognition, admission, and “affirmation” emphasizes that Christianity does not
speak only in radical spiritual condemnation of those who are non-Christian. Rather Christianity
affirms the good that is done in all worthy vocations, gives thanks for the valuable contributions
of others and supports the practices of all that can be conducive to the common good. Hunter’s
enjoying the same lifestyle as before, only without the nuisance of suicide bombers and TV evangelists. We should
be able to salvage the best that life has to offer right now, but without worrying about getting blown up by Godinspired fanatics.” Haught, God, 20. Douglas Wilson, in his book God Is makes a similar argument, showing that
even the basic New Atheist claims that religions are evil rest on the premise that one can define evil, and the
standards of evil that the New Atheists use to call religions evil are essentially the standards of Christianity. Thus,
the New Atheists are trying to maintain Christian morality without Christianity and without God, which Wilson
points out cannot be done. Wilson, God Is, 4–9. Wilson comes back to this line of argument frequently throughout
the book. The end result for the New Atheists is that they promote an understanding of “good” and “evil” that is
virtually indistinguishable from a Christian understanding of what is “good” and “evil,” but with little theoretical
basis for doing so. Ian Markham shows how dependent the New Atheists are on Judeo-Christian morality by
comparing them with the far more radical moral program of Nietzsche. Markham argues that the New Atheists
would like to dismiss the hypothesis of God’s existence but keep other outgrowths of theism (such as morality)
unchanged, which Markham states Nietzsche rightly understands to be impossible. Markham, Against Atheism, 28–
45. The pertinent point to the argument here is not the contrast between the New Atheists and Nietzshe per se, but
rather the implication that the New Atheists utilize a recognizably Judeo-Christian morality in their ethical outlook.
This is the “common ground of moral understanding even between Christians and the New Atheists” to which I refer
above.
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call for affirmation, practiced through governing righteousness, is an answer to the depiction of
Christianity as consistently fostering hatemongering anti-social people who harm others and seek
to disrupt or destroy social relations. Instead, Biermann’s governing righteousness seen as a
function of Hunter’s affirmation shows Christians as fellow co-workers for the common good of
society, working along with those outside the Christian faith. Thus Christianity is not anti-social
as Dawkins would depict but pro-social, and rather than disrupting social relationships it seeks to
establish relationships of mutual cooperation as public work for the common good is openly
affirmed.
The New Atheists would make the allegation that people of faith in their relational dealings
with those around them are inherently intolerant, and thus unworthy of toleration themselves.
Vocational Apologetics reverses this view as it accepts and affirms the work for the common
good done by all, even without affirming doctrinal differences. Of course, human relationships
will always include some degree of difference, but as Hunter notes, the paired efforts of
affirmation and antithesis work to overcome the problem of difference. As such, Christian
relationships should be marked by respect and peace, even when they are not marked by full
agreement. Starting with relationships in the family, and then expanding out through the spheres
of vocation to the broader world, this harmony and respect includes relationships among
ethnicities, genders, Christians, non-Christians, and others. All these relationships should be
marked with generosity and honest love.
Luther’s doctrine of vocation also fulfills well Hunter’s call for antithesis which he
understands as “constructive opposition … with the possibility of hope.”122 In a focus on vocation
through the lens of conforming righteousness, the Christian can offer a different view of the
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impact of faith than the picture painted with such vivid power by the New Atheists. Where the
New Atheists describe Christianity as seeking violent domination, vocation through the lens of
conforming righteousness offers the antithetical view of Christianity as humble, peaceful service
to others. The lens of conforming righteousness pictures Christians offering a non-threatening
manifestation of their beliefs in action for the good of the community and culture. In this way,
even when serving as an antithesis to the New Atheist depiction of Christianity, the Christian
voice is not violent but patient, long-suffering, and of service to the other in tangible
manifestation of God’s presence among his people. The Christian living in vocation serves as a
means of answering the problems of difference and dissolution described by Hunter through an
enfleshed joining of word and event.
Vocation as a grounding for Enfleshed Apologetics meshes well with Hunter’s call for
affirmation and antitheses as the basis for a theology and practice of “faithful presence,”
overcoming the partnered problems of difference and dissolution. Hunter offers “two essential
lessons for our time”123 regarding these issues:
The first is that incarnation is the only adequate reply to the challenges of
dissolution; the erosion of trust between word and world and the problems that
attend it. From this follows the second: it is the way of the Word became incarnate in
Jesus Christ and the purposes to which the incarnation was directed that are the only
adequate reply to the challenge of difference. For the Christian, if there is a
possibility for human flourishing in a world such as ours, it begins when God’s word
of love becomes flesh in us, is embodied in us, is enacted through us and in so doing,
a trust is forged between the word spoken and the reality to which it speaks; to the
words we speak and the realities to which we, the church, point. In all, presence and
place matter decisively.124
Luther’s understanding of vocation addresses both the matters of presence and place recognized
as decisive needs by Hunter. Vocation focuses on the work done in the specific locations where
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God has placed people to be, expanding outward in the spheres of Family, Work, Public Life,
and the Church, and it also addresses the manner of service rendered by the one present in that
place.
Luther’s doctrine of vocation provides an Enfleshed Apologetic answer to the New
Atheists’ challenge that Christianity is not a force for good in society by saying that Christianity
does in fact demonstrate goodness. However, on a surface level this argument only devolves into
a difficulty of conflicting reports of goodness and evil. To deny charges verbally from one seen
as an adversary is to be defined by what you are against, rather than by what you are for. Hunter
would point out that this is merely the path of negation leading to nihilism, not a path of true
affirmation and antithesis. The beauty of vocation as a form of Enfleshed Apologetics is that it
allows a much-needed move from mere negation to the creation of a positive new outlook. To
use Hunter’s terms, vocation as a form of Enfleshed Apologetics goes beyond “contradiction …
critique and hostility”125 to build “the possibility of hope.”126
It is important to clarify that to encourage Hunter’s concepts of affirmation and antithesis is
not to deny that a verbal rebuttal of error has an important place in the role of apologetics.
Apologetics functions best when it utilizes all available means to defend the Christian faith.
Traditional, rational objections to Christianity can and should be refuted through traditional
apologetic means. Rational and vocational apologetics should not be set in opposition to each
other, but should be seen as working together to bring a fuller defense to a challenge than could
have been presented otherwise. While traditional, rationally-focused apologetic methods do
function in a way as a negation of the charges they address, they are still needed tools for the
apologist to use. The challenge comes if they are used alone, without any recourse to an
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Enfleshed Apologetic approach, leaving the impression that apologetics only tears down without
offering uplifting alternatives.
Enfleshed Apologetics rooted in vocation offers a healthy complement as it leads the
Christian not just to speak in defense of Christianity or refute the charges of the New Atheists
with words (all of which are still necessary but run the risk of serving as a form negation rather
than a means of building up), but calls the Christian to put into practice in life what one professes
as well. Vocation guides the Christian to real, tangible, and concrete ways and places to work for
the common good, embodying a vision of human flourishing that is credible and offers hope.
An example from current culture may serve to illustrate this point. In recent years, access
to affordable health care has become a significant societal issue. Due to the politicization of
American life, the approach taken to address the challenge has been a legislative one. A will to
power pushed one vision of an answer through the political process, and a competing will to
power has sought to tear down the legislative “victory” and replace it with an equally political
alternative. The church has taken the role of political lobbyist for or against various proposals
and it has often played the part of the wronged victim when the political process goes the
opposite direction from church preferences. This victimization has been seen in the many
lawsuits church bodies have filed through the course of the ongoing healthcare debate. All of this
activity on the part of the church from every side of the political spectrum can be classified as
walking the path to negation. Positions are delineated in opposition to those with whom
particular branches of the church disagree and losses are carefully cultivated into resentments.
What is needed, by way of alternative, is not a political negation—or a political synthesis
for that matter—but a true antithesis, a positive alternative offering the possibility of hope. This
has begun in some places as the church, in a very vocational approach, has engaged members
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with specializations in the medical fields to provide parish-based medical care outside of the
political and insurance systems. Parish nursing positions and parish health clinics are
representative of this opportunity for the church to offer a real antithesis to the destructive
tendencies of society led by the political system. The church does not so much fight in the ways
of the world as offer “a bursting out of new creation from within it.”127 That is Vocational
Apologetics in practice.
As Christians seek to live for the good of those around them through vocation they actively
work to counter the New Atheists’ emotional and ethical argument against Christianity. I would
propose that Vocational Apologetics moves on to present “the possibility of hope” while offering
an ethical appeal to rebuild the credibility of Christianity in society. It does so by showing that
Christians embody Scriptural morality reflecting God’s nature as the gracious sustainer of life as
they care for the neighbor in ways that are simple, concrete, and contextualized.

Christian Responses To The Rhetorical Appeals Used By The New Atheists, Rooted In
Vocational Apologetics
One of the foundational charges of the New Atheists is that religion causes violence. This
was demonstrated through the case study of Harris’ depiction of a bus suicide bombing, and also
came out in the case study of Harris’ writing about the passages in Scripture that advocate
violence such as killing children who talk back to their parents. A Christian apologetic approach
would seek to refute this allegation of violence from the New Atheists. Apologists, however,
must be careful to consider Hunter’s charge that mere negation leads to nihilism. Vocational
Apologetics, as I am proposing, does not serve as a verbal negation of the charge from the New
Atheists that religion causes violence, it does not say “No, religions are peaceful rather than

127

Hunter, To Change the World, 265.

212

violent,” and in fact Vocational Apologetics is not just a negation of the charge of violence by
simply living peaceful and non-violent lives to offer a living contradiction to the charge of
violence. Rather, Vocational Apologetics moves beyond straight contradiction of the New
Atheist allegations, as that would represent only the path of negation, and instead seeks to build
the possibility of hope. It does so by actually serving the neighbor in ways that counteract the
effects of violence, work for the healing of those who are hurt, and seek to establish a more
lasting peace. When the New Atheists charge that religion causes violence, Vocational
Apologetics does not so much contradict the charge in the manner of negation as it actively seeks
to reverse the effects of violence in a way that builds hope as Hunter urges. In this way,
Vocational Apologetics allows the church to be seen in what it says and does, rather than only
what it opposes.
In support for their claim that religions lead to violence, the New Atheists claim that people
of faith will act in literal accord with the teachings they interpret literally, and they further claim
that Christian Scriptures advocate violence. Harris writes, “The belief that it will rain puts an
umbrella in the hand of every man or woman who owns one.”128 He concludes, “As a man
believes, so will he act.”129 Of course, in this way, the New Atheists are asserting that Christians
who take Scripture literally are doing so in a way that is a danger to society—eventually leading
to violence.
Those who would practice Vocational Apologetics would agree wholeheartedly with Harris
that as a Christian believes, so should he or she act, but would seek to show that acting on
Christian belief is a positive benefit to society. Instead of causing violence, Christianity is shaped
by the violence done to Christ in his sacrificial life and death. This central message of the saving
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work of Christ then leads to the outworking of the Christian life in manners of sacrificial service
meeting the needs of the neighbor. Thus, not only is Christianity not violent, it would in fact
rather suffer violence than inflict it and still seek to serve the common good in a way that
answers Hunter’s call for the establishment of hope. The New Atheists would try to claim that
following the Bible leads to evil, but this form of apologetics seeks to respond by showing forth
work for the common good embodied in the vocational life of Christians.
The New Atheist assertion that following the Bible literally leads to violence is a simplistic
misinterpretation of the Bible, and such a faux-fundamentalist reading is easily refuted on
academic, scholarly, theological grounds.130 However, that is not where most of the problem lies.
As often is the case, the world needs living proof, not just academic proof. The New Atheists say
that following the teachings of the Bible will lead to violence and slaughter. Solid Scriptural
theologians can explain violent passages responsibly and point to an overarching narrative of
peace. However, for the watching world, the proof will not be in libraries but in lives. This is the
form of living proof offered by those who would practice Vocational Apologetics. What does it
mean to put into practice the beliefs one holds from Scripture? Vocational Apologetics says
watch and see. True enough, “As a man believes, so will he act,”131 but Vocational Apologetics
will strive to show others that those actions are helpful rather than hurtful.
Harris does recognize the possibility of religious motivation for sacrificial service, as he
writes:
It is true that there are millions of people whose faith moves them to perform
extraordinary acts of self-sacrifice for the benefit of others. The hope rendered to the
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poor by Christian missionaries in the developing world demonstrates that religious
ideas can lead to actions that are both beautiful and necessary.132
However, Harris then proceeds to argue “But there are far better reasons for self-sacrifice than
those that religion provides. … It can be quite possible, even reasonable, to risk one’s life to save
others without believing any incredible ideas about the nature of the universe.”133 However,
Harris does not explain or even list any better reasons. He leaves this as an unsupported
assertion. A Christian can fully agree that there are motivations apparently outside of religious
belief that can lead people to sacrifice for the common good, and faithful Christians can rejoice
at the common ground this creates. However, Christians would seek to support their claims that
Scripture gives very good reasons for self-sacrifice through a demonstrated life of discipleship.
Unlike Harris, Christianity would not leave its assertion of goodness unsupported. Through
Vocational Apologetics connected to Biermann’s three kinds of righteousness and Hunter’s call
for affirmation, Christians can rejoice in what good is done by all, including atheists. But even
while rejoicing in the common good, Christians also seek to supplement it through their own
lives of faithful service to those around them.
According to Dawkins, as we saw in the case study of his famous and oft-quoted rhetorical
gem, those who follow such a God as described by Dawkins as a jealous, violent, bloodthirsty
ethnic cleanser134 would be apt to act in an evil way. This could be the case either because their
God demands such behavior or because their God in his character models such behavior for
them. Note that Dawkins’ description of God under consideration is very relational in nature.
The God Dawkins decries is not a hands-off, removed deity who works from a distance, but
instead a very interactive, relational God. Dawkins goes to great lengths to show problems with
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God in relationship after relationship. Dawkins points to problems in relationships among
couples and families by using such words as jealous, petty, and control-freak. He points to
problems in relationships among ethnic groups by using such words as ethnic cleanser, racist,
and genocidal. Dawkins points to problems in relationships between genders with such words as
misogynistic and homophobic. With these terms, Dawkins ascribes of God problems common
and readily observable in human relationships, and Dawkins attributes these problems to God’s
followers by extension.
By way of example, recall that Dawkins attributes to God an emotion: God is jealous—
jealous and proud of it.135 While jealousy can properly be understood in a relationship as a
positive trait pointing to a shielding, protecting enactment of pure love, in our current cultural
context jealousy is commonly considered to be a negative trait in a relationship. Jealousy in a
relationship would indicate that one or the other partner’s motivation is self-interest and selfpromotion, rather than seeking the good of the other. Thus, while the world sees the description
of Christian relationships built on a model of a jealous God to be inherently selfish, those who
practice Vocational Apologetic seek to show instead a commitment to the other based on
selflessness and sacrifice as the essence of love. This enactment of loving relationships flows, in
Vocational Apologetics, directly from the message of the saving relationship that Jesus Christ
established, a relationship based on sacrifice and service.
When apologetics is understood as a response to a particular line of challenge or attack, and
the New Atheists in a way attack the nature of Christianity’s relationship with the outside world,
then healthy Christian relationships, with other Christians and especially with non-Christians, are
themselves a form of apologetics. Relationships at their best are rooted in love, and love
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becomes an important factor in counteracting Dawkins’ variously-worded charges of hatred
within Christianity. In Dawkins’ argument, God is hate-filled toward group after group, thus
Christians are hate-filled toward group after group to the point of becoming a detriment to
society, and those who hate should be hated in return. Vocational Apologetics builds on the
strengths of Enfleshed Apologetics, and would agree that Christians are to follow their God in
their relationships recognizing the structure of relationships in which God has placed them.
Christians practicing Vocational Apologetics also show by their actions of kindness and
generous goodness toward those around them that the God they serve is likewise kind, generous,
and good to an even greater extent.
To see how the church could formulate an ethical appeal to counteract the attacks of the
New Atheists using Vocational Apologetics, consider a depiction given by Margaret Feinberg in
Kinnaman and Lyons book, UnChristian. Dawkins depicts Christians and their God as hostile to
outsiders and inward facing by using descriptors such as “jealous,” vindictive,” “misogynistic,
homophobic, racist,” and the like.136 By way of contrast, Feinberg paints a picture for the church
of Vocational Apologetics put into practice in the present and future. Feinberg calls for
Christians putting their faith into action (not using the term “vocation” specifically, but including
some elements of vocation in her thought):
I would hope people would look at us and say, “Those Christians are the ones who
run in when everyone else is running out. Those Christians are the ones who didn’t
give up on the crumbling inner cities. Those Christians are the ones who brought
peace to Darfur. Those Christians are the ones who put an end to human trafficking.
Those Christians are the ones who helped win the war on AIDS around the world.
Those Christians are the ones who write those incredible lyrics, pen those
unforgettable books, and create artwork that’s mesmerizing. Those Christians are the
ones who helped my mother when she got Alzheimer’s. Those Christians are the ones
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who were kind to me when I was new in the area. Those Christians are the ones that
made me want to believe in God.”137
While Feinberg did not necessarily have Dawkins’ passage in mind when she wrote this,
consider the points of comparison. Dawkins says Christians are racist, Feinberg calls for
Christians to work in crumbling inner cities. Dawkins says Christians are homophobic, but
Feinberg calls for Christians to work for the end of the AIDS epidemic. Dawkins cumulatively
depicts Christians as closed in, Feinberg calls for Christians to be open in service to all.
In Chapter Three we saw how in times of plague, Romans fled from cities leaving their
infected loved ones to die in the streets. The Christians, meanwhile, brought the plague-stricken
pagan Romans in and provided basic nursing care, saving many lives.138 Feinberg suggests the
same move for the church today and into the future. Run in to the inner cities when the rest of
society is rushing out. Provide nursing care and bring healing in light of the AIDS crisis. Give
human care when no one else will. Feinberg’s description of the future of the church actually
looks very much like the past practice of the church. Vocational Apologetics is the present and
future implementation of past charitable practices described in Historical Goodness Apologetics.
In doing so, Vocational Apologetics as Christian life lived in service to those around, driven by
the needs of our various neighbors, serves to refute the emotionally-laden charges of the New
Atheists with a competing account of faithfulness that has an emotional power all its own.
Feinberg’s paragraph not only can be seen to address the New Atheists’ emotional appeals
on a congruent level of emotional appeal, but also begins to address the ad hominem attacks of
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the New Atheists against the moral standing of Christians. Because of the good Christians do in
many walks of life (demonstrating an Enfleshed, Vocational Apologetic as for example Feinberg
points out with her references to Christians providing health care, rebuilding inner cities, caring
for new neighbors, and the like), others may desire to be associated with them. This directly
counteracts the ethical appeal used by the New Atheists as described above, in which they
present atheism. The ethical appeal given by Feinberg counteracts the varied rhetorical appeals
of the New Atheists. It counteracts them not by mere contradiction, but by offering a vision of
Christian presence that works toward the common good in the civil realm. This ethical appeal
shows that the Christian is even willing to suffer personal misfortune for the sake of such
service. Willingness to sacrifice on behalf of a cause is a strong marker of integrity, and forms a
significant ethical appeal on the part of Christianity to claim a valid voice against the challenges
of the New Atheists.
Work for the common good is both a function of “affirmation” and “antithesis” as
described by Hunter. In a world marked by difference, Hunter’s term for pluralism, this approach
finds common ground in sacrificial service, affirming those who seek to manifest care in such
situations. Also, in a world marked by dissolution, Hunter’s word for deconstruction, such an
approach begins to rebuild a missing and much-needed ethical basis for Christianity, rooted in
sacrificial work towards the common good. The vocational approach to Enfleshed Apologetics
does not require the alteration of Christian teaching or accommodation to the thought patterns of
the secular world, but it gives open evidence of a different approach to life, one rooted in the
embodiment of Christ’s love in the lives of his people.
The impact of a Vocational Apologetic approach that focuses on life and not just on words
can be noted in no less a difficult case than Christopher Hitchens himself. In god is not Great,
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Hitchens relates his experience in a rehabilitation center in northern Uganda that was established
to help children who had been kidnapped and enslaved by Joseph Kony. Hitchens attempts to
paint Kony as a fanatical Christian, describing him as “a passionate former altar boy who wanted
to subject the area to the rule of the Ten Commandments. … His was a fanatical preachment of
Christianity.”139 In this description, one sees the core components of the New Atheist argument
against Christianity: its systematic sanctioning of violent behavior from youth (“altar boy”) that
manifests itself in a radical act of political and social persecution based upon its Scriptural texts
(“to subject the area to the rule of the Ten Commandments”).
Hitchens notes that the rehabilitation center he visited was run by a fundamentalist
Christian organization, and he recounts an interview he held with a missionary who was trying to
give medical and humanitarian care and counseling to victims who had suffered under Kony and
his militia, the Lord’s Resistance Army. Hitchens asked the missionary which one—the
missionary or Kony—was the truest believer? Hitchens justifies his question by claiming, “Any
secular or state-run outfit could be doing what [the missionary] was doing—fitting prosthetic
limbs and providing shelter and ‘counseling’—but in order to be Joseph Kony one had to have
real faith.”140 Again, one sees the core components of New Atheist reasoning: religion leads to
radical acts of violence.
Hitchens recalls that he was surprised with the missionary’s answer, in which he did not
dismiss the question outright. “It was true, he said, that Kony’s authority arose in part from his
background in a priestly Christian family … all that the missionary could do was to try and show
people a different face of Christianity.”141 Hitchens writes, “I was impressed with this man’s

139

Hitchens, god is not Great, 189.

140

Hitchens, god is not Great, 189.

141

Hitchens, god is not Great, 189.

220

frankness. There were some other defenses that he might have offered.”142 And yet, the
missionary’s simple, lifestyle-oriented answer, “All that a missionary could do was to try and
show people a different face of Christianity”143 elicits perhaps a slight bit of praise from
Hitchens: “I was impressed with this man’s frankness.”144 This statement is, by my reading, one
of the strongest compliments Hitchens gives to religion anywhere in his book. The defense of
Christianity that most moved Hitchens was not a rational one, but one that might best be
described as aligning with a Vocational Apologetic approach, this time understanding vocation
as the job of the doctor.
To be sure, other unbelieving doctors could have been, and have been, serving in ways that
are outwardly quite similar to the doctor interviewed by Hitchens, and their service is also
commendable. This is the realm of governing righteousness as expounded by Biermann, in
which the outward works of both Christians and non-Christians are similar and equally
admirable. Hitchens is happy to point out such examples as he does when he writes that although
he has met some extremely dedicated relief workers who are believers, “as it happens the best
ones I have met are secularists who were not trying to proselytize for any faith.”145 However,
while the outward effect may be the same, in this case doctors working to heal people in warravaged regions of the world, the Christian has the added motivation of serving as Christ has
given himself for us, and demonstrating by his actions the good that Christianity does in the
world. This is the realm of Biermann’s conforming righteousness in which Christian motivation
guided by the call of the Holy Spirit to testify to the work of Christ is taken into account.
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Consider Hitchens’ own example of the doctor in Uganda in light of Vocational
Apologetics as a way of responding to the various New Atheist arguments presented. Harris
alleges that faith drives people to blow themselves up on busses. A straight negation of that
allegation would be the contrary argument that no, in fact religion causes people to be less
violent and terrorism is much more likely a political or socio-economic tool than a religious
expression as described by Harris.146 The doctor in Uganda, on the other hand, in seeking to
present a different face of Christianity, chooses not to argue with words but by his deeds of
fitting prosthetic limbs to those who had been injured. He provides a living alternative to
violence by working to undo the damage of destruction. In this way he works in a manner
reflective of Hunter’s description of antithesis rather than negation. When Harris makes an effort
at an emotionally laden Scriptural argument regarding harsh punishment of children and frequent
encouragement towards killing, the doctor described by Hitchens does not give a contrary
Scriptural interpretation of passages that point toward violence,147 instead he puts into practice in
his life what he in fact actually believes based on his understanding of Scripture. While Dawkins
describes Christianity as a religion of ethnic cleansers, the doctor doesn’t pass the blame for
ethnic cleansing elsewhere or deny the charge with an attempt at a rational explanation. Instead
he sets about in his life to show forth love and care for all he can reach, including victims of
crimes against humanity, whatever the root cause of that violence may be. In all cases, the reply
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to the New Atheists is more powerful because it is not a merely a verbal denial of the charges,
but it is an active antithesis of the New Atheist arguments.
All of the charges from the New Atheists described in the preceding paragraph could be
refuted by means of traditional, rational apologetic responses. Such a response would be valid
and helpful, but insufficient. Verbal and enfleshed forms of apologetics should be held together,
rather than pulled apart. Traditional apologetics could show that the New Atheists are wrong in
their attacks on Christianity. Historical Goodness Apologetics could show that the church in the
past has been a force for the common good of society, contrary to the claims of the New
Atheists. But only Enfleshed Apologetics lived by Christians in their vocations can build a
positive current case for Christianity. Any of these approaches could be used productively to
rebuff the arguments of the New Atheists. But used together, they form a case stronger than the
individual sum of the parts.

Consideration of the Difference between A Written Description of Vocational Apologetics
And A Lived Example of Vocational Apologetics
Written apologetics, even writing about Vocational Apologetics as a form of Enfleshed
Apologetics, can only ever be an example of recently enacted Historical Goodness Apologetics.
Before an action can be transformed into writing, it is already by definition history. This is the
great challenge of Enfleshed Apologetics. It can be described in writing, but it cannot be fulfilled
in writing. True Enfleshed Apologetics must be experienced not in written form, but lived and
enacted.
Vocational Apologetics calls for action within the contemporary Christian life. This active,
insistent call to serve the neighbor in vocation is different from the form of apologetics I
described above as Historical Goodness Apologetics. The emphasis of that form of apologetics
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was to show that in the past, Christians had done wonderful things for the good and advancement
of society. In Enfleshed Apologetics, shaped through Luther’s understanding of vocation, the
focus is not relegated to what Christians have done in the past. Instead, the call is for Christians
to engage actively in public life through their vocational outlook in the present and work for the
betterment of society in the here and now through their expanding spheres of influence. This is
what sets what I am calling Vocational Apologetics apart from Historical Goodness Apologetics.
Vocational Apologetics calls Christians from the couch out into culture through living their
vocations in concrete action. But it must be granted that this movement is humble and hard to
discern to the eyes of the world. Christians are not necessarily called to serve the world in huge,
eye-catching or headline-making ways. Instead, Christians are called to serve in simple,
everyday ways that typically don’t make news. Vocational Apologetics focuses more on the
quiet, ordinary life of everyday Christians in the regular relationships around them expanding
outward from there into the wider world. In some ways, Vocational Apologetics would seem to
be a strange way to approach the New Atheists. After all, the New Atheists are anything but
quiet and ordinary in their accusations against Christianity. They are brash, harsh, strident, and
nearly violent in their denunciation of religion. The temptation for an apologist is to respond in
kind. But the better approach than to respond in kind is to respond in kindness, with humility and
grace by urging faithfulness in the ordinary lives of believers.
Luther’s teaching focuses upon the blessings of vocation exercised by the lowest and most
menial forms of service. Hein observes that in putting Luther’s ideas of vocation into practice,
“the saints of God ended up appearing very ordinary in the eyes of the world. [Luther’s]
depiction of faith faithfully going to work in the world presented the Christian with a regimen for
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life that looks rather indistinguishable from would-be citizens of the Kingdom of the Devil.”148 In
fact, the work that Christians do in vocation is in many instances exactly the same as what nonChristians would do in the same circumstances. That is the point of Biermann’s first kind of
righteousness, “governing righteousness,” and of Hunter’s call to “affirmation,” namely to
validate that non-Christians also work for the common good. Thus, Vocational Apologetics will
not be flashy or readily noticed. That does not, however, make it any less valid or valuable of an
apologetic approach. Quite the contrary.
As mundane as it may seem, Vocational Apologetics stresses the ongoing nature of a
Christian’s commitment to the world around. Living in vocation becomes the training ground for
Christians to continue learning how to serve the needs of the neighbor. God locates his people in
specific places among specific people, to develop a faithful presence with them. Christians live
in the location where God has placed them. There, they grow deeper in their relationships with
their families, their neighbors, their co-workers, the people in their communities and churches,
living in their various vocations. Eventually they find themselves reaching out into the broader
world as they continue to learn how best to serve and love those around them. The expectation is
that the Vocational Apologetic engagement will deepen and strengthen over time. It is a learning
and growing process. Hein explains:
Here our Lord calls us to express our faith in him and his righteousness by loving
service within the social communities to which we already belong through the
responsibilities that arise from our stations and offices within them. Our roles and
commitments within these communities are the schools by which our Lord teaches us
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how to live out our faith as his children. Here he would teach us how faith is to be
acted out in life as loving service.149
Unfortunately, writing can only go so far, especially concerning Enfleshed Apologetics.
The ultimate value of Enfleshed Apologetics is in actual work for the common good
accomplished through the variety of vocations given to each Christian. But, while words cannot
be actions, one hopes they can spur readers on to actions. To that end, a few examples of
Vocational Apologetics at work (even though only described in words) are in order.
Benne relates the story of a Christian woman living in her vocation as an art teacher, who
had a problem student named Jimmy. He was dumped in her class one year for lack of anywhere
else to put him. Jimmy did not turn in any homework all term, so the art teacher failed him. The
next year, Jimmy asked the teacher if he could take art again, and the teacher refused. However,
she did allow Jimmy to spend his study hall in her classroom, which coincided with her planning
period. The teacher relates:
As time passed, Jimmy began to talk to me and to ask if there was anything he could
do to help me. I knew enough about him to be hesitant to say yes, but then decided
maybe he needed someone to trust him and to give him some responsibilities. I began
by giving him small things to do and as the year progressed gave him more and more.
Not once did he ever make a mistake or refuse to do what I asked him. He did his
work and was a tremendous help to me.
The last week of school we always had an assembly program at which the seniors
read their last will and testament. When Jimmy got up to read his, he looked straight
at me and left me his undying friendship. Needless to say, I was shocked and know
there must have been tears in my eyes. Here was a student I had refused to let take art
but who in the past year had come to consider me his friend. That made all the
heartache worthwhile and I’ve often wondered what happened to Jimmy and what he
is doing now.150
Benne then points out that, “True to life, the story has no triumphant end with Jimmy going on to
be president of IBM. But his chances of making a decent way in the world were enhanced by that
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ordinary saint.”151 This shows an apologetic refutation through the example of a life lived in
vocation—in this case the vocation of a teacher. Here is a form of Vocational Apologetics in
which a disrespectful child is treated by a Christian believer with love and patience.
Benne’s anecdote also addresses the allegations of the New Atheists at the level of
rhetorical attack the New Atheists utilize. Benne does not make an argument about the goodness
of the Christian life so much as he provides an emotionally powerful example of the Christian
life in action. That is to say, Benne here presents primarily an emotional appeal rather than a
straight rational appeal. In responding to the New Atheists, this is a very helpful methodology.
We have seen in the previous example that Vocational Apologetics can make a difference
with individual youth, but can it go farther? What if a group of committed Christians become
involved together? Consider the following example from Charles Colson and Nancy Pearcey, in
How Now Shall We Live? as they describe a project that took place in Montgomery, Alabama.
Fifty Christian teenagers armed with hedge clippers and weed whackers descended on a
neighborhood of mostly elderly people. Determined to tackle the overgrown bushes that
provided hiding places for vandals, burglars, and muggers, the kids trimmed towering hedges,
thinned low-hanging tree branches, and even replaced burned-out lights and installed peepholes
in doors. The project was called Youth Cutting Down on Crime, and it was organized by
Neighbors Who Care, a Prison Fellowship ministry that mobilizes churches to help crime
victims.152
These activities took place because Christians encouraged other Christians to act on the
vocation God had given them, in the location where God had placed them.153 Colson and Pearcey
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argue that Christians “have a worldview capable of providing workable solutions to the problems
of community life. Thus, we ought to be in the forefront, helping communities take charge of
their own neighborhoods.”154 They suggest that what is happening through the example they cite
is nothing other than:
what Christians should be doing everywhere: converting chaos into the tranquillitas
ordinis, one house at a time, one block at a time, one neighborhood at a time, one
community at a time. … We begin with our personal lives and habits, move out from
there to our families and schools and then into our communities—and from there into
our society as a whole.155
Note that Colson and Pearcey follow the outline of the spheres of vocation even without using
the term. They call for Christians living in vocation to start “one house at a time,” thus working
within the family to begin the most fundamental, profound changes to society. They then work
outward in the expanding ripples of located vocation by working on “one block,” “one
neighborhood,” and “one community.” Their approach, parallel to the vocational methodology
laid out above, does not overreach. It does not try to skip over the more humble local needs to try
to engage in flashier, more publicity-driven global efforts. Thus it is not as likely to succumb to
paralysis of doing nothing because a global effort is out of reach. This approach calls on
Christians to make a difference in their everyday life through their vocational placements in the
manner that is most needed locally.
neighborhoods. They cite a research study that showed the importance of a strong sense of working for the good of
the community (such as that instilled by churches) as a major factor in reducing crime rates. They document:
“Researchers at Harvard University, the Kaiser Institute, and the University of Chicago joined together to survey
382 Chicago neighborhoods, all with different ethnic, racial, and economic characteristics. They could find no
common thread in traditional demographics. In some minority communities crime was high, while in others it was
low. The same was true of poverty. The only common pattern researchers found was that rates of violence were
lower in areas that had a strong sense of community values and a willingness to impose those values on the public
space—for example, where neighbors felt free to step in and discipline kids who skip school or scribble graffiti on
the walls or hang out on the streets. In other words, even disadvantaged communities can overcome adverse
conditions if they have common values and are willing to enforce them especially among the young.” Colson and
Pearcey, How Now, 368. The study cited is by Robert J. Sampson, “Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel
Study of Collective Efficacy,” Science 277, no. 5328 (August 15, 1997): 918.
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This approach does not just say, “Christians clean up neighborhoods and reduce crime.”
Instead, a Vocational Apologetic approach relies on the communicative value of actions in
addition to words. Christians do not just say that the implementation of their faith is for the good
and up-building of society; they actually do it and lead the way. They work to establish the
tranquillitas ordinis, which is in every case the antithesis of the violent depictions provided by
the New Atheists. In an innermost circle of vocation, that of the family, establishment of the
tranquillitas ordinis is the antithesis of violence in the home as alleged by Harris. In an
outwardly expanding circle of community, the establishment of the tranquillitas ordinis is the
antithesis of city-wide violence such as a bus bombing described with emotional flourish in the
opening pages of The End of Faith. Finally, in the broadest circle of vocation, reaching out into
society as a whole, seeking to establish the tranquillitas ordinis is the antithesis of social
violence like genocide as described by Dawkins, accomplished by establishing tranquility and
trust in place of race-based mistrust, anger, and hatred. In the end, this builds trust in the
Christian message, because actions and words speak loudest when they work in concert with
each other.
When words become actions, when writing Historical Apologetics of the near-recent past
truly becomes Vocational Apologetic in action, the results can at times be plain to see—even in
the effect it can have on activist atheists. George Yancey, in his book Hostile Environment, tells
of the example of Patrick Greene, a committed atheist from Ontario, California. Greene was
following courses of action much in line with the New Atheist approach, including protesting the
display of nativity scenes at Christmastime. However, Greene was diagnosed with a detached
retina that could eventually cause him to become blind. Local Christians, who were by extension
Greene’s Christian neighbors, heard about his trouble and gave Greene donations to help with his

229

medical care. As a result of this act of Christian love and kindness shown by his community
neighbors, Greene for a time converted to Christianity. He has since left the church and
renounced his conversion, but as of the time Yancey wrote, he had not returned to his hostile
activism against Christianity.156 Actions and words had worked together. That is the essence of
Enfleshed Apologetics.

Conclusion
These thoughts and examples considered above from varied sources all serve as an effort to
direct the Christian response to the New Atheists away from only the realm of rational
argumentation and evidence and into the realm of enactment in life. The harshest accusations of
the New Atheists are not theoretical or intellectual—that Christianity is wrong on certain points
of doctrine—but instead the charges are practical and lifestyle-oriented, but that Christianity is in
fact and in life a force for evil in culture. The way to counteract these criticisms of Christianity is
not primarily in the realm of traditional apologetics, but by putting faith into practice through the
directed, tangible framework of vocation as understood by Martin Luther.
An apologetic focus on vocation and the humble service Christians render to the world is
appropriate as a means of countering the claims of the New Atheists, even though it may not be
exciting or news-worthy. The congruity of the arguments made by the New Atheists and the
response given in Vocational Apologetics can be hard to see, since the New Atheists shout their
messages of displeasure toward Christianity from every media microphone they can access,
while Christians set about simply serving those around them in need. But while the volume
between Vocational Apologetics and the vocalizations of the New Atheists is nowhere near
compatible, the rebuttal provided by vocational service to the New Atheist charge that
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Christianity is wicked is a resounding one indeed.
It also is exactly what is sought by younger generations of Christians themselves. David
Kinnaman and Gabe Lyons document this in their book UnChristian.157 In the final chapter of the
book, Kinnaman and Lyons set the stage for transforming the negative image of the church by
means of changing the church’s focus toward service. They write, “A young generation of
outsiders is raising significant criticism of the Christian faith and its people. Knowing the
problem and diagnosing the hostility are just the start. How will we respond? What will we do to
address the unChristian perception of our faith?”158 Kinnaman and Lyons present what they call a
straightforward but challenging idea: “We have to be defined by our service and sacrifice, by
lives that exude humility and grace. If young outsiders say they can’t see Jesus in our lives, we
have to solve our ‘hidden Jesus’ problem.”159
While they do not use the term, what Kinnaman and Lyons describe is readily compatible
with Luther’s expansive view of vocation. Later in the chapter, they note the benefit of a faith
that is lived, to use our framework, within Luther’s ideas of vocation:
Mosaics and Busters, perhaps as much as any American generation before them, need
to experience faith that is expressed toward others. They want to do more than learn
about their faith; they want to live it. We interview many young people who have
fallen away from faith because it was never more than a mere allegiance to life
principles, not a deep inner connection to a living God who wants his people to give
themselves away in sacrifice and service.
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And so, to move from unChristian to Christian, young people need to see Christianity
rejecting self-preservation and insularity and embracing true concern and compassion
for others.160
Kinnaman and Lyons argue that:
Currently Christianity is known for being unlike Jesus; one of the best ways to shift
that perception would be to esteem and serve outsiders. This means being
compassionate, soft-hearted, and kind to people who are different from us, even
hostile toward us. In this book’s afterword, many leaders describe this element,
saying that our future reputation as Christians is intricately connected to our passion
for justice, service, and sacrifice.161
Preceding this call to action by nearly 500 years, Martin Luther, in his thought on vocation, calls
for Christians to serve others with God’s love in the specific and concrete locations where God
has placed them. This solid call to serve provides ample opportunity for Christians—living and
serving in vocation—to show the error of the New Atheist charge that Christianity is a force for
evil in the world. As a response to the criticism of the New Atheists, this is an apologetic
undertaking. As it is rooted in Luther’s understanding of the spheres that comprise Christian
vocation, it is a vocational approach. Thus, Vocational Apologetics can be a very direct and
appropriate means for the church to respond to the vitriolic attacks of the New Atheists, and as
such it should be incorporated into the church’s overall apologetic framework.
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION
In apologetics, the final chapter is never really written, at least not conclusively so. People
continue to ask new questions or pose new challenges to the Christian faith, and often old
challenges and questions are posed in new ways. As long as people pose challenges to the
Christian faith, Christians need to find appropriate and creative apologetic responses. At times
the answers to old questions are helpful. Still today, apologetic answers arising out of the
Enlightenment can be of assistance in supporting the truth claims of Christianity when the
questions point in that direction. At times, however, new challenges require new responses. The
emotional and ethical charges of the New Atheists need to be answered using a rhetorically
similar approach, which is the role of an Enfleshed Apologetic shaped by Luther’s teaching on
vocation. Whether the answers are tried and true or new, the responses given through apologetics
need to meet the specific challenge presented, rather than just providing a general restatement of
apologetic answers that have found success in the past. Apologetics needs to be seen as a
responsive discipline. That is why apologetics can never really have a definitive final chapter.
New and different challenges will continue to require new and different defenses.
A number of apologists, who recognize that apologetics is a responsive discipline and
needs to adapt based on changing challenges, have written of a future for the field of apologetics
that looks somewhat different from the present. Sean McDowell—the son of Josh McDowell, the
prominent apologist of the late-modern era—writes:
To say that apologetics is critical for ministry today is not to say that we just continue
business as usual. That would be foolish. Our world is changing, and it is changing
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rapidly. … We have certainly made mistakes in the way we have defended our
beliefs in the past … but this hardly means we should abandon apologetics altogether.
Rather, we ought to learn from the past and adjust accordingly.1
Likewise, David Wilkinson argues that Christian apologetics should adopt a form that is
“not merely intellectual confrontation or defense, but which is personal and holistic and which
takes contemporary culture seriously. The truth of the message is not diluted, but the character
and attitude of the apologist is as important as the arguments he or she deploys.”2 Wilkinson
writes that apologetics “is an art to be developed rather than a science to be understood.”3 He
notes that “Often our western theological tradition has narrowed the practice of apologetics,
making it largely irrelevant to contemporary mission.”4 Wilkinson summarizes his view of
apologetics in the twenty-first century by saying, “Apologetics therefore needs to reflect a
diversity of approaches. It must reflect the diversity of different ways of knowing, and the
importance of role models and mentoring … the medium needs to reflect the message in twentyfirst century apologetics.”5 One way that our culture is changing is that the style and form of
attacks on Christianity are broadening. Criticisms of Christianity are no longer exclusively or
predominantly rational in nature. Lifestyle challenges are just as prominent, or more prominent
under the influence of the New Atheists. Since the criticisms of Christianity are becoming more
diverse, Wilkinson’s call for a diversity of apologetic approaches is a very valid one. This call
can be answered, in part, by an Enfleshed or Vocational apologetic, rooted in Luther’s teaching,
distinguishing two and three kinds of righteousness.
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The challenges that have been brought forward by the New Atheists tend to go in a
different direction than apologists have been accustomed to defending. For the New Atheists,
questions about the existence of God fade from prominence and charges regarding the nature of
God as unjust and immoral, with related questions about the goodness of Christians and their
benefit to society, come to the fore. For this reason, the approach taken in the apologetic task
needs to change as well. Apologetic responses that defend traditional Christian teachings or truth
claims address the accusations of the New Atheists only secondarily or indirectly. Therefore, in
order to address the criticisms raised by the New Atheists more directly, the church needs to
recognize that how Christians live in their daily spheres of vocation as recognized by Luther is
also important as a form of apologetics.
This is, in part, what is driving the calls we have seen in McDowell and Wilkinson for a
broadening of the understanding of the apologetic task. As apologetics must shift from answering
the question “Does God exist” to answering the questions, “If God does exist, is he good?” or
even “Are Christians good, or are they a force for hate, division, strife, and violence?” the form
of the answers must shift responsively. A focus on the goodness of Christianity as it is applied in
life can become a valid apologetic approach. Throughout this dissertation I have been
considering the challenges posed to Christianity from our current culture, largely using the
writings of the New Atheists as representative samples of the broader culture. I have argued that
the New Atheists’ strongest challenges to Christianity come in the area of lifestyle rather than
doctrine, and thus a lifestyle-oriented approach is needed as a response. This led to a
consideration of Enfleshed Apologetics in general, and specifically a form of apologetics shaped
by Luther’s views on Christian vocation, which I have been calling Vocational Apologetics.
While a Vocational Apologetic view of the Christian life is certainly good and godly in its
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own right, the underlying apologetic question up to this point could be understood as, “Is this
actually a form of apologetics?” Few would object to the call for Christians to be pointed out into
the world to serve as Christ has served us. The call to serve is not in question. The question is,
“Does this qualify as apologetics?” I will provide two brief concluding affirmative answers.
First, the question about whether the Christian life experienced in the spheres of vocation is
actually apologetic is at heart a definitional question. If apologetics is defined as a rational
endeavor, as it often has been in the recent centuries, then lifestyle is out of bounds as an
apologetic undertaking. However, if the definition of apologetics is more broadly understood as
“a defense in the area of attack” and if the area of attack is the Christian life as I have shown it to
be with the New Atheists, then an Enfleshed Apologetic focusing on the Christian life in
vocation is indeed an apologetic undertaking.
Second, while Vocational Apologetics does not lend itself to a more traditional, rational
apologetic approach, it does fit very well in an understanding of apologetics in which the
definition of the task is not limited to reason alone, and therefore can become one component in
the overall sample of apologetic methods available for use. The life of the Christian, reflective of
God’s love for us, becomes the apologetic method needed when the criticism of Christianity is
lifestyle-based, and thus becomes one component of an overall apologetic approach. Enfleshed
or Vocational Apologetics fits well into Cumulative Case Apologetics.
Cumulative Case Apologetics is not beholden to any one exclusive methodology, but
recognizes the validity of a diverse variety of apologetic methods to respond to the diverse
challenges presented to the Christian faith. Even such seemingly opposite approaches as
Presuppositionalism and Evidentialism can both find a place in Cumulative Case Apologetics,
with each being able to be used appropriately for answering different challenges to Christianity.
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If both Presuppositionalism and Evidentialism can be included in Cumulative Case Apologetics,
then both traditional apologetic methodologies and newer apologetic approaches that point to the
vocational nature of the Christian life can find a place together under the umbrella of Cumulative
Case Apologetics. Vocational Apologetics, then, which emphasizes emotional and ethical
rhetorical appeals, finds a place alongside more commonly used and understood methodologies.
Is Vocational Apologetics really a form of apologetics to be considered under the
overarching program of Cumulative Case Apologetics? Without using the specific terms, but
echoing the concepts, two prominent apologists answer in the affirmative.
William Lane Craig is broadly regarded as a leading apologist and his most prominent
book is Reasonable Faith. He is known for his kalām cosmological argument, and his definition
of apologetics tends to side with more traditional, rationally driven understandings. He writes
that “Apologetics is primarily a theoretical discipline, though it has practical application. That is
to say, apologetics is that branch of theology that seeks to provide a rational justification for the
truth claims of the Christian faith.”6 With such credentials, including a book called Reasonable
Faith, a significant contribution to the rational apologetic of the cosmological proofs, and a
reason-based definition, Craig is certainly not an outside or fringe voice when it comes to
understanding what comprises the apologetic undertaking. Yet at the end of his book Reasonable
Faith, he turns to the Christian life as a form of apologetics. Granted, he does not use the terms
Enfleshed or Vocational Apologetics, but he devotes the last chapter of his book to the Christian
life, under the title of “The Ultimate Apologetic.” There he writes:
Now I want to share with you what I believe to be the most effective and practical
apologetic for the Christian faith that I know of. This apologetic will help you to win
more persons to Christ than all other arguments in your apologetic arsenal put
together.
6
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This ultimate apologetic involves two relationships: your relationship with God and
your relationship with others.7
What will be the final result when these two relationships are strong and close? There
will be a unity and warmth among Christians. … And what will be the result of this
unity through love? ... Our love is a sign to all people that we are [Jesus’] disciples;
but even more than that, our love and unity are living proof to the world that God the
Father has sent his Son Jesus Christ and that the Father loves people even as he loves
Jesus. When people see this—our love for one another and our unity through love—
then they will in turn be drawn to Christ and will respond to the gospel’s offer of
salvation. More often than not, it is who you are rather than what you say that will
bring an unbeliever to Christ.
This, then, is the ultimate apologetic. For the ultimate apologetic is—your life.8
If the author of Reasonable Faith makes the case that the Christian life itself is the ultimate
apologetic methodology, then Vocational Apologetics as one form of an overall Cumulative
Case approach is certainly on solid ground as a valid apologetic undertaking.
The second prominent apologist to recognize the importance of a good and attractive
Christian life to the overall apologetic task is Blaise Pascal. While writing in the 1600s, Pascal’s
themes seem startlingly reminiscent of the present time. He writes, “Men despise Religion. They
hate it and fear to find it true. To cure this, I must begin by showing that Religion is not contrary
to reason—is venerable—inspire respect for it; next, render it attractive; make good men wish it
were true, and then show that it is true.”9
Without referencing it specifically, Pascal points to the importance of the Christian life. A
good Christian life, well-lived in the spheres of vocation, does much to demonstrate the
attractiveness of the faith. This in itself will be a tremendous help to people who start from a
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position of hating religion and fearing it. Interestingly, Pascal holds together the rational,
emotional, and ethical rhetorical appeals in this famous portion of the Pensées. Due to his time,
he places the rational appeal first and foremost. However, he recognizes that the rational appeal
alone will not sway those who are firmly opposed to Christianity to the point of despising it,
hating it, and fearing it. In such cases, people also need to be shown the beauty of the faith10 and
the attractive nature of the Christian life. This effort correlates most closely with the ethical and
emotional appeals, rather than the rational appeal. Granted, Pascal placed the position of the
rational appeal in his presentation as chronologically first, but he did not discount the Christian
life as a form of the emotional and ethical appeals.
This brings us back to the nature of the rhetorical appeals as outlined by Aristotle, and their
application for apologetic uses. In general, Vocational Apologetics is a valid and legitimate form
of apologetics, functioning as one of several available approaches to be applied as needed based
on a careful responsiveness to the exact challenges presented within a Cumulative Case
Apologetic methodology. In particular, Vocational Apologetics can help significantly to rebuild
the ethical standing of Christianity in a culture where its moral authority has been battered by the
attacks of the New Atheists. In the current situation of Western Christianity, a concentrated focus
on an ethical rhetorical appeal is much needed. Aristotle noted, “it adds much to an orator’s
influence that his own character should look right.”11 Currently, the character of Christians does
not at all “look right,” but instead appears to be immoral and dangerous. Thus, the message of
Christianity is dismissed because the speaker is not trusted or respected.
This shows the extreme importance of the ethical rhetorical appeal. As Herrick pointed out
10
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in The History and Theory of Rhetoric:
Aristotle apparently held that of the three artistic proofs—logos, pathos, and ethos—
this last one, ethos, potentially was the most persuasive. When people are convinced
that a speaker is knowledgeable, trustworthy, and has their best interests at heart, they
likely will accept as true what the speaker has to say.12
If a speaker is seen as unreliable or immoral, then whatever the speaker says—even if it is
factually accurate and logically sound—could possibly be dismissed. If, however, the speaker is
seen as reputable and trustworthy, then the rational content of the speaker’s message is more
likely to be accepted even if the logic is faulty or even perhaps if it is factually in error. That is
the power of the ethical rhetorical appeal. If a speaker fails at establishing a strong ethical appeal,
then the reception of the speaker’s message could be in jeopardy, regardless of the quality and
rational legitimacy of the message itself.
This situation, I would argue, is the current standing in the field of apologetics. For
centuries, Christian apologists have developed logically sound, factually-based, rational
arguments in defense of the existence of God and various points of doctrine and historical
accuracy for the Christian faith. These rational arguments worked well in a culture with two
basic tenets: first, under the influence of the Enlightenment, reason was seen as a supreme
authority; and second, the moral authority of the church was not questioned, at least not to the
point of becoming an ethical detriment to the message it presented. The rational, logical,
factually driven apologetic answers set forward were generally well-received because their
grounding in reason was respected, and the ethical standing of Christianity allowed these
apologetic answers to be heard.
The problem is that neither of these basic tenets continues to hold in today’s culture. The
cultural sway of unaided reason and objective truth-claims has receded as the influences of
12
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Rationalism and the Enlightenment have weakened under the force of postmodernism. For this
reason, the logical, rational apologetic arguments deployed by Christian apologists would likely
receive a lukewarm-at-best reception from many challengers under even the best of
circumstances.
But we do not face the best of circumstances. The New Atheists have made an effective
two-pronged challenge to Christianity. First, they have employed a successful ethical appeal of
their own, raising their ethical standing through various appeals: to their carefully cultivated
personas as scholars and scientists; to having their audiences identify with them through
presenting morally recognizable dilemmas in such a way that the hearers or readers would group
themselves with the New Atheists rather than with people of faith; to the moral and ethical
superiority of an atheistic lifestyle as opposed to a lifestyle based on Christian morality. They
have paired this ethical appeal in favor of atheism with strong emotional appeals, especially a
perceived link between religion and violence, and complemented these ethical and emotional
rhetorical appeals with ad hominem attacks against the moral standing of people of faith in
general and Christianity in particular.
This leads to a significant change in balance in the way a message is heard in the culture.
Whereas previously the rational apologetic messages of Christianity were likely to be received
because of the ethical appeal inherent in the church’s moral authority, and atheist arguments
were likely to be dismissed because atheists were seen as untrustworthy,13 now the places have
been reversed.14 Due to a general disrespect for the moral authority of Christianity, its rational
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apologetic arguments are likely to be dismissed, even though they are solid. Due to the very
effective ethical appeal employed by the New Atheists, their rational arguments are likely to be
accepted, even if they are weak or nearly non-existent. This points to the need for Christianity to
rebuild its ethical appeal in light of the New Atheist attacks against the moral goodness of the
Christian life. Enfleshed Apologetics, shaped through Luther’s understanding of vocation, does
exactly that. As Christians live in their spheres of vocation, where God has placed them to be his
hands to care for the needy and his arms to carry the weak, they humbly shore up the church’s
ethical appeal one act, one life at a time. This is not accomplished on a flashy, news-making
level, but on a deeply personal but powerful level where the most lasting impact can be made.
While it seems clear that the church needs to work to rebuild its moral standing in culture
through an intentional use of the ethical rhetorical appeal, it is important to note that for
Aristotle, rhetorical appeals were used together in an overall argument. All three rhetorical
appeals would lead toward a comprehensive presentation. Ethical and rational rhetorical appeals
were not seen as separated or independent from each other (or from the emotional appeal, for
that matter), but the one opened the door to the other. Certainly, the church needs to rebuild a
strong ethical appeal, and doing so is a valid form of apologetics in itself. However, a strong
ethical rhetorical appeal is not to be separated from an equally strong rational appeal applied
when needed. Thus, an Enfleshed Apologetic approach, while being a valid form of apologetics
as part of a Cumulative Case, can at times also serve an important role to open ears to
complementary (not competing) rational appeals of Christianity when and as they are needed.
The need for the church to rebuild its ethical appeal in order to support and further its
rational appeal has been recognized by others in the field of apologetics, even if they have not
it should be turned on its head. The new atheists almost uniformly claim that it is modern atheists who hold the
moral high ground, and that it is the practitioners of the world’s religions that are immoral, both in historical practice
and in fundamental commitment.” Peterson, “Ethics, Out-Group Altruism,” 159.
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used the same terminology. Philip Kenneson points to the need for the church to redevelop its
ethical appeal in our current culture, while also recognizing the validity and necessity of a strong
rational rhetorical appeal. He says that without a consistent and visible Christian life on the part
of the apologist, the church’s message is not heard. He writes:
To their credit, evangelicals, perhaps more than anyone, are poised to give answers;
the problem is that no one is asking. Unless we are content to answer questions no
one is posing, it seems to me the most urgent apologetic task of the church today is to
live in the world in such a way that the world is driven to ask us about the hope we
have. Until that happens, I fear all the theories in the world about apologetics are in
vain, and the truth we say we bear witness to will be heard as falsehood.15
In a similar manner, Paul Louis Metzger also begins to recognize the need for the church to
rebuild its ethical appeal in order to regain a hearing for its message. He sees the Christian life as
a part of the relational-incarnational apologetic approach as central. He writes, “Our lives as
God’s people must create the space for our views to be heard.”16 He further elaborates, “our
words must be accompanied, undergirded, and energized by lives lived with the people with
whom we are sharing. Christ’s church as a lived and living community of holistic care that
suffers for others and even at the hands of others, while seeking to do them good, is one of the
greatest testimonies to the truthfulness and power of the Gospel.”17
David Wheeler likewise points to the need for the church to rebuild its ethical appeal as a
way to open ears to hear the church’s rational appeals in contemporary culture. He writes, “In the
end, Christians must understand that an unbelieving world will not believe what we say about
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Christ until they see Christ in us. In short, this is incarnational apologetics at its best.”18 As these
few brief illustrations show, one of the great opportunities for Vocational Apologetics is to begin
to rebuild the ethical standing of Christianity. The life of the Christian itself becomes the ethical
rhetorical appeal, and thus becomes the heart of the needed apologetic task. While Vocational
Apologetics is a functioning apologetic in itself and not merely a precursor to what others might
argue should truly be understood as apologetics, it is also plain that without Vocational
Apologetics to rebuild the ethical standing of Christianity, a more traditional, rationally-driven
apologetic message may not be given the honor of being heard outside the church.
One way to fill this need for the church to rebuild its ethical standing in society is for
Christians to demonstrate the goodness rather than evil of their faith. They can show the benefit
rather than detriment of the Christian life to society by actually living a life that benefits society
through the spheres of Christian vocation. God has placed Christians in families, in communities,
in occupations, in churches, and in various other relationships where they have many
opportunities not just to talk about what is right, but actually to do it. In these daily, humble,
often unnoticed outpourings of goodness enacted by his followers, God works to preserve and
sustain his creation. Christians are seen as a good for society, and its message is heard as a
blessing, because Christians demonstrate themselves to be, in fact, good.
Of course, the recognition that the Christian life well-lived can serve to establish trust and
reputability on behalf of God and his church is not new to apologetics. The Bible gives
exhortations of the same nature, including from Jesus Christ himself. “In the same way, let your
light shine before others, so that they may see your good works and give glory to your Father
18
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who is in heaven.”19 When Timothy faced a weakness of ethical rhetorical appeal due to his
young age, Paul encouraged, “Let no one despise you for your youth, but set the believers an
example in speech, in conduct, in love, in faith, in purity.”20 Peter also, while not using the
terminology of an ethical rhetorical appeal, notes the importance of a good life in the face of
accusations to the contrary, and that an honorable lifestyle will silence attacks against
Christianity. He writes:
Keep your conduct among the Gentiles honorable, so that when they speak against
you as evildoers, they may see your good deeds and glorify God on the day of
visitation. Be subject for the Lord's sake to every human institution, whether it be to
the emperor as supreme, or to governors as sent by him to punish those who do evil
and to praise those who do good. For this is the will of God, that by doing good you
should put to silence the ignorance of foolish people. Live as people who are free, not
using your freedom as a cover-up for evil, but living as servants of God.21
Not only recent apologetic developments, but also Scripture call for a well-lived life on the part
of Christians to serve as a component of God’s message to the world.
Even with a strong Vocational Apologetics, however, it is not a given that the culture, or at
least broad swaths of the culture, will be significantly swayed. In his book, Hostile Environment,
George Yancey has laid out the challenges that Christians face. He notes that in his experience,
he has found that working with people with racial bias is easier than working with people with a
strong anti-Christian bias, which he calls Christianophobia. Yancey notes that regarding racial
differences people want to find agreement, but those angry at Christians take steps to make
conciliatory communication almost impossible. Yancey therefore has little hope for compromise
with those who hate Christians.22 Yancey acknowledges that Christians do need to strive to live
as Christians, but that alone will not eliminate anti-Christian hatred. He argues that Christians
19
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need to do more than live right,23 which is an acknowledgement that rhetorical appeals need to
work together to create a comprehensive overall presentation. While Yancey argues that those
with Christianophobia will likely not adopt a kinder view of Christians even if they are treated
kindly by Christians, he takes a different tack to arrive at basically the same place. Yancey
argues that Christians must do what is right simply because it is right. If living a good Christian
life brings greater acceptance of Christianity and Christians, that is an added bonus in Yancey’s
view.24
It is important to note, however, that the intended recipient of Vocational Apologetics is
not necessarily the hard-core atheist or the person with severe Christianophobia. Rather,
Vocational Apologetics works on a much more local scale, in the more intimate spheres of
vocational influence where a Christian is already active. Will a Vocational Apologetic approach
convince Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, or Daniel Dennett of the goodness of Christianity?
Almost certainly not.25 Will it change the views of people with Christianophobia about the nature
of Christianity? Yancey finds this to be unlikely, and thus he advocates the Christian life as a
good end to itself rather than an apologetic undertaking. However, can a Vocational Apologetic
approach respond to the questions about Christianity raised by a non-Christian neighbor who has
been influenced to a degree by those with Christianophobia, or who is familiar with the
arguments of the New Atheists, or who is a Christian but has been rattled by the claims of the
23
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New Atheists? I think this is where the apologetic strength of a vocational approach has real
merit and possibility. As has been pointed out through the consideration of Luther’s spheres of
vocation, the closer one is to the center of the of Vocational Apologetic influence, the more
likely one is to see the defense of Christianity thus lived as beneficial.
Yancey seems to arrive a similar position, as he does advocate that Christians should strive
to develop friendships with those with Christianophobia to reduce the animosity felt toward
Christians.26 While he is skeptical of the ability to sway those with Christianophobia, he has
occasionally seen evidence that kindness can moderate some strong emotional reactions against
Christianity.27 Such signs are encouraging.28 He writes:
Willingness to love those who hate us is of paramount importance (Matthew 5:44).
We likely have friends, family members, coworkers and other in our lives with
Christianophobia. Though we may not become close friends, we can still care about
them. If we get an opportunity, we must act in ways that benefit them, whether by
providing resources, advice on issues they will listen to us on, or time and attention,
or by any other way we might serve them. Such service may help them to rethink
their anti-Christian stereotypes and prejudices though this should not be the main
reason for serving them.29
While Yancey again stresses that any outcome or apologetic effort must not be the main reason
for living a Christian life in vocation, he does recognize that within a Christian’s circles of
influence a degree of change can at times be affected. Even without specific reference to a
Christian living in vocation, Yancey references family members, co-workers, and friends, who
constitute the three closest spheres of influence in Vocational Apologetics: family, work, and
public life.
While not thinking in apologetic terms, Einar Billing—a Lutheran theologian writing about
26
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Luther’s thoughts on vocation—noted:
I think each one of us knows some such humble Lutheran Christian who for us has
been a personal gospel. Those who saw him from a distance did not notice it, but they
who stood closer to him felt it in proportion to their intimacy with him, and daily they
praised God for this His gospel.30
Perhaps the New Atheists themselves stand too far away from humble Christians living in
vocation to see the love of Christ lived out in everyday life. But what may not be noticed by the
New Atheists themselves is seen and recognized with rejoicing by the Christian’s neighbor. The
Christian does not need to travel to the far-flung locations of the New Atheists themselves. This
is likely not the vocation of most Christians. However, they are called to model Christ’s love and
service for those around them, in the concrete spheres of vocational influence where God has
already placed them. In these areas where Christians already have a degree of influence in their
families, careers, communities, churches, and the like, they can also have a positive apologetic
influence on a local scale. And perhaps in God’s plan of vocation, that is exactly the way it is
supposed to be.
At various points I have cited research regarding the status of views of Christianity within
culture. Kinnaman and his co-authors, while realistic about the dire state of the church’s
reputation in culture, advocate a strong emphasis on the Christian life as a helpful way forward.
Kinnaman and Lyons write:
Young people said they formed their views of Christians based on conversations with
others, often with Christians. This is significant because not only does it mean we
have a great deal of responsibility in developing many of the perceptions that people
hold, but it also suggests the possibility that our words and our lives can change these
negative images.31
Kinnaman and Lyons return to the theme of the Christian life as a way to address the challenges
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of our current culture in their most recent, book, Good Faith. In this book, Kinnaman and Lyons
argue that in current culture, Christianity is seen as the unlikely combination of being both
irrelevant and extreme.32 In this unlikely combination of descriptors, we see an echo of the
relationship between the rational rhetorical appeal and the ethical rhetorical appeal. The fact that
Christianity is seen as irrelevant is a result of the rejection of the overall rational appeal of
Christianity. This rejection is influenced by the view that Christianity is extreme, which shows
the fundamental problem with the church’s ethical appeal. The moral standing of the church is
called into question, thus leading to the view that Christians are extremists, and as a result the
doctrinal message or the truth claims of Christianity are seen as irrelevant since the Christian has
been dismissed as a reputable representative in society.
Kinnaman and Lyon’s most recent research corroborates the arguments about what kind of
New Atheist challenges to Christianity are taking root in the broader culture. Their studies have
found that “One-quarter of non-Christian Millennials believe the Bible is a ‘dangerous book of
religious dogma that has been used for centuries to oppress people.’”33 Three out of ten
Americans who profess no religious belief say that the church is not a benefit to society, and
another three out of ten non-religious Americans say that they don’t know if the church is of any
benefit or not.34 After a Barna study was published showing an uptick among young people in
Scotland in Christianity, the chairman of the Scottish Secular Society was quoted in the
newspaper as saying, “People now struggle to associate religion with anything other than
conflict, sectarianism, child abuse, homophobia, misogyny, violence, and privilege. Religion is
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now perceived as the catalyst for the horrors we see on our televisions every day.”35 The lifestyle
oriented charges of the New Atheists are not abating, but seem to be taking root in culture.
In response, Kinnaman and Lyons advocate a lifestyle oriented approach for Christians to
regain their cultural footing. Among the topics explored by Kinnaman and Lyons include
neighborliness and relationships.36 They encourage Christians to form households, be faithful in
marriage, and practice hospitality37 along with focusing on parenting.38 Again, the connections to
Luther’s thoughts on Christian Vocation are apparent.
Kinnaman and Lyons stress the importance of the Christian life as a response to the
challenges faced from the current culture, but they miss the apologetic implications of such a
life, since they function with a common, Enlightenment-based, rational understanding of the
apologetic task. They write, “How good faith Christians engage in relationships says more about
the truth of what we believe than all our well-argued apologetics or carefully worded doctrinal
statements.”39 Kinnaman and Lyons separate and distinguish the Christian life from apologetics. I
am arguing that, in fact, how Christians engage in relationships is apologetics. Apologetics can
and should go well beyond the bounds of reason alone in its effort to respond to the many and
varied criticisms of Christianity faced in current culture.
Ultimately, apologetics is not bound to any style or rigid approach. At its heart, apologetics
is a defense, a response to a particular line of criticism. When the line of criticism advanced
against Christianity utilizes a form of argumentation other than a strictly rational appeal, then the
apologetic defense likewise needs to respond using approaches other than sheer logic, reason,
35

Kinnaman and Lyons, Good Faith, 236.

36

Kinnaman and Lyons, Good Faith, 46–47.
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Kinnaman and Lyons, Good Faith, 250.
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Kinnaman and Lyons, Good Faith, 251.
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Kinnaman and Lyons, Good Faith, 154.
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and facts. When the challenges to Christianity are framed as an attack against the moral nature of
the Christian life, then the Christian life—lived in humble service guided by Luther’s teaching
on Christian Vocation—becomes an apologetic in and of itself.
The defense that is given (apologetics) must be tailored to and appropriate for the specific
attack being presented. The current challenges to Christianity include being simultaneously
irrelevant and extremist, with the New Atheist writings sounding the alarm against all forms of
faith as versions of evil, violent extremism. In such a situation, the needed, focused, specifically
tailored apologetic response is not to explain the historicity of the resurrection or the accuracy of
Scripture. The challenges of the culture and of the New Atheists skirt the question of Christian
truth claims and drive instead to the question of the morality of Christianity. When the criticism
of Christianity is not that it is necessarily factually wrong, but that it is not good, the answer is
not just to be right, but also to be good.
Some have suggested that living a good Christian life, such as through Vocational
Apologetics, will not work to convert hard-core atheists to Christianity. That may be true, (in
fact, it certainly is true, as conversion is entirely the work of the Holy Spirit, not the work of any
Christian) but in regards to the apologetic task it is also an irrelevant question. Apologetics goes
wrong, and becomes deservedly much maligned40 when it focuses on the outcome (conversion to
Christianity), instead of being faithful in the defense of the faith in response to specific areas of
attack. Will it “work” in the sense of leading opponents of Christianity to be converted to
Christianity? That is an open (but irrelevant) question. The Christian apologist is not called to
make converts, but to make a defense. Peter admonishes:
40

Even extremely recent works of apologetics continue to note the problem of apologetics being
argumentative and harsh. “Apologetics has a reputation problem. We’re the ones who ‘like to argue.’ We’re the ones
with a need to win. We’re the people who don’t understand people, though we claim to understand everything else.
That may be distorted, but it’s not entirely off the mark … We do have a problem.” Tom Gilson, “Servant
Apologetics,” in A New Kind of Apologist, ed. Sean McDowell (Eugene, OR: Harvest, 2016), 39.
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But even if you should suffer for righteousness' sake, you will be blessed. Have no
fear of them, nor be troubled, but in your hearts honor Christ the Lord as holy, always
being prepared to make a defense to anyone who asks you for a reason for the hope
that is in you; yet do it with gentleness and respect, having a good conscience, so that,
when you are slandered, those who revile your good behavior in Christ may be put to
shame.41
The Christian apologist is simply called to make a defense, gently and respectfully, exhibiting
good behavior as befits the Christian life. That is the apologetic task. The outcome is up to God.
Only he can write the definitive conclusion to the final chapter of apologetics.

41

1 Pt 3:14–16 (ESV).
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